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THE MARPART RESEARCH CONSORTIUM 
The consortium focuses on management, organization and governance of cross-
border collaboration related to emergency operations in the High North. 
The key purpose of the Marpart research consortium is to increase understanding 
of the emergency management challenges in large-scale emergencies in the Arctic 
sea areas. We start with an assessment of the risk related to different types of 
maritime activity in the High North and the implications for the preparedness 
institutions in this region. We focus on cross-institutional and cross-country 
partnerships between preparedness institutions as well as private companies in the 
Arctic region. We elaborate on the operational crisis management of joint 
emergency operations including several parts of the preparedness system and 
resources from several countries. 
We emphasize the responsibility of the governments as to safety, security and 
environmental protection in the High North. Maritime preparedness is defined as 
the system for damage avoidance and reduction related to unexpected and 
unwanted incidents at sea. We elaborate on the need for enhanced measures to 
respond to composite challenges including Search and Rescue (SAR), Oil Spill 
Recovery, firefighting and salvage, and actions against terror or other forms of 
destructive action. To increase both effectiveness and efficiency within the 
preparedness system, we are in need of management tools for coordination and 
control making optimal use of the joint resources of several institutions both 
within and between countries. 
In this project, we take as a starting point the commercial activity in the High 
North and the vulnerability related to human safety, environment, and physical 
installations/vessels. The commercial activity in the High North includes intra- / 
interregional transportation, search for and exploitation of petroleum and mineral 
resources, fisheries, and cruise tourism. Limited infrastructure, low temperatures 
with ice and icing, polar lows and a vulnerable nature, challenge maritime 
operations in this region. 
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MARPART project goals: 
 To increase understanding of future needs for joint operations within a 
preparedness system in the High North including both Search and Rescue, 
Oil Spill Recovery, firefighting and salvage, and actions against terror or 
other forms of destructive action; 
 To provide analytical concepts for studying coordination challenges in 
cross-border, multi-tasking operations; 
 To contribute with organizational concepts for inter-organizational 
partnership and management of joint operations. 
The cross-disciplinary, international research network consists of 16 universities 
and research institutes that focus on emergency management and crisis 
preparedness. The consortium is coordinated by Nord University in Bodø, 
Norway. Universities, police and naval academies and research institutes from 
Norway, Russia, Iceland, Greenland, Denmark and Sweden are now part of the 
Marpart network. In addition, universities from Canada, USA, and Finland are 
part of an extended academic network called UArctic thematic network on Arctic 
Safety and Security. The project partners have established Advisory Boards in 
each country including government preparedness authorities and industry 
representatives. The Marpart projects currently include two interlinked projects: 
Marpart 1 “Maritime Preparedness and International Partnership in the High 
North” and Marpart (2)-MAN “Joint-task Force Management in High North 
Emergency Response”. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report “MARITIME EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS RESOURCES IN 
ARCTIC – CAPACITY CHALLENGES AND THE BENEFITS OF CROSS-
BORDER COOPERATION BETWEEN NORWAY, RUSSIA, ICELAND AND 
GREENLAND” is a result of the Marpart-projects funded by the Arctic 2030 
program of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Nordland County 
Administration, Nord University and the partner institutions. It provides an 
overview of emergency preparedness capacities in the following fields: 
- Search and Rescue (SAR) 
- Oil Spill Response (OSR) 
- Violent Action Response (including anti-terror action). 
The report elaborates on the available physical and personnel capacities in the 
four countries, including stationary facilities, specialized personnel, vessel 
capacities, airborne capacities, and management coordination capacity. It builds 
upon the three earlier reports from the Marpart project emphasizing maritime 
activity and risk aspects in the four countries, as well as the institutional 
framework and agreements both nationally and internationally between those 
countries. 
In this report, we highlight the challenges regarding Arctic maritime preparedness 
capacities for each of the countries based on the findings in the earlier reports, 
analyses, as well as secondary information from each country. We reflect on the 
potential benefits of cross-border collaboration in complex, large scale 
emergencies. 
Response capacities 
Norway 
Norway has the largest maritime traffic in the Arctic in its area of responsibility 
– however, access to emergency preparedness resources is always a challenge. 
This is especially the case in the light of increased activity in the most remote 
regions of the Barents Sea and the Svalbard region, particularly in the autumn and 
winter seasons. The capability for survival onboard distress vessels are currently 
improving since the introduction of the Polar Code. The Polar Code demands for 
more adequate rescue equipment suited for Arctic conditions. It will, however, 
take time for the code to be properly implemented. Furthermore, the Polar Code 
has its limitations with regard to training and exercises. 
Telecommunication is also crucial in large scale emergency response. 
Communication is a challenge, in particular north of 75 degrees where satellite- 
and radio coverage is limited. A specific challenge is found due to the increased 
size of cruise vessels. Additionally, Spitsbergen bound vessels are more often 
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taking routes via remote waters to and from the Greenlandic coast and the 
Northernmost Russian islands. Normal day to day incidents are handled well 
however mass evacuation incidents with several hundred and maybe several 
thousand evacuated people represent a challenge. 
Norway has capacity to mobilize significant SAR resources. However, the 
response time highly depends on air transport capacity, the availability of other 
suitable SAR vessels, coast guard positioning, and distribution of medical 
personnel and hospital capacities from the mainland. Within Search and Rescue, 
Norway has heavily invested in increased capacity. 
Two modern SAR helicopters with distributed fuel depots and a government hired 
supply vessel with SAR capacities are currently located at Longyearbyen. 16 new 
AWSAR helicopters are introduced during the next couple of years for the 
mainland stations with an option for six more. The Norwegian Coast Guard is also 
introducing new high capacity helicopters dedicated for the coast guard vessels. 
Three new coast guard vessels for the Barents Sea are commissioned and will be 
built during the next five years period. For the Svalbard region, SAR equipment 
including a field hospital is stored at Longyearbyen, where a large number of 
volunteers from the Red Cross represent a significant reinforcement of capacity.  
In addition, the operating commercial actors and especially the oil and gas 
industry are obliged by law to have further emergency response capacities. That 
means added capacity for both SAR and Oil Spill Response along the Norwegian 
coast, including the Barents Sea. 
The Joint Rescue Coordination Centers (JRCC) have a central position when it 
comes to Norway’s preparedness efforts. They are focusing strongly on 
competence, innovation and international SAR cooperation. The police in 
Nordland, Troms and Finnmark police districts and the Governor of Svalbard are 
also focusing on similar developments. The coast guard has, among other 
capabilities, special competences to perform the role as an On Scene Coordinator 
and function as a link to the JRCC. 
JRCC Northern Norway maintains close dialogue with the RCCs of neighboring 
countries, including MRCC Murmansk. Norwegian helicopters have performed 
several SAR missions in Russian waters. There are also some exercises run by 
various authorities, such as the joint SAR and oil spill exercise between Norway 
and Russia. Yet, two committees under the Ministry of Justice and Preparedness 
have concluded that there is still limited analytical capacity for gap analyses and 
too little efforts towards joint training and exercise programs in Norway. 
The Oil Spill Response resources are operated by various organizations: the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA), the Norwegian Clean Seas 
Association for Operating Companies (NOFO), the municipalities (IUA), 
refineries, terminals, ports and private businesses. While private level needs to 
directly deal with acute pollution on site, the municipal level can provide 
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personnel and equipment to deal with smaller acute spills. NCA has the main 
responsibilty for the governmental preparedness against acute pollution, and to 
take the lead in larger incidents. 
NCA is active in facilitating cross-border cooperation in the Arctic, for example 
within the Arctic Council working group for Emergency Preventation, 
Preparedness and Response (EPPR). The combined capacity of government and 
NOFO resources makes Norway well equipped when it comes to heavy oil 
recovery equipment. However, oil recovery in rough weather with high waves, 
strong currents, icing and ice is still a significant challenge. Also, significant 
traffic of heavy fuel oil fueled vessels, including cruise vessels to and from 
Svalbard may present a challenge. An increasing transit traffic of crude oil tankers 
from Northern Russia and Barents Sea oil fields are another aspect of concern. 
With the above in mind, cooperation between NCA and the Russian Maritime 
Rescue Services is highly important. Norwegian authorities are prepared to call 
for Host Nation Support (HNS) capacity, and Norwegian and Russian authorities 
have a close cooperation both on SAR and Oil Spill Response.  These relations 
are partly based on international agreements, and the bilateral agreement between 
Norway and Russia on SAR and Oil Spill Response calling for annual exercises. 
With regards to Violent Action Response, Norway’s response regime is based on 
police authority and regulated according to the procedures for Ongoing Life-
threatening Violence (PLIVO). PLIVO is a joint procedure for the emergency 
services, under the command of the police. For anti-terror operations, additional 
rules and regulations are used. Norway may mobilize both police special task 
forces as well as the military special forces. Challenges have been seen with a 
complicated mobilization process and limited helicopter capacities, hampering 
the response time. This problem has been dealt with during the last few years, 
with increased capacities both for the police special forces and the military. 
Especially when it comes to offshore anti-terror operations, the military resources 
play a special reinforcement role. Within both European police agreements and 
the NATO system, Norway has a broad network of intelligence available. During 
the recent years, contact between Norwegian police and Russian border guard 
FSB has increased with frequent exchange of critical information. 
Russia 
In Russia, the most important capacities are the capacities of the maritime rescue 
coordination centers, the Marine Rescue Service (Morspassluzhba), the Northern 
Expeditionary Unit of rescue and salvage operations, the Boarder Guard of 
Federal Security Service (FSB), EMERCON, the Search and Rescue 
Administration of the Northern Fleet, and regional SAR capacities. 
Also in Russia, the availability of adequate resources and mobilization time is a 
challenge. A program introduced for modernization of SAR and Oil Spill 
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Response vessels will increase this capacity. This is especially true for the private 
resources of the offshore oil and gas industry. 
The fleet of Morspassluzhba has lately been updated. Rosmorrechflot is updating 
41 vessels by 2020. EMERCOM which is responsible within the 12 miles 
maritime zone, is also advised to further update their fleet and airborne resources.  
A challenge is the coordination of resources across institutional borders. 
Cooperation on information sharing between the Air Northern Fleet which is a 
unit of the Navy SAR, as well as coordinators in Murmansk is in needed. 
Communication challenges are present in Russian maritime SAR. According to 
the legislation of the Russian Federation, aircrafts and sea vessels use different 
frequency bands and have problems communicating directly. Furthermore, the 
quality of long distance radio wave communication needs to become more robust. 
The authorities in charge of coordination of oil spill preparedness capacities are 
similarly diverse as they are with SAR. They include federal executive bodies 
(Rosmorechflot and its branches, Energy Ministry, EMERCOM, Federal Fishery 
Agency, etc.), regional executive bodies, local self-government bodies, and 
private companies. Regional vessels, state facilities as well as multipurpose 
facilities of the RF Ministry of transport etc. are available. Further development 
efforts should be focused on improved cooperation between the state and industry 
resources. 
When it comes to Violent Action Response in Russia, there are five national legal 
regimes with different responsibilities. The Western Arctic Area includes the 
Barents Sea and the high Arctic border region between Svalbard and Franz Josef’s 
land. The Frontier Service of FSB is the body to implement border protection at 
sea. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) line departments of water transport in 
the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions are in charge of counteracting any 
criminal activity in the coastal region. 
Due to limited helicopter capacity, fast response with adequate resources in 
remote areas in the Northern Russia represents a challenge. Other vessels in the 
northermost regions including the Nothern fleet can be used as a resource. 
However, due to the many organizations involved and hierarchical layers of 
decision-making, mobilization of larger resources may take time. 
Iceland 
In Iceland, SAR operational capacity focuses mainly on response to vessel 
incidents within Iceland’s Exclusive Economic Zone involving fishing vessels 
and cargo ships. Multilateral collaboration with authorities from Denmark, Faroe 
Island, Norway etc. are essential in case of larger incidents, for example cruise 
ship accidents. The mobilization of adequate SAR resources is therefore a 
challenge. The preparedness system is mainly based on the Icelandic Coast 
Guard’s three patrol vessels and two helicopters on continuous standby. An ICG 
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surveillance aircraft frequently participates in financed missions abroad, up to six 
months a year. Response to fire at sea would be much more effective if resources 
with class 1 firefighting system would be available and fire fighters trained for 
maritime rescue of people. 
The Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources is in charge of pollution 
prevention, fire prevention and fire brigades. The ICG’s vessel Þór is equipped 
with a 300 m oil boom and an oil skimmer. It is the only patrol vessel in the region 
that has oil recovery equipment needed to maintain control of a larger oil spill 
situation until further assistance arrives. It could take many days for vessels with 
sufficient towing capacity to arrive from Norway or from continental Europe. 
When it comes to Violent Action Response, Iceland has no military, but has “soft 
security” cooperation arrangements. The Minister of Justice is responsible for 
Maritime Security and the police has a special force with anti-terrorist training in 
maritime situations. 
Being a small country, Iceland has altogether very limited resources taking into 
consideration the considerable traffic activity in its area of responsibility. Host 
Nation Support is a crucial aspect for Iceland. 
Greenland 
In Greenland, the main challenge is the vast area of responsibility, lack of 
infrastructure in the small communities and the distance to mainland resources in 
Denmark. The responsibility for SAR and oil spill is shared between the Joint 
Arctic Command of the Danish Navy and the Greenlandic government. The Joint 
Arctic Command provides an overall picture of the maritime situation in 
Greenland waters by utilising satellite surveillance of maritime activity and 
environmental pollution. This endeavour is partly based on cooperation and 
information sharing between Canada, Norway, Iceland, the USA and Denmark. 
A limited number of navy vessels and helicopters are available in Greenlandic 
waters. Greenland is therefore heavily dependent on civilian resouces, among 
others mobilization of civilian helicopters, and samaritan vessels at sea. 
A limited amount of Oil Spill Response equipment is available in Nuuk and in 
Aasiaat. It is still a question on how fast the equipment can arrive at other possible 
waste sites. More equipment dedicated for Greenland is located at depots in 
Denmark. 
Violent Action Response is the responsibility of the Danish police. Special police 
units for anti-terror are located in Denmark. 
In total, Greenland has very limited preparedness resources in every area of 
response. It is heavily dependent on transport of resources from Denmark and 
neighboring countries. With an increased tourist activity, including a significant 
number of cruise ships, the challenges may increase over the next years. 
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SAR-response cooperation 
The analyzed capacity challenges connected to the Arctic operational context and 
the management challenges within the four countries call for stronger cross-
border cooperation focus and not the least more realistic training based on the new 
scenarios appearing. The changes in traffic patterns with more all-year cruise ship 
activity in remote waters, fishing fleets operating close to the ice ridge, and more 
dangerous goods transport from Russiand and Norwegian oil and gas fields in the 
North call for a significant emphasis on and analyses of future capacity needs. 
None of the countries included in this report have adequate resources for major 
incidents outside the more densely populated mainland regions. How large the 
gaps are, is difficult to estimate because most countries lack systematic 
evaluations based on defined risk areas, clear response objectives and capacity 
assessments. 
However, there is increasing interest and development happening within 
international forums. The Arctic Council with working groups such as EPPR 
(hosting the SAR and MER Expert Group) and PAME-Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment provide an arena for analysis and information exchange. 
Also, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum represent a platform for further cooperation 
on routines for coordination and control, operational tasks and competence 
sharing. Both arenas should be followed up by central governments. 
The governments should also provide programs for frequent visits, exchange and 
development of joint plans, systems and procedures. Personnel exchange and 
shared exercises – both full scale, functional and table top – are in demand as 
means to improve cooperation as well as understanding of each other’s capacities. 
The annual bilateral Norwegian-Russian “Exercise Barents” on SAR and Oil Spill 
Response has a potential for further development both in including more countries 
and more challenging exercise areas and contents. 
Increased studies of each organizations’ operational culture, shared operational 
systems and IT- tools may also provide a more fluent coordination of resources. 
Each nations’ military preparedness system, including the navy and air forces, 
represent significant capacity. However, we know too little abouth their capacities 
and mobilization times, and they should be more involved in joint exchange and 
competence programs. Efforts to make the military resources more available for 
civilian purposes may be a great opportunity in the High North. Furthermore, the 
capacity of private cooperation including oil and gas, cruise industry and other 
maritime activity should be further assessed for preparedness operations to give 
more insights on avaiability, mobilization time and potential capacity. 
For all countries there is a challenge with silo thinking and fragmented 
responsibility between institutions, companies and organization. Reflections on 
linking up organizations more closely, exchange and overlap of tasks, and close 
cooperation on strategic, operational and tactical levels are in demand. 
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Oil Spill Response cooperation 
For major oil spills in the High Arctic, the capacities are in general limited. 
Preparedness is costly. The Oil Spill Response equipment has limitations for 
operation in heavy wave and current, and not the least ice and icing contexts. The 
mobilization time for heavy equipment is long.  Most countries have a very 
limited amount of offshore Oil Spill Response booms and collectors, as well as 
OSR vessels. Norway is an exception, especially due to the capacities and 
developments of the oil and gas industry. The transport and mobilization capacity 
represent a significant challenge for this type of heavy equipment. A large-scale 
spill will in most cases have significant negative consequences and long term 
ripple effects. Legislation as to dangerous goods and fuel types and increased 
preparedness capacities of industries in the Arctic also within pollution response 
are in demand. 
There is a need for joint research to develop better methods for separation of oil, 
ice and water. Additionally, further development of the coordination of 
preparedness capacities is needed. It is crucial that equipment from several 
countries can be transported to the maritime spill area quickly and efficiently in 
case of an incident. 
For areas closer to shore, also cooperation with voluntary organizations should be 
enhanced. This may increase capability and potentially availability of capacity in 
large scale maritime operations throughout the whole preparedness value chain. 
More education and training for voluntary groups in the Arctic communities could 
be at hand, as among others the Red Cross has shown. 
Violent Action Response cooperation 
When it comes to Violent Action Response, all individual country sections of this 
report highlight the potential benefits of further bilateral and international 
cooperation of Violent Action Response capacities, yet in some cases political 
conditions for sharing information have to be considered. There is a strong 
European cooperation on intelligence exchange in case of terror, however there 
has not been much focus on maritime based activity. Joint exercises should be 
considered between the police and border guard special forces in the Barents Sea 
region. As much of the activities of the police and military anti-terror capacities 
are classified, cooperation across borders is a challenge. This is especially true for 
cooperation between Norwegian and Russian forces. However, the coast guard, 
the border guards, and the police in Norway and Russia are cooperating well on a 
day to day and ad hoc basis if it is a matter of Violent Action Response. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
MARPART report 4 seeks to present an overview of maritime directed 
preparedness capacities in the fields of Search and Rescue (SAR), Oil Spill 
Response (OSR) and Violent Action Response (including anti-terror action) 
available in the northern areas of Norway, Russia, Iceland and Greenland 
(Denmark) for maritime operations. The ealier reports of the Marpart-project 
show a change in maritime activity with a larger number of both passengers and 
amount of dangerous goods transport.  Accidents, especially in the coldest waters 
may have severe consequences and may lead to a significant risk for human lives 
and the environment, especially in remote and isolated areas. Response time and 
type of resouces may vary due to long distances to base and limited emergency 
response capacities. Therefore, there is a need for better knowledge about 
emergency preparedness resource capacities and how to facilitate smooth cross-
institutional and cross-border support. Helicopters, aircrafts, ships, equipment and 
personnel capacity from many organizations and companies also call for efficient 
management. This report gives a substantial overview of the preparedness 
capacities in the four countries, and discusses potential challenges in capacities 
and opportunities for adding resources through cross—border cooperation. 
The data within this report is based on the material provided by the preparedness 
institutions, analytical reports, articles and interviews. Data sources include 
analyses on preparedness capacities, reports on assessments of preparedness 
capacities, and reports after emergency exercises revealing challenges related to 
capacities, accident reports and interviews. 
Each of the four countries starts their report with the description of the national 
institutional preparedness capacities, which include physical resources that the 
main preparedness institutions have at present or in some cases which are to be 
invested in. The main resources include helicopters, aircrafts, vessels, 
communication and navigation resources, rescue and Oil Spill Response 
equipment, personnel, medical services etc. available for the different sea regions. 
The next subsection highlights particularly the potential challenges in the 
preparedness capacities and challenges of the capacities in this region. Finally, 
reflections on the need for cooperation and opportunities for solving capacity 
problems through cross-border cooperation are discussed. 
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2 NORWAY’S PREPAREDNESS CAPACITIES, CHALLENGES 
AND NEED FOR COOPERATION BY NATALIA ANDREASSEN, 
JOHANNES SCHMIED AND ODD JARL BORCH 
2.1 PREPAREDNESS CAPACITIES 
2.1.1 Search and Rescue capacities 
Norway’s maritime SAR responsibility goes beyond its territorial-, economic- and 
fishing zones and comprises a very extensive area roughly extending from 57 
degrees north all the way up to the North pole along from the zero meridian and 
to  35° East (Barentswatch 2013). In North-east, the border is towards Russia, in 
the North-West the border is towards Iceland and Greenland. 
The largest industry players such as the oil and gas industry have their own SAR 
capacity. In the Norwegian and Norwegian part of the Barents Sea there are 
capacities built up to match the defined risk areas related to the exploration and 
exploitation activity.  
According to a report by the Norwegian Maritime Authority (Norwegian 
Maritime Authority 2014), the Norwegian SAR preparedness system has 
experienced around 500 registered incidents on commercial vessels per year 
between 2009 and 2014. Half of the incidents have involved person injury or 
deaths, and the other half have been incidents with ship damage. Within these 6 
years a total of 89 people (out of 1639 total incidents with injury or deaths) died. 
In addition, there has been a large amount of leisure boat incidents with casualties 
involving almost 200 people in the same period. Marpart Project Report 2 on 
“maritime activity and risk patterns in the High North” gives a deeper insight and 
further statistics on these issues (Borch et al. 2016a). 
Larger incidents with vessels come in more irregular intervals and then SAR 
capacities need to be available and on point. Special concern is often raised for 
SAR incidents on large passenger vessels such as cruise ships. Incidents in highly 
remote areas off the coast are deemed critical. 
Another very difficult SAR incident will be in case of nuclear accidents and 
radiation. The JRCC then has to link up to the Norwegian Radiation Protection 
Authority and the Crisis Committee for Nuclear Preparedness. The Crisis 
Committee consists of representatives from key government offices, who have a 
special responsibility for a sector in the management of a nuclear or radiological 
event with the responsibility for implementing protective measures. 
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2.1.1.1 The Joint Rescue Coordination Centers and the Rescue Management 
Board 
The Norwegian Rescue service carries out the Norwegian duty according to the 
relevant international SAR agreements. The most relevant SAR agreements for 
maritime and aeronautical SAR are especially the International Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR), International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS)-code. Others are the STCW Convention – International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers, the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (STCW-F), the recent Polar 
Code, as well as other IMO conventions with indirect relevance to SAR and 
standards by standardization societies. In general, the UN law of the sea 
(UNCLOS) is important with respect to responsibilities in cross-boundary 
coordination of SAR incidents. Marpart Report 3 (Elgsaas & Offerdal, 2018) 
gives detailed insights on the most relevant agreements. 
The two Norwegian Joint Rescue Coordination Centers (JRCC) are responsible 
for coordinating SAR action in Norway at both sea, land and air. The Royal 
Decree of 19 June 2015 gives the formal instructions for the public rescue services 
and explain in detail the organisation, tasks and responsibilities of the Joint 
Rescue Coordination Centers (JRCC) (chapter 2) and the rescue sub-centers 
(chapter 3) (FOR-2015-06-19-677). The JRCCs are administrative agencies under 
the authority of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Ministry of Justice 
and Public Security Norway 2013). 
The two Joint Rescue Coordination Centers (JRCC) serve as Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Center (MRCC) and Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Center 
(ARCC). One is located in Stavanger (JRCC South-Norway) and is responsible 
for SAR activity below 65 degrees north, where there is a border between Nord-
Trøndelag and Nordland. JRCC North-Norway is located in Bodø and is 
responsible for Northern Norway above 65 degrees, hence also for the Arctic 
maritime regions. 
On the regional level, the JRCCs work closely with regional Rescue Sub-centres 
(RSC) led by the chiefs of Police in the regional Police districts. For rescue 
operations on shore, the JRCCs normally monitor the operation, and delegate the 
responsibility for the coordination of the rescue operation to the RSCs located in 
the operations centers of the local Police district. The Norwegian police districts 
have recently been re-organized into 12 regional police districts (13 including 
Svalbard). Each police district is responsible for the management of the overall 
emergency response resources within their area of jurisdiction. The JRCCs 
support the operation by providing rescue helicopters or other relevant SAR 
resources which are not available in the Police district. Most of the land SAR 
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operations are coordinated from the 13 RSCs which are connected to the 
following police districts in Norway: Agder, Finnmark, Innlandet, Møre og 
Romsdal, Nordland, Oslo, Sør-Vest, Sør-Øst, Troms, Trøndelag, Vest, Øst, and 
the RSC connected to the governor of Svalbard. The RSCs are on the daily basis 
managed by the local police stations and their chiefs, but are under the JRCCs 
chain of command when involved in SAR. For SAR operations in the Svalbard 
area, the RSC of the Svalbard County Governor has the same responsibility as the 
RSCs in the local police districts on the Norwegian mainland. JRCC North-
Norway monitors and provides reinforcements from the Norwegian mainland if 
necessary (JRCC Norway 2016). 
Currently the JRCCs and the RSCs are aiming to increase the interaction with 
each other, to increase the role of JRCC as auditor as well as to support the RSCs 
in their operations. In terms of cooperation with each other, they comprise now of 
a joint management system for information, joint operational plans and data-
storage and replication (JRCC Norway 2016). 
In major incidents, the chiefs of police in Bodø and Sola act as the leaders of the 
Rescue Management Boards of the JRCCs (see figure below). In this role they 
report directly to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, and not to the 
directorate of the Police as they do in their role as chief of their Police districts. 
The National SAR Management Board consists of representatives of various 
authorities that coordinate the national emergency preparedness and response – 
the Armed Forces, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Norwegian Coastal 
Administration, the Norwegian Maritime Directorate, the National 
Communications Authority, the Norwegian Directorate of Health and the 
Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection. 
 
Figure 1: The Rescue Management Boards of the JRCCs (Jamtli, 2017) 
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The JRCCs aim to increase the quality of cooperation with all rescue resources. 
As such they highlight their role as a hub when it comes to the Cooperation 
Principle both with national and international agencies and companies. Actions 
include experience seminars, rescue conferences, the national rescue council 
(NRR) and as organizer and participating in rescue exercises (JRCC Norway 
2016). 
The centers, which have an operations room each, have the capacities to unite 
their resources if necessary, or they may take over each other’s SAR operation if 
needed. The JRCCs have at their disposal the dedicated AWSAR helicopters, and 
may mobilize whatever resources they find necessary including military forces 
and support from other countries. 
According to the Norwegian JRCC annual report of 2016, JRCC North Norway 
has had 22 employees and JRCC South Norway has had 26 employees. The report 
states that strengthening the strategic level including administrative personnel and 
staff-functions is in priority. However lately they had to put focus on ensuring 
enough staff to lead the rescue operations (JRCC Norway 2016). 
When it comes to large-scale incidents in the Arctic, the JRCC North-Norway has 
long-lasting connections with the SAR agencies in the neighboring Arctic 
countries. As soon as human life is at risk, and with the existence of a relevant 
SAR agreement (bilateral, multilateral, International), the JRCC in accordance 
with these agreements may directly request assistance from the other countries’ 
SAR-services. Several agreements on Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the 
Arctic Ocean, the Agreement on Search and Rescue for persons in distress in the 
Barents Sea - October 1995, the Agreement on Oil Spill Response in the Barents 
Sea between Norway and Russia - April 1994 are important when it comes to 
capacities. These agreements connect the JRCC North Norway with the capacities 
of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) Murmansk/Russia, the 
Russian Northern Fleet and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) including 
Russian Coast Guard duties. The annual Exercise Barents is important for the 
relation between Norway and Russia with SAR practice at sea. Similarly, Exercise 
Barents Rescue connects the Norwegian agencies with Russian, Swedish and 
Finish SAR-actors and their capacities when it comes to land operations (JRCC 
Norway 2016). 
When the SAR operation extends beyond national capacities and assistance is 
needed from abroad, the responsible authority in Norway has to make a formal 
request. In case of SAR there is a possibility to contact Alarm helpline 24/7 of the 
Joint Rescue Coordination Centers. The JRCCs can also request international 
assistance from neighboring countries. In SAR situations the JRCC or the 
Regional Rescue Sub-centres (RSC) can request assistance directly from other 
countries' SAR services in accordance with existing agreements and principles. 
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2.1.1.2 SAR at Svalbard  
The Governor of Svalbard has police jurisdiction and leads the RSC in conducting 
SAR operations on shore. Maritime SAR operations and major emergencies will 
be coordinated by JRCC NN. The Governor of Svalbard has at his disposal both 
helicopter and vessel capacities. 
The Governor of Svalbard (Sysselmannen) has available a modern 89 meter long 
supply vessel ice-class 1b which is located in the Longyearbyen area including 
Svalbard, Bjørnøya and Hopen from early spring to the autumn (9 months of the 
year). The vessel “Polarsyssel” is supporting the preparedness body of the region. 
It has a movable helicopter deck, fire fighting equipment, and good 
accommodation capacity. Particularly in consideration of cruise ship scenarios its 
capability of towing vessels is useful (Sysselmannen på Svalbard 2016). 
The Governor of Svalbard also has available two Super Puma AS332L1 AWSAR 
helicopters. They have 250nm operational radius and there are several helicopter 
fuel depots around the Svalbard area for extended range. Also, there are two 
Dornier Do-228 airplanes stationed at Svalbard. These resources are also central 
during maritime and aeronautical SAR when JRCC North-Norway is in charge of 
the operation and RSC Svalbard supports. 
2.1.1.3 Coast Guard 
The Coast Guard is part of the Norwegian Armed Forces and belongs to the Royal 
Navy. However, the coast guard has its own law, the law of the Norwegian Coast 
Guard, and serves the civilian government in several fields. According to the law 
of the Coast Guard (Ministry of Defence Norway 1997) the Coast Guard has a 
role in Rescue Operations stating that the coast guard are to participate in SAR 
operations in case of danger and risk situations at sea. 
Together with the rescue helicopters, the Coast Guard is the most important SAR 
platform at sea, especially when it comes to large scale incidents. The Coast Guard 
resources are particularly important when it comes to operations in ice infested 
waters, with the use of their ice breaker class vessel KV Svalbard, and the ice 
strengthened Nordkapp-class. The homeport for all the vessels is at the Norwegian 
Coast Guard Base in Sortland, Northern Norway. The Coast Guard has the 
following capacities: 
 NoCGV Harstad – The ship is equipped for SAR, Oil Spill Response, 
towing and fire fighting. It has long range capacity and crew of 22+ people. 
It is used as supply vessel for stations at Jan Mayen, Hopen and Bjørnøya. 
 NoCGV Svalbard – icebreaker and offshore patrol vessel. It is especially 
relevant for high arctic waters because it has Icebreaker class. CGV 
Svalbard is currently the heaviest Norwegian Coast Guard ship with a crew 
of 48+ persons. It is mostly used in the Svalbard area and suitable for 
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sovereignty asserting, resource control, Search and Rescue, Oil Spill 
Response, diver assistance and towing. 
 NoCGV Ålesund – KV Ålesund is normally operating only south of 
Norwegian Arctic. It has a 22+ crew size. 
 NoCGV Barentshav-class of offshore patrol vessels – These vessels were 
especially constructed for the Norwegian Coast Guard duties and are most 
relevant for Oil Spill Response, towing and fire fighting. They have 23+ 
crew size. 
 NoCGV Nordkapp- class of offshore patrol vessels –KV Senja, KV 
Nordkapp and KV Andenes  are operative certified until 2020. They have 
60+ crew size and are well prepared for Northern waters and equipped with 
hangar and helicopter deck. 
 5x NoCGV Nornen-class of offshore patrol vessels – These vessels 
support Police and customs according to Coast Guard Law. They are long 
range ships with good towing capabilities. 
 2x NoCGV Reine-class of offshore patrol vessels – These vessels operate 
along the coastline and assist cooperative agencies like the police, customs, 
the Directorate of Fisheries and other public agencies. The vessel KNM 
«Olav Tryggvason» is used as training vessel. They have 32+ crew size 
(Ministry of Defence of Norway) 
All the Coast Guard vessels can support the JRCC as On Scene Coordinator in 
SAR, OSR and ship-accidents.  
Every year the Coast Guard releases information on the quantity and structure of 
their human resources (as part of the military year’s report). Coast Guard’s 
personnel counted 724 persons in 2016 (Ministry of Defence Norway 2016).  
Due to the law of the Coast Guard, certain Norwegian Coast Guard staff has to be 
particularly trained with respect to policing. They also have education and 
frequent training as On Scene Coordinators during incidents. This includes being 
a resource for providing On Scene Coordinator and support roles, Air Coordinator 
roles, and rescue coordination with triage as well as evacuation capacities on their 
vessels. Even though not specified, these tasks are often a task for a team of 
several persons at each level in larger operations. The main tasks of the 
coordinators are to assess the scope of the incident, analysing the need for 
resources to prevent and avoid the impact of incident, communicate with 
emergency units, contribute to decision-making process related to recourse 
coordination, logging data about all facts and activities, and summarizing and 
evaluating data for reporting to other units. With their well-equipped bridges, 
long-established internal manuals which go beyond the regular “Norwegian Coast 
Guard preparedness manual” and the substantial experience of the captains and 
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officers, the Coast Guard should be seen as a major resource for cooperation on 
scene (tactical coordination)1.  
2.1.1.4 The Royal Norwegian Navy 
The JRCCs or the police may also mobilize resources from the rest of the 
Norwegian Navy. Different types of vessels are available along the Norwegian 
coast, even though the mobilization time may vary. The navy has the following 
resources that may be included in SAR operations: 
 5x Fregates – Fridtjof Nansen-class 
The five frigates have high capacity for SAR operations including 
helicopter capacity and advanced surveillance capacity including long 
range radars and communication capacities. They are well manned and may 
operate for a long time. The speed is 26 knots, and the crew size is 120+. 
The vessels may accommodate a large amount of rescued people on board, 
and have hospital and medical personnel onboard. 
 6x Coastal Corvettes Skjold-class 
These very mobile and fast vessel with 60 knots max speed, is well suited 
for SAR operations and support close to coastal areas. It has IR-camera 
equipment and has 20+ in crew size. 
 6x mine-clearance vessels 
Three minesweepers (Alta-class) and three mine-hunting vessels (Oksøy-
class) have speed of 23 knots and their crew size is 32+.  
2.1.1.5 The Royal Norwegian Air Force 
The resources of the Norwegian Air Force include surveillance planes and fighter 
jets with advanced sensors that may be used for search operations, helicopters for 
Search and Rescue, and transport planes for transport of equipment and personnel. 
The Royal Norwegian Air Force is also responsible for operating the Sea King 
rescue helicopters coordinated by the JRCCs (Ministry of Defence Norway s.a.). 
The Rescue helicopter service 
 The 330-Squadron 
The 330-squadron of the Military Helicopter Service has been the biggest 
squadron in Norway, especially when it comes to air support in maritime SAR. 
The helicopters are owned by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and 
operated by the Norwegian Air Force. There are five bases which are located in 
Sola, Rygge, Ørland, and in the Arctic cities of Banak and Bodø. The resources 
bases have 15 (25) min. preparedness 24/7/365. 
                                                          
1 From an observation report of Sarex Spitzbergen see also:(Solberg et al. 2016) 
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Figure 2: 330 Squadron bases (Forsvaret, 2018) 
12x Sea King Helicopter – Sea King is operational in Norway since 1973. 
However they are being replaced by the AW101 according to NAWSARH. Crew 
size is of 6 persons: 2 pilots, engineer, systems operator, rescuer and 
anaesthesiologist. The capacity is to carry up to 18 passengers or 6 stretchers. 
16x AW101 Helicopter – The Augusta/Westland AW101 will between 2018 and 
2020 replace the Sea King helicopters’ role as the rescue helicopter. According to 
information from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the first helicopters 
will be tested between  November 2017 and November 2018 (JRCC North-
Norway 2017). They require a crew of 6 persons and can carry 25 passengers and 
have a reach of 500 kilometres. 
They are able to rescue 20 people up to 150 nm outside of the Norwegian coastline 
within 2 hours. Also medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) should be provided for 
two persons within 400 nm outside of the coastline. In addition, the whole coastal 
area and land area shall be covered. 
339 Squadron. The 339 squadron has 2 bases which are located in Rygge and 
Bardufoss. Their resources are used for multiple purposes including SAR over 
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land and close to the coast. These helicopters have very limited maritime SAR 
capability 
18x Bell 412 SP Helicopter. The 412 SP may be used for SAR and as mobile 
command stations. Maximum flying time is 4,5 hours with extra tank. Crew size 
of 2 plus potential space for doctor, rescuer or coordinator (Ministry of Defence 
of Norway). 
134 Air Wing, 139 Air Wing, 337 Squadron. The squadron is based at 
Bardufoss Air Station and operates eight NH90 helicopters. The helicopters are 
used by the Norwegian Coast Guard and serve on the Nordkapp-class, the 
Barentshav-class and on NoCGV Svalbard. 
14x NH90 Helicopter – These helicopters are dedicated to maritime operations 
and divided between the largest coast guard vessels and the frigates.  Their tasks 
include SAR, medical evacuation, anti-submarine and terror control as well as 
surveillance. Operation time is of over 4 hours and they have capacity of 16 
passengers. At present  (2018), only a few of these helicopters are operative 
(Ministry of Defence Norway s.a.). 
335 Squadron. The 335-squadron is based in Oslo-Gardemoen and all of the 
larger long-haul cargo aircrafts with relevance to SAR are located there. 
- 4x C-130J Hercules Airplane – Provides tactical transport and support to 
logistics and can also be used for emergency situations. (Ministry of 
Defence Norway s.a.) 
331, 332 Squadrons. These squadrons are operating the fighter aircraft which 
may also be used as observation flights within large scale incidents. Resources 
include: 
- 55x F-16 fighter aircraft – There are always two F-16 Quick Reaction 
Alert (QRA) on 15 minutes mobilization time in Northern Norway. They 
may provide observation flights with information of the incident site. These 
resources will be replaced by the F35.  
- 52x F-35 fighter aircraft – They will be established from 2017 until 2025. 
They also have only 15 minutes mobilization time and replace the old F-16 
fighter aircrafts. They may provide observation flight information of 
incident site. 
333 Squadron: 
- 6x P-3 Orion – Orion are maritime long haul patrol aircraft stationed at 
Andøya. They have been an important resource for border control but also 
SAR operations and information gathering and transport of eg. SKAD 
(Survival Kit Air Dropable) and two Rescue floats are possible. They 
have 8000 kilometres reaching distance.  These planes will be replaced by 
P8 Poseidon planes with more advanced sensors. 
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717 Squadron 
- 3x DA-20 Jet Falcon Airplane – DA-20 provide passenger transport, 
radar and navigation supports. (Ministry of Defence Norway s.a.). 
2.1.1.6 National Air Ambulance Services of Norway  
The Air Ambulance Services which are owned by Helse Nord RHF, Helse Midt-
Norge RHF, Helse Vest RHF and Helse Sør-Øst RHF provide advanced 
emergency medical transportation between the hospitals, especially for 
specialized treatment. As such, they represent an important part of the 
preparedness logistics system taking care of injured persons from the sea 
accidents. Also, they employ smaller ambulance helicopters that can be utilized 
for land area SAR operations. All helicopters are staffed with a pilot, one rescue 
crew/HEMS Crew Member and anesthesiologist/emergency doctor. The 
helicopters are equipped with advanced medical equipment and have room to 
transport two stretcher patients.  
Also, there are ambulance airplanes for transport of patients and carrying of 
advanced medical equipment (Luftambulansetjenesten s.a.).  
Norsk Luftambulanse AS which has helicopters and focuses more on seasonal 
preparedness and arranged emergency preparedness for events 
(NorskLuftambulanse s.a.). 
The Air Ambulance Services have nine ambulance airplanes which are available 
between Kirkenes, Alta, Tromsø, Bodø, Brønnøysund, Ålesund and Gardermoen. 
Alta and Gardemoen have two additional aircraft. Eleven locations (Tromsø, 
Brønnøysund, Trondheim, Ålesund, Førde, Bergen, Stavanger, Arendal, Ål, 
Lørenskog and Dombås) have twelve ambulance helicopters in service. 
Lørenskog has two helicopters (Luftambulansetjenesten s.a.). 
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Figure 3: National Air Ambulance Services of Norway 
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2.1.1.7 The Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue (RS) 
The Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue (RS) is a Norway wide, non-profit 
humanitarian organisation owned by its members providing rescue capacities 
along the Norwegian coast. This includes vessels, equipment and personnel. RS 
is part of the International Maritime Rescue Federation (IMRF) with resources 
and therefore has the potential for cooperation with members in 112 organizations 
in 48 countries. 
The RS have 50 rescue vessels and 4 ambulance boats stationed along the 
Norwegian coast. Of these, 25 rescue vessels and 4 ambulance boats are 
professionally manned and 25 rescue vessels are manned by 1.300 volunteers. 
They are most of the time equipped with water/foam fire pumps, thermal cameras, 
night lights and first aid. Sizes are mostly in the range around 10 to 20+ passengers 
and the crew sizes are around 3-4 people. In total, RS has around 1.500 rescuers. 
RS accounts the following locations and boats to their fleet in the North (from 
Brønnøysund north) (Redningsskøytene s.a.): 
Table 1: Resources of the Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue (Redningsskøytene s.a.) 
Vesseltype Vessel Location Specifications 
Fosen-klassen RS 150 Odin Havøysund 29 knots speed, 600nm reach,  
Simrad-klassen RS 145 Vekteren Alta 36 knots speed, 165nm reach 
Simrad-klassen RS 144 Uni Helgeland RSRK Brønnøysund 36 knots speed, 165nm reach 
Petter C.G. Sundt-
klassen 
RS 138 Sundt Flyer Svolvær 40 knots speed, 350nm reach 
Fosen-klassen RS 132 Gjert 
Wilhelmsen 
Sørvær 24,9 knots speed, 600nm reach 
Simrad-klassen RS 129 Køpstad RSRK Harstad 30 knots speed, 200nm reach 
Simrad-klassen RS 128 Gideon RSRK Tromsø 34 knots speed, 165nm reach 
Fosen-klassen RS 125 Det Norske 
Veritas 
Ballstad 24,9 knots speed, 600nm reach 
Simrad-klassen RS 122 Simrad 
Færder 
Harstad 30 knots speed, 200nm reach 
Koss-klassen RS 110 Reidar von 
Koss 
Båtsfjord 25 knots speed, 800nm reach 
Skomvær-klassen RS 107 Knut Hoem Myre 24,9 knots speed, 600nm reach 
Adeler-klassen RS 106 Skuld Træna 24,9 knots speed,  
Adeler-klassen RS 105 Ruth Opsahl Bodø 24,9 knots speed, 300nm reach 
Skomvær-klassen RS 104 Oscar Tybring 
IV 
Tromsø 25 knots speed, 422nm reach 
Skomvær-klassen RS103 Dagfinn Paust Andenes 25 knots speed, 417nm reach 
Skomvær-klassen RS 99 Skomvær III Røst 25 knots speed, 300nm reach 
Ambulance-boat RS 420 Eyr 
Ytterholmen 
Bjørn 40 knots speed, 300nm reach 
Ambulance-boat RS 421 Eyr Bremstein Rørøy 40 knots speed, 300nm reach 
Ambulance-boat RS 422 Eyr Myken Rødøy 40 knots speed, 300nm reach 
Doctor shuttle 
boat 
(Legeskyssbåt) 
RS 423 Eyr Åsvær Ørnes 29 knots speed,  
Petter C. G. 
Sundt-klassen 
RS 162 Klaveness 
Marine 
Bodø 42 knots speed, 400nm reach 
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2.1.1.8 Norwegian fire brigades – Maritime Incident Response Groups 
(MIRG) 
The municipalities are responsible for the fire brigades in Norway offering a fine-
grained system of fire and rescue services. Most of the fire brigades are manned 
by volunteer personnel. After the tragic fire-incident on the passenger ferry 
“Scandinavian Star” in 1990 on its way between Norway and Denmark where 158 
persons died, seven fire-brigades along the coast were given the task of 
establishing a Maritime incident rescue group (MIRG) to provide support in 
maritime emergency operations if necessary. These are located in Tromsø, Bodø, 
Ålesund, Bergen, Stavanger, Larvik and Oslo. 
 
Figure 4: MIRG and helicopter bases in Norway (Fure, 2018) 
All Fire and Rescue Brigades that are located along the Norwegian shoreline are 
obliged by law to respond to incidents at sea or close to their sea shore if called 
upon. The fire departments have, upon request, the duty to assist in fires and other 
maritime accident situations within or outside the Norwegian territorial boundary. 
When called upon by the JRCC they shall respond to severe fires, in particular 
fires on board passenger vessels. 
MIRG-personnel estimate a response time of a 15min, and the decision to start a 
MIRG-operation is taken by the JRCC. In most cases, MIRG personnel and their 
equipment are transported to the incident site by the local rescue helicopters or by 
boat. MIRG personnel has self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) capacity to 
operate under smoke and gas conditions. 
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A MIRG team usually consists of one leader, one SCBA-leader and four SCBA-
equipped rescue personnel2. Equipment consists of a Norkapp-suite (or other 
approved survival suit or fire-suits), SCBA, helmet, gloves and extra bag with 
clothes and equipment. 
Typically, MIRG operations focus on ship fires, but may also involve a range of 
damage-prevention tasks, help with evacuation and first aid. In 2011, DSB and 
the Coastal Administration agreed to investigate the possibility of MIRG services 
providing assistance for the Coastal Administration related to chemical 
preparedness. MIRG preparedness is also available in case of accidents on land. 
In addition to the MIRG teams there are several fire brigades that have built up 
their maritime preparedness locally, but do not have a separate agreement with 
DSB (DSB, 2018). 
2.1.1.9 Maritime medicine advice - Radio Medico Norge 
Radio Medico Norway is a 24/7 helpline to provide tele-medicine to seafarers in 
distress when medical issues appear. They cooperate both with JRCC as well as 
Coastal Radio. They have focus on medical emergencies, general medical 
services, special advice and preventative care (Radio-Medico s.a.).  
2.1.1.10 SAR – communication systems  
The Norwegian system for maritime distress communication is structured 
according to international law. The Coastal Radio has stations with 24/7 
assistance. The service is provided by Telenor and top priority is to be the hub 
between vessels in distress and JRCCs. The maritime radio is co-located with the 
JRCCs operation centers in Bodo and Stavanger giving maximum cooperation 
between the two agencies. 
As requested by the Ekom-rules, emergency authorities are connected via the 
emergency communication network “Nødnett”. Nødnett – the Norwegian 
Emergency Public Safety Network is a separate radio network, built specifically 
for rescue and emergency users. Nødnett provides TETRA standard 
communication which includes “secure, encrypted radio communications in talk 
groups and in direct one-to-one communications. It is also possible to transfer 
data at moderate speeds” (DSB 2016). Nødnett is terrestrial-based, hence, built 
similarly to a mobile network (DSB 2016). As of May 2018 there were over 
56.000 terminals and over 2.000 base stations (Nødnett s.a.) 
Motorola Solutions currently has a contract until 2026 to operate and service the 
net, but the time afterwards is open. The current Nødnett technology may be 
increased in life-span for another 5 years until 2031. At any cause, the 
preparedness institutions are expecting NGN (Next generation Nødnett), a mobile 
broadband for critical data communication, to be installed (DSB 2017).  
                                                          
2 Interviews with representatives of Saltenbrann 
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While Nødnett and NGN are land-based, Norway has also put effort into 
establishing a maritime mobile broadband radio (MBR) connection. The project 
is managed by Kongsberg Seatex and Radionor, the network is capabale of 
connecting ships without internet but can also connect to the internet. The 
Norwegian Coastal Administration and NOFO the Norwegian Clean Seas 
Association for Operating Companies have been the first to install the technology 
on their affiliated resources (Kystverket 2017). 
2.1.1.11 Industry SAR-capacities 
Commercial vessels as SAR capacities 
The earlier Marpart reports have shown the change in the maritime activity 
patterns taking place. One trend is larger cruise vessels visiting the Arctic. An 
increasing amount of smaller expedition cruise vessels go to remote areas North 
East Spitsbergen, Franz Josefs Land, the North-East passage and West passage as 
well as Greenland. These areas have limited SAR capacity and resources (Keil 
2017).  
Both commercial passenger vessels and transport vessels, according to MARPOL 
Annex I, Ch. 5, Reg. 37.4, Oil Pollution Act 33 CFR 155.240 [OPA 90], SOLAS 
Ch. II-1, Pt. B-1, Reg. 8-1 [Safe Return to Port] and OCIMF-Guidelines, have to 
provide their own Emergency Response Service (ERS system). This includes 24/7 
decision making capacities and coordination of the operator’s resources in case of 
SAR incidents. Officers and crew have to be skilled in SAR operations and fire-
fighting. On passenger vessels, the safety crew needs a passenger crowd and crises 
management course, and frequent training. This means that the commercial 
vessels have certain capacity to respond to own problems as well as help out other 
vessels in distress. 
The vessels operating in the Arctic represent an important asset in SAR 
operations. This includes the cruise vessels. They have significant capacities on 
board and may host many persons. The vessels bring with them large supplies of 
food and water, berths, clothes, tender boats, potentially helicopters, submarines, 
drones and diving-equipment, pumps, welders, medicine, potentially hospital, 
doctors, nurses, fire-fighters and other experts. Some of them may also have Oil 
Spill Response equipment. They are sailing in areas with limited SAR-capacities. 
The fishing fleet represents a similar capacity. 
The oil and gas industry – area and field SAR-capacities 
The oil and gas industry operating in Norwegian territorial waters needs to have 
a significant capacity for their own emergency preparedness based on predefined 
risk areas. The oil majors have their own preparedness organizations, while the 
smaller operators have sourced these tasks to emergency response organizations 
such as OFFB and RESQ. This organization will cooperate closely with the 
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JRCCs when a SAR situation arise or with other authorities if an emergency 
situation occur. 
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association has published Recommended Guidelines 
which shall serve as the benchmark for offshore activities in several areas. This 
includes emergency preparedness and SAR response and guideline 064 “Regional 
preparedness” defines the requirements for available capacities in Norwegian 
waters (NorskOlje&Gas 2015). According to “DFU” Defined Hazard and 
Accident Conditions, there are four scenarios with relevance to existing SAR-
capacity. DFU1 on man over board during work, DFU2 on personnel in the water 
after helicopter accident, DFU3 on personnel in the sea with emergency 
evacuation, DFU6 on fire with need for external assistance and DFU7 on injury 
or sickness with need for external assistance. Particularly DFU3 deals with upper 
limits of the capacities and requires the operators to perform a quantitative risk 
analysis and establish and operate emergency resources accordingly.  These 
resources are normally a shore located rescue helicopter, a stand by vessel close 
to the field, and supply vessels serving as additional SAR capacity. 
2.1.2 Oil Spill Response (OSR) 
The Norwegian oil spill preparedness and response system is a combined effort 
of government and large industry players. In Northern Norway, a growing 
petroleum activity has brought more capacity to the region. The range of actors 
involved in oil spill preparedness system has various responsibilities and 
obligations. The Ministry of Transport and Communications has overall 
responsibility for the state's preparedness for acute pollution, while The Ministry 
of Climate and Environment has the overall responsibility for demanding private 
and municipal emergency response to acute pollution. Oil Spill Preparedness and 
Response capacities may be referred to the three levels of actors in the system for 
Oil Spill Response in Norway – private, municipality (local government) and state 
(Sydnes&Sydnes, 2011). The private level includes offshore oil companies which 
have to deal with acute pollution on site. NOFO, the Norwegian Clean Seas 
Association for Operating Companies develops, on behalf of the oil companies’ 
contingency plans and provides operating companies with response equipment 
and technical personnel. The municipal level preparedness capacities refer to 
coastal municipalities, which provide personnel and equipment to deal with 
smaller acute spills. In addition, the local authorities will be involved in shoreline 
operations when the state preparedness is mobilized after shipping incidents with 
major spills. They have also agreement with NOFO to take part in Oil Spill 
Response operations after spills from the offshore oil industry. Local authorities 
cooperate on preparedness through 32 inter-municipal preparedness regions, 
headed by inter-municipal emergency response committees (IUAs). The fire 
brigades or the larger harbors have the main coordinating responsibilities for the 
IUAs. The state level is responsible for emergency response in case of major acute 
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pollution incidents not covered by local authority or private-sector plans.  The 
Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) is responsible for the governmental 
preparedness against acute pollution, and has nation-wide administrative 
authority in the case of acute pollution incidents. In addition, authority has been 
delegated to the NCA to ensure the best possible coordination of operational 
emergency preparedness for acute pollution in a national system. 
In an effort to build capacity and to advance technologies, the Norwegian Coastal 
Administration (NCA) and NOFO have been experimenting with different types 
of capacities and action patterns, and promoted innovations and new technology. 
The Norwegian Coastal Administration, NOFO, and private companies manage 
equipment depots. 
For major coastal and beach cleaning operations, this basic scheme will be the 
starting point for building a long-term response plan. It is reasonable to assume 
that the agreements between NOFO, IUA, NCA and other private organizations 
will provide access to nearly 1,000 people in the acute phase of an Oil Spill 
Response action. In addition to this, the response organization might use the 
labour market in combination with the established structures for training and skills 
management. It will also be appropriate to request international resources through 
international agreements which are managed by NCA and through international 
cooperation agreements in oil industry (Norsk Olje&Gass, 2014, p.45). 
2.1.2.1 The OSR-capacities of the oil industry  
The oil companies and NOFO can mobilize heavy resources on short notice. 
Stand-by emergency response vessels are at hand close to the oil installation. 
Supply vessels can be mobilized to carry several hundred meters of floating 
booms out from the supply bases. The slicks are pumped into the vessels’ tanks 
by floating skimmers (de Nanteuil, 2015). 
The oil company or operating companies are responsible to initiate measures and 
handle oil spills from their own activity, ref. Norwegian Pollution Control Act. If 
pollution has been caused by offshore petroleum activities, the NCA will be 
notified by the Petroleum Safety Agency (PSA) and contact will be established 
between these agencies. 
Oil spill contingency planning in Norwegian offshore petroleum industry is based 
on the barrier concept and includes five barriers to be mobilized from the source 
of pollution until the coastline. Organization and dimensioning of emergency 
preparedness are important prerequisites for effective handling of acute pollution 
(St.Meld 35, 2016). The following table overviews the barriers and capacities as 
followed by the oil and gas companies for offshore drilling and production 
(Oljevern.no, 2011): 
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Table 2: Oil spill preparedness barriers and capacities for the offshore oil industry in Norway 
 Location Purpose Equipment/measures 
Barrier 0 At the 
production 
facility, or 
close to a 
platform 
Procedures are 
established and 
equipment is in place to 
detect abnormalities 
and initiate measures 
for rapid shutdown to 
prevent spills, fire or 
explosion 
For the oil and gas sites, we are here talking 
about advanced sensors, alarm equipment, 
mechanical valves and duplicated barriers are 
examples of systems which are intended to 
prevent and limit damage. These are located 
both at the seabed and on the drilling facility. 
Barrier 1 Combating 
close to 
the source. 
A standby 
vessel and 
helicopters 
are always 
close by. 
If a spill should occur, 
the contingency plans 
on board and in the 
vicinity of the platform 
will come into 
operation 
The standby vessel is equipped with oil spill 
protection equipment in compliance with 
Norwegian standards. The vessel will be 
capable of commencing damage-limiting 
operations immediately, in the form of the 
deployment of marine booms and skimmer 
equipment. In parallel with this the operator, in 
co-operation with the authorities and the 
Norwegian Clean Seas Association for 
Operating Companies (NOFO), will commence 
the mobilization of the next safety barriers. 
Barrier 2 Combating 
along the 
drift 
trajectory 
of the spill 
Work of recovering oil 
in the open sea before it 
reaches land 
With the help of infrared cameras and oil-
detecting radar systems, an oil slick can be 
followed even in conditions of poor visibility 
and darkness. Small buoys are also used which 
transmit signals to satellites. These are 
deployed in an oil slick so that the effect of wind 
and currents on its trajectory can be monitored 
accurately. In addition, drift trajectory 
calculations are prepared with the assistance of 
specialist groups connected with the 
contingency apparatus. 
Barrier 3 Combating 
in the 
coastal 
zone 
Deploying resources 
closer to the coast too, 
in case any of the oil 
should penetrate 
Barriers 1 or 2. 
Equipment depots with modern, efficient 
equipment.  
One of the innovations is the use of boom 
systems and skimmer equipment, which can be 
operated by smaller vessels, paving the way for 
collaboration with coastal fishermen. 
Barrier 4 Recovery 
of oil in 
the shore 
zone 
If oil reaches the coast, 
the operations will enter 
two phases: an 
emergency phase and a 
long-term phase. In the 
emergency phase, 
special task forces will 
be mobilized in the 
shore zone. 
The efforts on sea include the establishment of 
new equipment depots for shore zone 
contingency equipment and a contingency 
scheme in collaboration with the local fishing 
fleet. 
In coastal operations, amphibious landing craft 
may be used. These are highly flexible and can 
be used for collection and recovery, as well as 
transport functions such as landing equipment 
and personnel where access to the shore zone 
from land is difficult. 
Increased petroleum activities in coastal areas, combined with limited 
infrastructure and long distances in Northern Norway, require special attention to 
the preparedness at oil fields near Lofoten and in the Barents Sea. 
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Equinor (Statoil)’s preparedness map with resources supply bases and heliports is 
presented in the figure below. 
 
Figure 5: Preparedness at Norwegian continental shelf, Statoil (Hauge, 2017) (supply base) 
In the Barents Sea Eni Norge’s preparedness activity for the Goliat field is tailored 
to the area and strengthens the resource capacity related to Oil Spill Response, 
emergency towing as well as Search and Rescue. The oil spill preparedness at sea 
consists of six large, ocean-going vessels designed specifically for Oil Spill 
Response, with ocean-going lenses and collection and storage capacity. Three of 
these vessels also have dispersion equipment. Two of the Eni Norway-contracted 
36 
vessels, (Esvagt Aurora and Stril Barents), have new solutions for dispersion 
where the equipment is stored and installed inside the vessels and can be 
controlled automatically from the bridge. The vessels are also equipped with 
Infrared (IR) camera and oil radar that can detect and follow a discharge in the 
darkness or bad visibility. In addition, airplanes and helicopters can be used in an 
Oil Spill Response operation; these are also equipped with IR and oil radar (Eni 
Norge http://www.eninorge.com/no/Miljo-og-samfunn/Oljevern/Oljevern-til-havs/). 
If pollution has been caused by a vessel, the owner of the ship has the primary 
responsibility for preventing spills to the marine environment and for initiating 
damage limitation measures when pollution occurs or threatens. If the pollution 
has been caused by offshore activities, the responsible operator will normally 
mobilize NOFO to take charge of the pollution clean-up on its behalf. NOFO is 
responsible for maintaining emergency preparedness on behalf of the companies 
operating at the Norwegian Continental Shelf. NOFO serves as a coordinating 
organization if a spill occurs and is responsible for the tactical and operational 
management of response resources in use. 
All resources available to NOFO are also available to member companies. About 
30 operating companies are currently members of NOFO. NOFO's resources 
consist of own, public and private contractual resources. The core of the seagoing 
preparedness consists of 25 large mechanical collection system and 31 sea-going 
oil recovery vessels that meet NOFO’s standards. 11 of the 25 major NOFO 
systems are permanently located on board the vessels located on the shelf (Norsk 
Olje&Gass, 2014). 
NOFO has bases and depots spread along the Norwegian coastline with Oil Spill 
Response equipment for all barriers available (booms, skimmers, etc.). In 
addition, they have stocks of oil dispersants as well as remote sensing equipment. 
Dispersants are chemical products formulated to produce 10s-microns size oil 
droplets that will be dispersed, diluted and eventually biodegraded in the 
environment. New generations of dispersants have low toxicity and high 
efficiency (Source: IMO). 
The available standby personnel includes people from local municipalities and 
others (approx. 60 persons) and managers of a special task force. In Northern 
Norway, there are 2 NOFO bases and 2 NOFO depots (NOFO, 2014). The depots 
are located in Træna and Hammerfest, bases are in Sandnessjøen and Hammerfest. 
NOFO holds an Emergency Response Centre which will support the responsible 
oil companies’ emergency organizations in handling a situation. 
In regard to ocean preparedness, NOFO has at its disposition 31 Oil Spill 
Response vessels of NOFO-standard (OR), 34 ocean-going Oil Spill Response 
vessels, 25 ocean-going mechanical oil collection systems, 10 ocean-going 
dispersing systems, access for dispersion from aircraft, a large resource of 
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dispersants (about 750m3) and vessels specialized for surveillance (NOFO, 
2014). 
In regard to coastal preparedness, NOFO has contracted 30 vessels for Oil Spill 
Response (mainly fishing vessels)  in Finnmark, 30 vessels are located from 
Vestfjorden to Stadt, 3 supporting vessels, 4 speed barges, 1 large and 2 smaller 
work fleets, different Oil Spill Response equipment, 25 coastal and fjord systems, 
and oil booms (NOFO, 2014). 
NOFO’s special task force (IGSA), whose aim is to combat oil spil along 
shorelines has capacity to respond within 36 hours to acute pollution onshore, and 
combat  up to 100m3 oil per day. The IGSA consists of 40 trained and well-skilled 
personnel, work boats and speed barges, oil recovery equipment (booms, pumps, 
aggregate, storage devises, tents, field equipment and others), supporting vessels 
with operational level management (NOFO, 2014). This group is specialized in 
collecting free-flowing oil in the coastal zone and has access to equipment 
specially designed for this purpose. 
Two new large depots have been established in Hasvik and Måsøy, where 
extensive Oil Spill Resources have been stored for operations in the coastal areas. 
This equipment is purchased specifically for Goliat, but can be used for all events.  
One of the most significant innovations for the preparedness system in Northern 
Norway has been to incorporate the coastal fishing fleet into a permanent 
emergency structure in the north. This system is also in place for other parts of 
the Norwegian Coast. Through cooperation projects with the fisheries 
organizations, the suitability of various types of vessels has been studied, both in 
terms of the territory of oil spill preparedness, technical aspects, and a robust 
organization (oljevern.no). Eni Norge, the Fishermen’s Association in Northern 
Norway and NOFO are collaborating to build a new permanent contingency 
organization, in which fishing vessels from Finnmark will contribute to oil 
recovery operations. Fishing boats can operate light and mid-weight boom 
systems 3 . 30 local fishing vessels have become a part of the emergency 
preparedness organization of the Norwegian continental shelf and can assist 
during possible emissions that can reach coastal areas. The vessels are adapted 
and equipped with newly developed oil collection equipment from NOFI 
(Tromsø) that can be operated by a single fishing vessel and at higher speeds than 
the traditional system of lenses drawn by two vessels. The vessels exercise at least 
twice a year. The different fishing vessels have different size and capacity and 
will be set in areas where these are suitable. In addition, it is possible to use the 
ocean-going vessels in the coastal preparedness4. 
                                                          
3 http://www.eninorge.com/en/Environment-and-Society/Oil-conservation/Oil-spill-protection-measures-
along-the-coast/ 
4 Eni Norge http://www.eninorge.com/no/Miljo-og-samfunn/Oljevern/Oljevern-ved-kysten/ 
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There are several Norwegian companies, such as NOFI, MIROS, NorLense AS, 
Skimmer Technology AS, Jason Engineering AS, Framo, Kaliber and others, 
which are world leading providers in oil spill technologies and equipment. 
For aerial surveillance NOFO has an agreement with NCA to use their 
surveillance aircraft. In addition, helicopters can be used for surveillance.  NOFO 
has also wave radars, aerostat and satellite connection.  
NOFO and KSAT (Kongsberg Satellite Services) have entered into an extended 
agreement on satellite-based remote sensing on the Norwegian continental shelf 
for detection of acute pollution from petroleum activities. KSAT5 is the world's 
leading commercial satellite center. KSAT has a unique global terrestrial network 
for satellite data reception and has specialized for satellite-based near-real-time 
surveillance services from its head office in Tromsø. KSAT has provided satellite-
based oil detection service to industry, through NOFO, since 2005. Due to the 
latitude, KSAT can offer extremely high coverage frequency and rapid delivery 
in the High North. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery is used for 
operational ice management purposes during drilling activity, seismic activity and 
can also be used for finding leads within the ice, avoiding areas of heavy ice to 
save time and ensure a safe journey 
(https://www.ksat.no/en/services%20ksat/ksat%20in%20the%20arctic/). 
The service includes oil detection using images from radar satellites. The pictures 
are read at KSAT's back stations and analyzed experts in Tromsø. The results are 
then delivered in near real time to NOFO, which is responsible for disseminating 
the results to the oil field operators. This information is delivered in very small 
geo-referenced files suitable for delivery to vessels in low-bandwidth conditions 
– letting them know within minutes exactly where the ice has moved rapidly 
across areas thousands of square kilometers in size. 
2.1.2.2 The OSR-capacities at municipality level 
The municipalities have the responsibility to handle oil and chemical spills from 
minor spills of acute pollution that occur as a result of normal activities in the 
municipality and which are not covered by private emergency preparedness. 
Responses to acute pollution caused by shipping accidents which involve small 
vessels and which fall within the scope of local government emergency 
preparedness will be led by the local authority. The municipality also has a 
responsibility to assist in case of state response action. All municipalities in the 
country participate in inter-municipal cooperation through the Inter-Municipal 
Committees for Acute Pollution (IUA). Through this scheme, each municipality 
can receive assistance in the form of personnel, equipment and expertise to handle 
spills that are larger than the municipality can manage on its own (St.Meld.35, 
2016). 
                                                          
5 NOFO https://www.nofo.no/om-nofo/nyhetsarkiv/fjernmaling-satelitt/  
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There are 29 inter-municipal depots that are part of the state response equipment 
(Kystverket, 2014). About 70.000 m of lightweight booms and 300 oil skimmers 
are stored at municipal and intermunicipal depots (Knol & Arbo, 2014). The 
figure below shows the IUA depots with equipment owned by NCA. 
 
Figure 6: The IUA depots with equipment from Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA, 2015b) 
The depots of the Northern region are situated in Vadsø, Honningsvåg, 
Hammerfest, Tromsø, Harstad, Stamsund, Narvik, Bodø, Mo I Rana and 
Brønnøy. In case of acute pollution from an oil company on Norwegian 
continental shelf the IUA can contribute with management, professional 
personnel and equipment for Oil Spill Response in coastal areas and shoreline. 21 
IUAs have agreements with NOFO to provide support in Oil Spill Response 
operations in coastal areas in case of oil spills from the offshore oil industry.  The 
regional fire and rescue brigades often have the responsibility to run IUA 
operations. 
In the event of major accidents the IUA may request reinforcement support of  the 
Norwegian Support Team of the Norwegian Civil Defence, and personnel from 
volunteer organizations, like the Red Cross, World Wildlife Fund, Norwegian 
People’s Aid and Rescue and others. 
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The municipalities have a duty to provide assistance to the state and duty to act 
on all events as needed according the Pollution Control Act.  
2.1.2.3 The state level OSR-capacities 
Responses to acute pollution caused by shipping accidents which involve large 
vessels and which exceed the scope of local government emergency preparedness 
will normally be led by the NCA on behalf of the central government. The IUAs 
are expected to continue their work under the leadership of the NCA in line with 
the duty to assist as specified in the Pollution Control Act. The responsible 
polluter is also obliged to initiate measures after central government has assumed 
command (NCA, 2015a). 
The main objective of state preparedness is to prevent and limit environmental 
damage through acute pollution, or the risk of acute pollution. The state 
preparedness consists of a variety of equipment to prevent or limit environmental 
damage. For instance, if a ship incident happens near mainland, then efforts 
should be directed towards towing the vessel from ground and coast. In case of 
grounding there is a risk of acute pollution and oil spill, so the capacities to collect 
contamination is important. Using oil booms, the source of pollution is rounded 
and isolated, so it is possible to collect oil. Oil on sea is collected by sea-going 
Oil Spill Response vessels. If the oil spreads over a larger area, booms will be 
deployed to prevent that the beaches will be affected by the spill. If the oil reaches 
the coast, there will be carried out a beach cleaning operation if necessary.  
The Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) has 15 main Oil Spill Response 
depots and 10 supplementary depots along the Norwegian coast. The depots are 
equipped with booms, skimmers, beach cleaning- and Emergency pumping 
equipment, personnel and one supervisor. Geographical location of the depots and 
the type of equipment stored there is based on the Contingency analysis of the 
NCA from 2011. The analysis indicates the likelihood and consequences of acute 
pollution incidents in different parts of the coast (NCA, 2014). In Northern 
Norway, 7 main depots are located in Sandnessjøen, Bodø, Lødingen, Tromsø, 
Hammerfest, Vadsø and Longyearbyen. In addition, there are 6 secondary depots 
located in Narvik, Sortland, Skjervøy, Honningsvåg, Båtsfjord and Ny Ålesund 
(Figure 8). 
41 
 
Figure 7: The Norwegian Coastal Administration’s depots (NCA, 2014) 
The depots have equipment for mechanical recovery of oil, such as different types 
of booms, skimmers and beach cleaning equipment. Some of the depots also have 
emergency offloading equipment for bunkers oil. Each depot is connected to a 
team of 10 people and a supervisor. Furthermore, 13 pilot boat stations and four 
rescue boat stations operated by Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue (RS), can be 
quickly mobilized with oil booms. The depots do not have equipment for chemical 
dispersion of acute pollution, but the NCA has access to the dispersants in NOFO's 
depots. The NOFO dispersants are primarily developed for crude oil. NCA have 
not implemented the use of dispersants as a tool for the state preparedness, but 
this is under development. 
The NCA owns 7 specialized Oil Spill Response vessels, three of which are new 
multifunctional vessels (St.Meld. 35, 2016). The NCA may also deploy 11 Coast 
Guard vessels with oil booms, skimmers and pumping systems. The crew of these 
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vessels are trained by NCA in using the equipment in Oil Spill Response 
operations (NCA, 2014). The Coast Guard resources are particularly important 
when it comes to large-scale incidents and operations in ice infested waters. 
At Svalbard, the NCA has preparedness resources stored in a depot in 
Longyearbyen and some oil spill equipment located in Ny-Ålesund. The depot in 
Longyearbyen has a task-force of 20 people. When it comes to larger vessels with 
oil spill capacities, the Governor's MV "Polarsyssel" and Coast Guard vessels are 
normally located in the area. MV "Polarsyssel" is an important resource in the 
emergency response to acute pollution. The vessel's presence is limited to nine 
months a year (St.Meld.35, 2016). 
NCA has contracted 4 emergency towing vessels as well as 1 surveillance aircraft 
(www.kystverket.no). These vessels can also be mobilized for Oil Spill Response. 
Together with equipment depots, NCA has 45000 m of oil boom available (Knol 
& Arbo, 2014). Vardø Vessel Traffic Service has a special responsibility for 
monitoring the outer sailing routes along the Norwegian coast, where vessels with 
the highest pollution potential sail. 
These towing preparedness tasks are about to be taken over by the Norwegian 
Coast Guard. 
The NCA has signed contracts with 36 smaller vessels with trained crew 
connected to the different equipment depots. These are private boats, most of them 
fishing vessels, which shall assist NCA in Oil Spill Response. These boats do not 
have their own Oil Spill Response equipment on board, but may use equipment 
from the state depots. 
The Vardø Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is responsible for daily allocation and 
operational use of the vessels for emergency tow response in the event of 
undesired or acute incidents at sea based on the current traffic situation (NCA, 
2011). The VTS’ therefore play an important role in the NCA's first-line response 
to avoid acute pollution and other undesired situations and incidents at sea. The 
primary task of these vessels are preventing risk vessels (oil and HNS tankers) 
drifting ashore (www.kystverket.no). 
An NCA’s contracted surveillance aircraft is patrolling along the Norwegian coast 
600-800 hours annually. It has a wide range of facilities, and is specially built for 
monitoring oil spills in coastal and marine areas. The aircraft can exchange site-
attached photos and video with the watch team or action management on land. 
Today, the plane is also the most important source of information about oil spread 
and localization where it is possible to collect. It is mainly the NCA that uses the 
aircraft, but it is employed in cooperation with the Norwegian Coast Guard and 
NOFO. Therefore, it is used both for surveillance of shipping and petroleum 
activities on the Norwegian shelf, fisheries inspections and other surveillance 
missions. In addition, the aircraft is equipped to assist the Joint Rescue 
Coordination Center in Search and Rescue operations (St.Meld.35, 2016). 
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Remote sensing equipment on board of the surveillance aircraft makes it possible 
both to detect illegal discharges and calculate pollution levels. During Oil Spill 
Response operations aerial surveillance is used actively to survey the spreading, 
and thus detect where Oil Spill Response efforts should be made (kystverket.no). 
The NCA’s three new multifunctional vessels and 9 coastguard vessels have 
equipment for remote sensing of oil spill, which can detect emissions in poor 
visibility conditions. 
NCA uses satellite services to detect possible pollution at sea. These services are 
provided by KSAT and European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). If the 
satellite images indicate signs of contamination, NCA can send out its 
surveillance aircraft or a vessel to verify satellite observation. Possible indication 
of spills from an offshore oil installation will normally be followed up by 
contacting the operator responsible. Satellites may be used also to identify those 
responsible for the spill. Such observations will normally apply to illegal 
discharges. Monitoring of illegal discharges is done in cooperation with the police 
and Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NCA, 2014). 
The Pollution Control Act gives NCA the possibility to use Oil Spill Response 
equipment from the municipalities and private sector when necessary 
(kystverket.no). 
In order to carry out an effective Oil Spill Response it is important to have a good 
overview of the size and extent of the oil spill, as well as precise information on 
weather conditions and vulnerable environmental resources in the area. The NCA’ 
map tool on coastal information ("Kystinfo") has been significantly developed 
during the past ten years. Kystinfo gives the possibilities for compiling different 
information in a map / situation picture and are constantly under improvement. 
This also applies to the sharing of information. During an Oil Spill Response 
operation, the situation image will be updated continuously, including other 
remote sending data from surveillance aircraft and satellite, name and position of 
the resources participating in the action, information about vulnerable 
environmental resources in the area, video and map data from ships, as well as 
forecasts for oil movements and weathering (St.Meld 35., 2016). 
2.1.3 Violent Action Response  
The police is responsible for Violent Action Response in Norway. Violent action 
most often includes sharp assignments such as kidnapping, hostage situations, 
barricades and threats with weapons, specific hostage situations and terror. 
Violent Action Response calls for very close cooperation with other parts of the 
preparedness system especially the paramedics and hospitals, and the fire and 
rescue brigades. At the “sharp” end where weapons may be used, the regional 
police has special trained officers for Violent Action Response. In addition, they 
may ask for support from national resources such as the national Police 
Preparedness special response team and the national Bomb squad. Violent action 
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may escalate during terrorist acts. This may call for additional anti-terror 
capabilities. The regional chief of police may ask for additional support from the 
military forces. For maritime anti-terror operations, the police cooperates closely 
with the military special forces (FSK/MJK) and may request assistance. For anti-
terror actions towards oil and gas installations, four police districts (Troms, 
Nordland, Møre Romsdal and South-West police districts) have special 
responsibility and train for such actions. 
The national plan for Violent Action Response and counter terrorism includes the 
civil preparedness system and the Military preparedness system. Since May 2012 
there are also new guidelines for “Support to Allies”, an alliance work on counter-
terrorism with a focus on awareness, adequate capabilities and increase in 
cooperation with partner nations and international actors (NATO 2012). 
On a national basis, Violent Action Response in Norway during peace time is 
from a tactical and operational level regulated according to the procedures of 
Ongoing Life-threatening Violence (PLIVO). The PLIVO concept is a 
standardized procedure developed in cooperation with all the emergency services: 
police, fire and rescue, and health. It also includes a standard training concept that 
involves all three actors (Madsen, 2017). 
The PLIVO procedure is a joint procedure for emergency services, the police, 
fire- and health personnel: “A PLIVO – operation is an on-going situation where 
one or more offenders exerts life-threatening violence with weapon/dangerous 
objects towards innocent persons, and where the police in a direct effort shall 
neutralize the offender(s) to save life, and limit damage. The Fire and rescue 
brigades and Health authorities shall actively give support with lifesaving 
measures” (PLIVO, 2015, p. 4). The leader of capacities and main responsible for 
anti-terrorist measures is the Police Operational leader. However, a shared 
understanding of the situation, and common procedures is regarded crucial for 
cooperation. The police itself is bound by instructions of the Ministry of Justice 
and Public Security (DSB s.a.). 
National resources for Violent Action Response are in particular the Emergency 
Response Unit (Delta) with around 100 to 120 people (NRK, 2014). For 
transportation and off shore operations, they use among others the air force planes 
and helicopters. 
Terror at sea, such as a mass-shooting on a cruise ship may include the national 
police response unit (Delta), the military special forces (FSK/MJK) and/or the 
police district special response unit (UAE). In addition they will have support 
from others for transport, bording the ship, mapping and orientation, including the 
crew of the ship. 
FSK have since 1975 been given and developed specific capacities on maritime 
counter terror activity. Their marine commando “Marinejegerkommando” (MJK) 
are currently located in Bergen as well as in Northern Norway. Their duty also 
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includes anti-terror action against offshore oil platforms and ships 
(Forsvarsdepartementet 2011-2012). 
In general, vessels are covered by a specific regulation on security, pirate and 
terror preparedness activity (ISPS) and use of power on board a ship or oil rigs 
(Ministry of Trade and Industry 2005). It ensures that ship, crew passenger, cargo 
and port facility security are somewhat prepared against terrorist acts. It calls for 
regular assessments of risk and security incidents and operational plans to counter 
such scenarios. 
When it comes to further reaching agreements, Ministry of Defence and Ministry 
of Justice and Public Security have established a joint task force to analyse and 
understand international terrorism dangers and set up a Counter-terror centre 
(NSD 2014). 
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2.2 CHALLENGES REGARDING ARCTIC MARITIME EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS CAPACITIES 
2.2.1 Search and Rescue capacity challenges 
2.2.1.1 Government agencies and SAR-capacity challenges 
Sea and airborne capacities.  
Norway has a very large area of responsibility in the Arctic with limited 
infrastructure available. The activity and risk factors vary during seasons, and it 
its both challenging and costly to keep up a high level of preparedness in all sea 
regions. The first reports from the Marpart projects have emphasized different sea 
areas in the Arctic and the potential risks for accidents in each region 
(www.marpart.no). The Norwegian government has only partly done such 
analyses, and it is not clear goals for response levels and the capacities needed. In 
several white papers and other government documents, however, there has been a 
focus on the need for modernization and increased capacity to match the large 
responsibility area of Norway and the maritime activity, especially when it comes 
to more passenger traffic in the Arctic. The Sarinor reports commissioned by the 
industry organization Maritime Forum North have revealed several areas of 
limitations as to capacities (www.sarinor.no). When it comes to sea area 
capacities, except for the ice breaker KV Svalbard, the offshore coast guard 
vessels serving in the Barents Sea are old, and do not have any ice class. There 
are also too few ships for fulfilling the broad range of coast guard tasks in the 
region. Three new vessels were contracted in 2018 for deployment in 2022 and 
onwards. However, even replacing the old vessels with new ones is not sufficient 
to fulfill the obligations of continuous presence in the sea areas of jurisdiction.  
As for air lift capacity, additional resources have been established on Svalbard 
with two rescue helicopters from 2014. These helicopters may pick up 18 persons 
within a radius of 120 nautical miles. The helicopters performed 30 sea area SAR 
operations in 2015, where support to fishermen were the dominating reason 
(Governor of Svalbard, ROS analysis, 2016). Also, a multi-functional vessel 
“Polarsyssel” commissioned for nine month of the year add significantly to the 
capacity. Sixteen new AW 101 SAR all weather helicopters and the deployment 
of NH90 helicopters on the coast guard vessels and the frigates will almost double 
the range and capaicity for helicopter-based SAR. Delays in deliveries, and the 
coast guard helicopters not meeting the expectations as flying hours may represent 
a non-planned limitation in helicopter preparedness for the coming years. 
For accidents in the Svalbard-region and further up north, long distances and 
weather conditions may increase the reponse time beyond survival limitations in 
case of larger accidents. 
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A forward SAR-base with rescue equipment at Longeyarbyen may as stated by 
the Sarinor project represent a great capacity improvement for the first response 
services. 
Surveillance.  Quick response as to search activity and the creation of situational 
awareness is important. The P-3 Orion aircraft at Andøya is an important resource 
for SAR surveillance, since they have substantial reach and advanced sensors. 
However, mobilization time due to lack of funding may result in a long response 
time. Aircrafts stationed at Svalbard are also a good resource. Yet, they too have 
long mobilization times  (Antonsen et al. 2015). 
Increase in manned hours may improve overall preparedness on a large area. Air 
resources provide also air coordination capacities for handling mass rescue 
operations with multiple airborne resources from different countries. Here, 
cooperation facilitation both through more advanced technology and personnel 
will be crucial, also to ensure the safety of the pilots and aircrew. 
Another tool currently under development when it comes to airborne search is 
surveillance drones. Drones have already been used in full-scale exercises such as 
Barents Rescue and Exercise Nord. These tools provide images from the accident 
sites to facilitate the mission management. Still, drones are a resource not well 
implemented within the SAR system, for example at the coast guard vessels. 
Mass evacuation and rescue facilitity challenges. An increased amount of 
larger passenger and cruise vessels in the High Arctic waters represent a challenge 
as to evacuation and resuce. Accidents such as the ice collision of Maxim Gorkij 
in the Barents Sea, the grounding of Costa Concordia at the Italian coast and the 
fire onboard Le Boreal outside the Falklands Islands are examples of evacuation 
challenges related to SAR operations at sea. Both evacuation and rescueing people 
from tenders, lifeboats and rafts is very challenging in cases where the distress 
vessel lists heavily and under rough waves and wind conditions. Cooperation to 
develop new technology such as mass-lifting equipment in rough weather (cages, 
platforms etc.) needs further focus. The EU-funded ARCSAR project led by the 
JRCC North-Norway is now creating an innovation platform for new technology 
in this area (www.arcsar.no). 
Shore-based reception and medical support. Taking care of a large amount of 
wounded persons is a challenging taks both as to treatment, accommodation and 
transport. The most challenging area of the Norwegian SAR system is the northern 
and eastern part of the Barents Sea and the Svalbard region. A study conducted 
by DNV GL (2015) shows that emergency response concepts and technologies 
must be diversified in response to different challenges in the sea areas of the 
Barents Sea. Efforts should be directed towards determining environmental 
conditions, enhancing evacuation and rescue capacity, improving emergency 
response cooperation and developing joint emergency response concepts based 
on the principles of shared area-based emergency response resources (DNV GL 
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2015).  This means that the ROS analyses of the different regions should be more 
fine-grained, more adapted to local conditions, and should provide a clear picture 
of the SAR capacity needed through the whole SAR-value chain. In the Svalbard 
region, there are hospitals in Longyearbyen and in Barentsburg. The hospital in 
Longyearbyen has a capacity of four doctors and eight nurses, while the hospital 
in Barentsburg has one doctor and three nurses. In addition to the Longyearbyen 
hospital capacities, the University hospital of Tromso (UNN HF) in 2015 
organized a task force with medical personnel ready to fly out to remote areas for 
increased support. 
The Norwegian Civil Defense reinforcement teams also represent a capacity for 
first line response with advanced equipment for large scale operations. The 
mobilization time for the Norwegian Civil Defense reinforcement teams is a 
couple of hours. Their arrival on the scene will, however, depend on the transport 
capacities available. 
For immediate first line response, the government capacities may be limited in the 
most remote areas. The Governor of Svalbard states the following in the 2016 
Risk and Vulnerability analysis: 
The general health preparedness at Svalbard is highly vulnerable and 
Longyearbyen hospital is not today equipped to handle large incidents. One will 
relatively often face a gap between needs and available resources (Governor of 
Svalbard ROS analyse, 2016) 
As shown, for the remote areas fast first-line response may represent a challenge 
for the limited government capacities in major incidents. Thus, the use of 
available capacity within the communities and within units present in the region 
is crucial. The vessels in the vicinity such as cruise ships have trained personnel 
on board within first-aid. The same may be the case for shore-based companies 
on shore, the voluntary organizations represent an important mobilization 
potential. Among others, the Red Cross voluntary teams within the Search and 
Rescue Corps represent a significant capacity with 300 local units all over the 
country with 6000 volunteers certified for Search and Rescue and first-aid. These 
teams may be mobilized on short notice as they are already in the region. The 
voluntary organizations also have significant local knowledge that may be of great 
value in major incidents. 
One important aspect is, however, to have the necessary competence in running 
large scale operations, and operations at both sea and on shore. This calls for much 
training and exercises on large scale operations with many units and large needs 
for coordination and control. Unfortunaltely, there are few full-scale exercises 
giving these opportunities. 
Resource databases. Fast access to resources in Norway and in the neighboring 
countries is crucial. A problem for international cooperation is the lack of up-to 
date knowledge of available resources in the Arctic countries. This is due to 
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limited resource registers. These should be updated frequently enough to provide 
good knowledge for cooperation. Current systems such as the resource system of 
JRCC Norway “Narre” are not automatically updated by resource-owners, and 
therefore have a delay when it comes to new resources or repositioning. The 
project BarentsWatch has developed a shared resources register (felles 
ressursregister FRR) that will include land, sea and air resources. For other 
countries, the overview may be limited. Some efforts are made within the Arctic 
Council work group for emergency preventation and response (EPPR) to map 
resources in the Arctic countries. However, the overview of response times and 
capacities for different sea areas is not well developed. 
SAR coordination capacities. Mass evacuations, long-lasting operations and 
SAR-operations in remote areas put a heavy burden on SAR mission coordinaton. 
Additional resources are needed for coordination and control. The presence of the 
coast guard is important to take care of the on-scene coordination. The JRCC 
states in their annual report (2016) the need to enhance their capacity to manage 
large-scale accidents. There is a need for additional capacity with regard to SAR 
mission coordinators. The JRCC annual report comes to the conclusion that the 
roles of all the Norwegian SAR actors need to be as clear as possible (JRCC 
Norway 2016). This calls for increased focus on revisions and audits within the 
emergency response systems, as well as plan systems that covers all eventualities 
within each agency. Tailor-made training and exercises are in demand. A 
government committee initiated by the Ministry of Justice, Preparedness and 
Immigration (2016) emphasized the need for an Analysis center at each of the 
JRCCs for conducting analysis of real incidents and provide training and exercises 
for joint operations for the emergency agencies. 
Command and control systems for emergency management. The Norwegian 
SAR system is based on close cooperation between a broad range of responders. 
A challenge as to coordination is the command, communication and control 
systems (C3) currently limited with a multitude of different emergency 
management support platforms among the most critical emergency agencies 
JRCC (SARAS, Police (PO), paramedics and fire and rescue brigades 
(AMIS/Transmed/Tronsmobil). The governor of Svalbard has their own system 
and the military have limited interface with the civil systems. A few solutions 
such as an interface for Marine Traffic exchange and vector-information between 
coastguard, military headquarters, coastguard headquarters and JRCC have been 
introduced – yet further improvements both nationally as well as internationally 
may provide potential for improved coordination and control.  
Broadband and telephone communication. Several projects have focused on 
limited communication infrastructure. Sharing of information between RCCs, 
ship owners and emergency resources is subject to low automatization degrees in 
some of the areas (Haugstveit et al. 2016). More automatization could save time 
and increase efficiency of cooperation both nationally and internationally. 
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Radio and internet communication challenges emerge around 72 degrees north. 
There is limited capacity for satellite communication even though the emergency 
radio communication network in the GMDSS system is working. For large scale 
operations the current systems are not sufficient. 
As an example, the Iridium system is criticized for having too much down-time. 
Iridium NEXT may change this lack and provide improved Arctic wide 
connectivity and cooperation potential in emergencies (Fjortoft et al. 2015). 
One solution is the Maritime Broadband radio (MBR) that may serve as an ad hoc 
system (see SAR chapter). Varying ice conditions demand high cold climate 
adaptation of emergency equipment and vessels. The solutions must have better 
capacity, efficiency and a larger weather operating possibility, considering light, 
visibility, temperature and icing. Weather conditions vary, with rapid changes in 
visibility and ice conditions. Long periods of darkness or bad visibility due to 
snow or fog call for good remote sensing capacities (St.Meld. 35, 2016). 
 The Norwegian government has decided to support the launching of two 
communication satelites for the High North regions expected to be launched in 
2022 by Space Norway. If realized, these satelites may improve broadband 
communication capacity significantly. 
VHF Data Exchange System (VDES) shall be in full operation by 2020. It will be 
a worldwide system to enhance the capacity of the GMDSS system. Particularly 
smaller vessels which have no satellite communication equipment will benefit 
from VDES, as the VDES will improve connection of ship to ship and ship to land 
connections via the aid of satellites. 
Iridium NEXT satelites launched in 2018 will enhance the current Iridium 
network to provide their resources to the GMDSS system. Iridium NEXT includes 
66 cross-linked Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites also covering the polar regions. 
Iridium NEXT may be able to replace some of the current systems and offer 
improved bandwidth within the L-band for broadband maritime communication 
and first responders.  
2.2.1.2 The industry and SAR capacity challenges 
The industry operating in the Arctic has to follow international regulations with 
demands for both safety measures and emergency preparedness. For icy waters, 
the Polar Code of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) represents a 
signficiant upscaling of the demands as to vessel design, equipment, planning and 
competence. However, for large cruise ships with a mix of passengers of high age, 
the rescue capacity in remote areas are limited.  Even though the government SAR 
agencies such as the coast guard try to allocate resources according to traffic, the 
capacity is limited. Even though the Polar code demands certain capacities for 
survival over five days, the SARex- exercises at Svalbard show that the standard 
rescue equipment does not fullfil the requirements (SAREx report, 2017). Even 
51 
though risk assessments have to be made for the polar water manual obligatory 
on board the vessels, there is no certification of the equipment onboard, nor 
demands for survival times according to passenger and area characteristics. Some 
countries have made it clear that the companies operating in remote waters have 
to support themselves. One example is the tour with the passenger vessel Crystal 
Serenity trough the North West Passage where US and Canadian coast guard 
made it clear that the risks where too high with the resources available. As a 
consequence the ship owner hired an extra SAR ship that followed the cruise liner 
on its voyage. The cruise companies are now working on finding solutions to 
increase safety and preparedness. In particular the expedition cruise operators are 
working with the governments to improve preparedness. 
Within the oil and gas industry the Petroleum Safety Authority has come up with 
clear standards for the operators. For emergency response and rescue vessels there 
are clear objectives as to capacities and response time for the most expected risk 
types. The table below shows the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association 
recommendations for response in defined situations of hazards or accident 
(DSHA), and BASEC (Barents Sea operators) recommendations for the more 
remote parts of the Arctic. 
Table 3: The response capacities recommended on Norwegian Continental Shelf (Source: Hauge, 
2017). 
DHSA Norwegian Oil & 
Gas Association 
 
Recommended 
for more 
remote Arctic 
Resources 
Man overboard from rig 8 min 8 min Stand by vessel 
Personnel in sea after 
helicopter accident 
120 min (21 pers.) 4 hours Helicopter 
Supply vessels 
Personnel in sea after 
emergency rig evacuation  
120 min  Stand by vessel 
Helicopter 
Supply vessels 
Rescue from lifeboats  24 hours Helicopters 
Other vessels 
External assistance 
illness/accidents 
60 min  Helicopter 
Evacuation illness/accidents 180 min  Helicopter 
Risk of collision 50 min  Stand by vessel 
Fire with need of external 
assistance 
Field specific  Standby vessel 
Supply vessels 
Acute oil spill Field specific 
Goliat SBV: 120min 
Goliat PSV1: 8 hrs 
Goliat PSV2: 13 hrs 
Field specific: 
Korpfjell SBV 
120 min 
PSV1: 13 hrs 
PSV2: 30 hrs 
Standby vessel 
Supply vessels 
Specialized oil 
response vessels 
The table above shows that there will be challenges as to response time in the 
more remote operational areas. The hours above are under ideal conditions. 
However, fog and waves may create significant challenges. The oil and gas 
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operators in the Barents Sea will have to add more capacity to deal with long 
distances. This may include both helicopters, specialized standby emergency 
response vessels and platform supply vessels equipped for SAR and oil response 
operations, and specialized depot and passenger transport vessels. The oil and gas 
activity will represent an additional challenge and strain on the response 
capacities, but will also represent a significant increase in capacity. In this area, 
more emphasis may be put on coordinating government and industry capacity 
development. There should be a focus on how the government and industry 
capacities can be better synchronized. This may call for another way of organizing 
the SAR operations in the North, including more influence over the capacity 
development and the operations from the government emergency agencies. 
2.2.2 Pollution response and capacity challenges 
2.2.2.1 Government capacities and pollution response capacity challenges 
Except for the offshore oil and gas activity, the government is fully responsible 
for the maritime pollution response in Norwegian waters. Vessels sailing in 
Norwegian waters are not required to bring their own resources for acute pollution 
response. The government emergency preparedness has to take the full action 
when pollution occures. Oil Spill Response in the High North requires sufficient 
resources adapted to cold climate operations, and resources located in the region. 
This equipment is very expensive. There will be capacity limitations in the high 
North Sea regions should a major incident occur, and the response time may be 
high. It is vital that the equipment should be transported to the maritime spill arena 
quickly and efficiently, something that may prove difficult in the Arctic (Borch & 
Andreassen, 2017). St.Meld. 35 (2016) describes the main challenges of 
operations in the Arctic areas:  
- Long distances between potential discharges and resources such as depots, 
crews, workshops, airports and destinations for collected oil and waste will 
be a major challenge.  
- Access to efficient logistics solutions will be very demanding in the High 
North. Collected oil has to be transported out of the area if it is not dispersed 
or burned on site. If case of large spills, tank capacity for oil collected will 
be a challenge. 
- There is a need to develop better methods for separation of oil, ice and 
water. 
- Mechanical collection and absorption of oil in ice-filled waters is 
challenging. Even at low ice coverage, ice in booms and collecting systems 
have operational limitations. 
- There is a need for product development, winter adaptation of existing 
equipment and technology development for better detecting oil in ice. 
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- Logistics challenges in the High North are increasing the need for better 
technology and knowledge for treatment of oil on the spot, such as burning 
and chemical dispersion in ice. 
- There is a knowledge gap related to environmental effects of acute oil spill 
in the Arctic areas in general, about the ecosystem on the ice edge, the 
environmental vulnerability and how oil spill measures affect species and 
the ecosystem. 
Various organizations have argued that infrastructure and technologies are not 
sufficent to deal with the consequences of acute pollution (Knol & Arbo, 2014). 
To manage an acute pollution response is a complex interplay of strategic, tactical 
and practical considerations and actions. The NCA’s report on Oil Spill Recovery 
capacities (2015b) claim that coordination is as a challenge for Oil Spill Response 
in Norwegian waters. The services are operated by a long and varied list of 
organizations: the NCA, municipalities (IUA), refineries, the oil and gas field 
operators, terminals, ports and private businesses. These organizations must 
collaborate closely for an effective joint response. Efforts to improve the 
Norwegian emergency preparedness system therefore should aim to ensure 
effective interplay and coordination between these organizations. There is still a 
need for more realistic exercises to make the most of the resources (St.Meld. 35, 
2016). 
Within nuclear and radiation pollution as well as chemical pollution special 
competence for situational awareness and specialized reponse units are needed. 
The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority has sensors in different regions 
including on Svalbard for early detection and warning. As such events happen 
seldomly, fast response from specialists, as well as training and exercises with 
local forces is needed. Also, continuous evaluations for improvement of capacities 
and procedures are in demand. 
Managerial, social and technological skills are crucial factors for implementing 
good and effective recovery measures. Different approaches to both organization 
and management systems have previously been a challenge during government 
action. The NCA, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning 
and the Norwegian Environment Authority has accordingly developed an Incident 
command system (ELS) with accompanying guidance. Both the municipalities, 
Civil Defense, the NCA and several private actors today use this management 
system. Responses to actual or threatened acute pollution are organised in 
accordance with the Incident command system model (in Norwegian: Enhetlig 
Ledelsesystem [ELS]). The introduction of ELS has contributed that emergency 
preparedness actors can interact more effectively and it has become easier to draw 
on each other's personnel resources (St.Meld. 35., 2016). However, this system 
has to be evaluated. Research shows that this management system may be efficient 
in standardized and easy predictable incident response, but may prove challenging 
when it comes to high complexity, high uncertainty incidents where limited 
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mobilization may be the situation and improvisation with a broad range of 
different resources are needed (Borch & Andreassen, 2015).  
Access to sufficient personnel is challenging in case of a large-scaled event. The 
Pollution Control Act requires that municipalities take care of pollution 
prevention related to minor events that may occur within the municipality and 
which are not covered by private preparedness. In addition, the municipalities are 
affiliated with an intergovernmental committee against acute pollution (IUA) 
served by the regional fire and rescue brigades to ensure local response to events 
that exceed the capacity and competence of each municipality. Therefore, in order 
to ensure sufficiently robust response to a large-scaled incident, it will be 
necessary to involve municipalities and IUAs who are not directly affected by the 
incident to assist personnel and necessary equipment to a greater extent than has 
been the case with previous government actions (NCA, 2015a). 
The NCA’s comprehensive investigation of the depot structure of the state 
emergency preparedness response commissioned by the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications, analyses capacity and competence distribution of state 
depots and other actors. A new depot structure and supervisory and maintenance 
system is recommended. Geographical distances between Svalbard and the 
mainland, the local community organization in Svalbard and vulnerability of 
nature indicate that the solution with depot in Longyearbyen and the advance 
depot in Ny-Ålesund should still exist. The investigation, however, shows that 
with today's logistics solutions it will be possible to meet the response time 
requirements with a significant number of fewer deposits than the current deposit 
structure. A new structure with fewer depots and container storage equipment, as 
well as a framework agreement for logistics and transportation will enable far 
more targeted and efficient use of depot personnel. It is recommended to change 
the name of the depot teams to the NCA’s task forces and to increase personnel 
capacity from today's 10 days to 20 days of availability. It is also highlighted that 
training and exercises are needed (NCA, 2015b). 
Riksrevisjonen in 2015 issued recommendations for coordination resources of the 
authorities involved in the emergency preparedness system in Norway. They 
included: 
- to reinforce monitoring of the authorities’ work with the national 
preparedness system,  
- to improve coordination and partnership between agencies within the 
national preparedness system,  
- to ensure the learning outcomes out of past accidents and organized 
exercises, and  
- to clarify responsibilities of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and 
the DSB for better practice of coordination and partnership (Riksrevisjonen 
2015). 
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Some coordination resources should be directed towards better cooperation on 
emergency preparedness and development of joint emergency response concepts 
based on the principles of shared area-based emergency response resources (DNV 
GL 2015). 
For oil spill preparedness the question of organizational responsibilities has 
gained importance, as well as the question of private–public partnership. The 
NCA’s report on Oil Spill Recovery capacities (2015) describes as a challenge for 
Oil Spill Response that technologies and services are operated by a long and 
varied list of organizations: the NCA, NOFO, municipalities (IUA), refineries, 
terminals, ports and private businesses. There are many arenas where such 
collaboration is ongoing. Nevertheless, these organizations must still continue to 
collaborate on effective joint response. Efforts to improve the Norwegian 
emergency preparedness system therefore should aim to ensure effective interplay 
and coordination between these organizations. 
Sea currents and winds can carry pollution far away from the place of origin and 
affect ecosystems and humans elsewhere. There is a risk that the problems 
associated with this may become even more extensive as a result of expected 
population growth in the coming decades. The operational conditions in Northern 
Norway may reduce the functionality of equipment and facilities. There is a need 
for capacity development, more environmentally friendly production and 
purification technology, better waste prevention, collection and management, as 
well as more environmentally friendly consumption (Meld.St.22, 2017). 
The EPPR committee of the Arctic Council is working continuously to improve 
cross-border cooperation between the Arctic countries both as to surveillance, 
warning systems, cross-border support and coordination (https://www.eppr.org/). 
2.2.2.2 Industry capacity challenges 
As for the maritime industry, a significant preparedness capacities’ challenge 
relates to the risk of heavy fuel oil leakage from large cargo and cruise vessels. 
The heavy fuel oil is easier to contain, but may prove more challenging to pump. 
Another challenge is leakage and blow out from oil fields.  
Capacities for Oil Spill Response is about finding efficient tools for removing the 
oil spill. Among these tools we find booms and skimmers for collecting the spill, 
techniques for burning on site, and dispersants. New generations of dispersants 
have low toxicity and high efficiency. They produce 10s-microns size oil droplets 
that will be dispersed, diluted and eventually biodegraded in the environment 
(Source: IMO). Booms and skimmers have been much developed and have 
become more effective. The effectiveness of new Oil Spill Response equipment 
means that some oil spill operations that previously required up to three vessels 
can now be carried out by one vessel. However, mechanical Oil Spill Response 
equipment for the absorption of oil at sea still has weather constraints. In general, 
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oil booms have reduced effect at wave heights above three meters, but this will 
depend on the type of waves. It is estimated that effective damage limitation in 
outer waters with mechanical equipment can only be carried out for approx. 60 
percent of the year's days (St.Meld. 35, 2016). Natural conditions may pose 
challenges to the operation of the Oil Spill Response system. Weather conditions 
can impact the efficiency of the technology. Oil spill equipment has limitations 
when it comes to high waves, strong winds, poor visibility, little daylight and cold 
climate with ice and icing (NCA, 2015b). There are demands for alternative ways 
of getting rid of the oil including the use dispersants to make it disappear better 
into the water, or to burn it. In-situ burning is a method which is not in use in 
Norway, but this is an option that might be considered in the future. 
Oil Spill Response operation is about platforms for using skimmers for collecting 
oil, facilities for receiving and tank capacities for storing it, running oil booms, 
and dispersant capacity. Some of the contracted Oil Spill Response vessels do not 
have the OSR equipment on board. They have to sail ashore, unload, proceed to a 
depot, and load the equipment and then transit to the site for Oil Spill Response. 
This takes time both for making the equipment ready at base, transport it (11 hours 
from Hammerfest to Korpfjell distance 340 nm), and make it ready on site (min 2 
hours). 
The height of the seas and icing may reduce capacities of the booms for keeping 
the oil inside. There will be limitations as to how much oil is able to be recovered, 
and not more than 40% are expected in these regions (BASEC, 2016). Currently 
this percentage is less. The main Oil Spill Recovery methods in the Arctic areas 
give only 15 % result to remove the oil6. 
Thus, there are significant challenges related to how much capacity there should 
be for a major oil spill, the technology available for Oil Spill Response, and the 
mobilization time. 
As commercial activity moves further from the mainland, the emergency response 
system’s capabilities are stretched. The logistics are challenging when equipment, 
crew and collected oil must be transportws over long distances. The biggest 
challenge for oil spill preparedness is therefore posed by activity in the northern 
areas, especially offshore operations in the northern part of Barents Sea.  
When it comes to industry exercises for Oil Spill Response, NOFO plays a central 
role. As an example, as part of the work of verifying, maintaining and continuous 
development of the national oil spill preparedness, NOFO, together with the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration, arranges an annual realistic trial involving 
discharge of oil, called an oil-on-water trial, and documents implementation of 
this (OPV 2015). The trial helps to reveal challenges in Oil Spill Response 
capacities like lack of crane capacity at the base that lead to delays during 
mobilization, limits of transmission capacity that present a constant challenge to 
                                                          
6 The 7th Marpart conference in Nuuk, 29-30 August 2017. 
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the exchange of information between sea and shore, limitations on the detection 
ability of the sensors (OPV 2014), limitations of oil recovery by some equipment 
like barrier boom, oil trawler or current buster (OPV 2015). 
2.2.3 Violent Action Response and capacity challenges 
The capacities for Violent Action Response have been significantly increased 
after the July 22 tragedy. Each police district now has personnel with more 
training in sharp, armed operations. The police special force Delta has been 
significantly strengthened, and so have the military special forces FSK. A 
weakness has been the helicopter transport capacity for both special forces. This 
has been improved by investments in police helicopters close to Oslo, and plans 
for moving some of the military transport helicopters from the North to support 
the FSK operations. There is a need for even closer cooperation across borders in 
the North to mobilize enough resources, to safeguard critical installations such as 
oil platforms that are being moved or are on location. Joint exercises should be 
considered across borders between the special forces in the Barents Sea region. 
As more activity is taking place in the North, additional special forces capacity 
for the police should be considered in the North. 
As for regional police forces, they have limited experience in maritime operations. 
Thus, more active training together with the special forces at sea is recommended. 
Here the cooperation between the police and the Norwegian coast guard is of 
special importance and should be highlighted as to competence and coordination. 
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2.3 OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS FROM CROSS-BORDER 
COOPERATION 
2.3.1 Institutionalized cooperation 
Crisis response cooperation between Norway and the other Arctic countries are 
regulated by a broad range of agreements. The Marpart report 3 
(www.marpart.no) has provided detailed description on national relevant levels 
and agreements. From the national perspective, appropriate marine environment 
management requires local experience and knowledge. Cooperation through 
regional cooperation mechanisms, as in the regional marine programs related to 
the UN Environment Program (UNEP), the Convention for the Conservation of 
the Northeast Atlantic (OSPAR) and not the least the Arctic Council, are 
important. 
Regarding Oil Spill Response the IMO International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC) is the platform for cross 
border cooperation. Parties to the OPRC Convention are required to establish 
measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in co-operation 
with other countries. 
Ships are required to carry a shipboard oil pollution emergency plan. Operators 
of offshore units are also required to have oil pollution emergency plans or similar 
arrangements, which must be co-ordinated with national systems for responding 
promptly and effectively to oil pollution incidents. Ships are required to report 
incidents of pollution to coastal authorities. The convention details the actions that 
are to be taken. The Convention calls for the establishment of stockpiles of oil 
spill combating equipment, the holding of oil spill combating exercises and the 
development of detailed plans for dealing with pollution incidents7. Parties to the 
convention are required to provide assistance to others in the event of a pollution 
emergency. Provision is made for the reimbursement of any assistance provided. 
The Arctic Council plays a leading role in developing a common knowledge base 
and the necessary relations for cross-border cooperation in the Arctic when it 
comes to sea safety (PAME) and Oil Spill Response and Search and Rescue 
(EPPR). The Arctic Council's Working Group on Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response (EPPR) is responsible for the prevention, efforts and 
preparedness of accidents in the Arctic. EPPR facilitates the implementation of 
the Arctic Search and Rescue agreement and the Arctic oil spill preparedness and 
response agreement.  EPPR has established two Expert groups reporting to EPPR. 
These are the SAR Expert Group and the Marine Environmental Response (MER) 
Expert Group. These groups are among others focusing on increased cooperation, 
information exchange and experience sharing from joint exercises and events. The 
                                                          
7 IMO http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Oil-
Pollution-Preparedness,-Response-and-Co-operation-(OPRC).aspx 
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working group PAME –Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment is focusing 
on protection of the Arctic marine environment, and safety issues, including 
fulfillment of the Polar Code for vessels and ship owners. 
The multi-lateral agreements on cross-border cooperation provides opportunities 
to assess resources, people and share knowledge and experience in several 
countries.  Bilateral agreements provide more in-depth relations. As an example, 
Norway and Russia cooperate bilaterally on important issues In the High North, 
such as Search and Rescue, oil spill preparedness, nuclear safety, environmental 
protection, fisheries management and people-to-people cooperation. The 
Norwegian Government wishes to continue contact and constructive cooperation 
in these areas, which are mutually beneficial and contribute to low voltage and 
high predictability (Meld.St.22, 2017). 
Through a multitude of commitments, the JRCCs have a central position when it 
comes to Norway’s efforts for international SAR cooperation. Important meeting 
places, projects and platforms where the JRCCs participate on behalf of Norway 
are: 
- IMO (International Maritime Organization) and ICAO (International Civil 
Aviation Organization) participation 
- COSPAS / SARSAT – international satellite-based SAR system for 
emergency signals and information sharing 
- Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group 
(EPPR) of the Arctic Council 
- EPPR SAR Expert group (SAR EG)  
- Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation (BEAC) Joint Committee 
- NORDRED – permanent cooperation of the rescue responsibles of the 
Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden 
- Implementation of a new control center (MCC) in Bodø connected to EU’s 
ground station (project SARSAT MEOLUT NEXT) 
The two Norwegian JRCCs also participate in a broad range of national and 
international R&D projects to improve the SAR system. Among others, the EU-
funded ARCSAR project is lead by the JRCC North Norway with its goals to 
facilitate innovation within the Arctic preparedness system. The current approach 
to enhance the potential for collaboration is to increase trust and mutual 
understanding of each other’s capacities via common working groups. 
Within Oil Spill Response we find the same combination of multilateral and 
bilateral argreements. Through UN Sustainability Goal 14, Interim Objective 1, 
the world community has committed itself to preventing and significantly 
reducing all types of marine pollution by 2025, especially from land-based 
activities. The bilateral agreements between Norway and Russia include both 
SAR and oil spill.  Annual exercises (exercise Barents) provide a meeting place 
for experience sharing and consultations. 
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The Norwegian Coastal Administration works closely with sister organizations in 
other Arctic countries to improve the system. The NCA and the oil and gas 
operators’ organization NOFO run the annual “Oil –on-water” trials that may be 
developed further as an innovation arena for new technology (NCA, 2015b). 
Also, projects like SARiNOR (Search and Rescue in the High North) and 
MARPART (Maritime Preparedness and International Partnership in the High 
North) are important (Meld.St.22, 2017). These projects have highlighted both 
maritime activity changes, challenges and areas of improvement. The Marpart 
project has contributed to increased focus and debate on cross-border cooperation 
potential.  Both these projects have created a meeting place for the preparedness 
professionals, the industries and the academia. These arenas are stimulated by the 
Arctic 2030 program of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and provides 
new platforms for cooperation and innovation. The NCA is active within the 
Marine Environment Response Expert group to improve innovation within the 
Arctic Council member states. 
2.3.2 Host Nation Support on SAR and Oil Spill Response 
When an incident overwhelms national capacities and assistance is needed from 
abroad, the responsible authority in Norway has to make a formal request. DSB 
has established such a national contact point - international desk staffed 24/7 
(reached by int@dsb.no or phone +47 975 11 658). This contact point can assist 
competent authorities with requests concerning international assistance. Host 
Nation Support (HNS) in SAR operations is defined by DSB as follows “HNS 
will constitute a concrete set of resources organised in a specific manner” (DSB 
2014). This means that the Norwegian SAR-stakeholders have plans available to 
what to do and how to a) request, b) receive, c) support, and d) end the terms of 
HNS. This includes the elimination of administrative and legal obstacles and and 
adequate procedures to reduce mobilization time. 
Capacities for cooperation in Norway are specifically defined by the nomination 
of the lead ministry, emergency coordination by the Government Emergency 
Management Council (GEMC), and support function by the Government 
Emergency Support Unit (GESU). GEMC is there to increase the potential for 
cooperation between the responsible ministries and coordinates strategic 
decisions and communication (Lægreid and Rykkja 2013). 
This figure shows the international cooperation of capabilities of Norway when it 
comes to HNS. It illustrates the procedure for how Norwegian authorities can 
request assistance from abroad. 
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Figure 8: Illustration of procedure for how Norwegian authorities can request assistance from abroad 
(DSB, 2014) 
When international assistance is requested, an assessment must be made of 
whether receiving this assistance will require extra resources on the part of 
Norway. The request for HNS is directed to the Civil Defense district, which has 
a 24-hour watch system. Norwegian Civil Defense and Norwegian Armed Forces 
may in addition provide escort-resources. DSB has to make a plan for HNS, 
involving Norwegian Civil Defense, Norwegian Armed Forces and other 
resources, make sure to arrange administrative support, clear customs, provide 
facilities, accommodation, transportation, logistics support etc. All emergency 
help from abroad (personnel, equipment or other resources) utilizes a special visa 
exemption, easing of quarantine regulations, exemption from import customs etc. 
Special exemptions apply for different categories of resources, however goods 
may still have to be processed upon entry and go via staffed customs (in most 
cases during office hours 08:00-15:30). DSB provides HNS liaisons and acts as 
link, communicator, control between the Norwegian response leader organization 
and the foreign resources. Yet, also the sectoral authorities relevant to emergency 
preparedness including JRCC also have their own liaison responsible person. 
HNS liaisons will work together with each sectoral authority’s leader and customs 
to ensure tracking the foreign resources when they leave Norway. 
When it comes to the potential for cooperation in Host Nation Support from 
Norwegian side, it is the authority with “sectoral responsibility” such as the 
JRCCs and the Norwegian Coastal Administration which has the obligation to 
request assistance. If this authority has no arrangements with foreign capacities 
they may collaborate with another authority which has contact points with foreign 
entities, such as DSB in Norway holding fixed lines of communications and 
procedures with international organizations UN, NATO and EU. Yet in most 
cases, requests for assistance have to go through approval of the political 
leadership, and pass via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In case of acute pollution 
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or major oil spill, the Norwegian Coastal Administration will take care of this 
contact (DSB 2014). 
An example of significant international cooperation was the forest fires in 
Southern Norway and Southern Sweden in the summer of 2018. Reinforcements 
were sent from the fire and rescue brigades, the Civil Defense as well as fire 
fighting helicopters and planes from several EU countries to strengthen the local 
forces. 
Few countries have sufficient resources for combating major oil spills and other 
pollution incidents on their own over a longer time. NCA have the responsibility 
on behalf of Norway to follow up the different international agreements on mutual 
assistance. The following agreements and international cooperation is currently 
in place. 
Copenhagen Agreement 
Denmark including Greenland and the Faroe Island, Iceland, Finland including 
Åland, Sweden and Norway are parties to this agreement, which covers mutual 
notification, assistance and aerial surveillance of oil and other chemicals at sea. 
Bonn Agreement 
In order to limit acute oil and chemical pollution in the North Sea including 
Ireland, all countries bordering on the North Sea have entered into an agreement 
on mutual notification, assistance and environmental surveillance. 
Norway–Russia Oil spill agreement in the Barents Sea 
Norway and Russia have signed agreements on, among other issues, mutual 
notification, drills and combating acute oil spills in the Barents Sea. 
NORBRIT Plan 
Norway and the UK have developed the Norbrit Plan for joint counter pollution 
operations in the zone extending 50 miles either side of the median line separating 
the UK and Norwegian continental shelf. 
Arctic oil spill agreement and Arctic Cooperation 
The eight Arctic States signed in 2013 the Agreement on Arctic Marine Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response on, among other issues, mutual notification, 
drills and combating acute oil spills in the Arctic. 
The Arctic Council 
The Arctic Council consists of eight countries that have interests in the Arctic. 
NCA is involved in the Council’s work on acute pollution preparedness through 
the committee for Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR). 
EPPR has established a Marine Environmental Response Expert Group (MER 
EG) with the primary task to follow up the Arctic oil spill agreement, often named 
MOSPA. 
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European agreements 
Norway is a member of EMSA (European Maritime Safety Agency). NCA 
participates in the cooperation on Marine oil and chemical Pollution. NCA is 
Norway’s contact unit for notifications and request for assistance related to marine 
pollution via the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). This is the 
similar role as DSB have for Civil Protection issues. 
IMO (The International Maritime Organization) 
NCA is involved in the IMO’s work on preparedness against acute pollution. NCA 
participates in the Pollution, Prevention, Response (PPR) sub-committee, which 
among other things follows up the International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation. To a certain extent, the department also 
participates in the Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC). 
(Source: www.kystverket.no) 
If NCA activates one of the agreements above and requests assistance, NCA will 
also have to establish the Host Nation Support (HNS) plan. This plan is based on 
the EU HNS Guidelines, IMO International Offers of Assistance Guidelines and 
the Norwegian guidelines from DSB. In case of major emergencies, HNS might 
be relevant with respect to addressing the international assistance and including 
other actors in response. Within oil spill preparedness the responsibility lies with 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Norwegian Coastal 
Administration. Requests for assistance from abroad will go through the 
established channels for which this sector is responsible (DSB, 2014). 
2.3.3 Cross-border cooperation on Violent Action Response 
The maritime dimension has received increased focus within the security policy 
in recent years.  In Norway, the offshore oil and gas installations and platform 
have to be protected. Larger passenger vessels such as ferries and cruise vessels 
represent vulnerable communities of up to six thousand persons. And the traffic 
of vessels with dangerous goods also represent a security challenge.  For Norway, 
it is crucial to pursue a security policy that also safeguards the interests at sea. It 
is about the law of the sea, sovereignty, government exercise, security, defence 
and alliance policy, and free movement. The security challenges at sea are 
complex and vary considerably from region to region.  
The coast guard represents the first line of protection as to security in close 
cooperation with the police. Access to other military forces is important for the 
police in case of larger maritime incidents. Norway is a driving force for NATO 
to safeguard the maritime dimension and to have good understanding of the 
situation in the High North. Norway contributes significantly to the Alliance's 
standing maritime capabilities, especially in Northern Europe, and is a driving 
force for modernizing NATO's maritime strategy. It is important benefit if the 
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alliance fleet may strengthen collective defense and crisis management 
(Meld.St.22, 2017). 
It is very important that the standing fleet forces do not bind up with the ongoing 
operations, but are also available for collective defence and crisis management. 
Cooperation through NATO strengthens the potential resources against violent 
action, terror or piracy. 
In addition, Norway provides funds for combating environmental crime through 
the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Interpol and UN 
Environment Program. This includes dumping of chemicals and hazardous waste 
in the sea (Meld.St.37, 2015). 
There is a strong European cooperation and Host Nation Support scheme in case 
of terror. This includes cooperation of police and enforcement authorities as well 
as provision and receiving of support beyond borders. Itincludes, among others, 
access to the European Union Integrated Political Crisis Response.  
International cooperation within the Norwegian energy sector focuses also on 
security. A significant part of the petroleum activity takes place at or across the 
boundaries, or across the boundary lines between different countries' continental 
shelves. Therefore, close cooperation will give an opportunity to exchange 
experiences between the authorities in the oil and gas sector in various countries, 
both in terms of regulations, enforcement and learning from incidents 
(Meld.St.22, 2017). 
Violent Action Response at sea represents a significant challenge inluding an 
unstable operatonal field as well as logistics barriers. Also, there may be a need 
for special forces over a longer time period and attacks on different locations. This 
may wear down the existing capacity for a country, and additional support from 
other countries may be needed. Also, incidents may take place or mitigate across 
borders. Norwegian police has a close cooperation with Swedish, Danish and 
Finnish police on land-based events based on a Nordic agreement from 1972.  
Norway also has a bilateral agreement with Russia established in 1998 on 
information exchange related to crime. In 2017, there was also agreed on direct 
contact links between Finnmark police district and FSB Murmansk to combat 
crime in the sea regions between the Finnmark and the Murmansk district. At sea, 
a cooperation between the Norwegian coast guard and the coast guard part of FSB 
will be at hand. 
However, a closer cooperation on major maritime violent incidents in the Barents 
Sea between Norwegian and Russian police and special forces should be 
considered. Improved cooperation on policing and Violent Action Response call 
for frequent training and realistic exercises between the police, the special forces 
and the other SAR resouces. In the maritime Arctic, these types of exercises are 
today non-existing.  
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3 RUSSIA’S PREPAREDNESS CAPACITIES, CHALLENGES AND 
NEED FOR СOOPERATION BY SVETLANA KUZNETSOVA, 
ALEXANDER SUSLOV, IVAN SAVELIEV, DMITRY 
KOCHEGAROV AND MAXIM ZADORIN 
3.1 SEARCH AND RESCUE CAPACITIES 
This chapter examines the establishment and prompt provision of Search and 
Rescue and Oil Spill Resources in the Russian Arctic from the Barents Sea in the 
west to the Novaya Zemlya in the east.  
According to the IMO recommendations, the Russian government must ensure 
that necessary arrangements are made for distress communication and co-
ordination in their area of responsibility and for the rescue of persons in distress 
at sea around its coasts.  These arrangements shall include the establishment, 
operation and maintenance of such Search and Rescue capacities deemed 
practicable and necessary, having regard to the density of the seagoing traffic and 
the navigational dangers. They shall, so far as possible, provide adequate means 
of locating and rescuing such persons [IMO, 2016]. 
The aim of this chapter is to show how political intentions related to providing 
safety and security are being implemented in practice. 
3.1.1.1 Search and Rescue-capacities 
Under the Search and Rescue (SAR) services we understand the performance of 
distress monitoring, communication, co-ordination and Search and Rescue 
functions, including provision of medical advice, initial medical assistance, or 
medical evacuation, through the use of public and private resources, including co-
operating aircraft, vessels and other craft and installations [IMO, 2016]. 
The ship's captain is required to inform the following institutions immediately 
about the accident:  
- State Marine Rescue Coordination Center or Marine Rescue Coordination 
Centers/Subcenters if a ship is in the Search and Rescue area/territory of the 
Russian Federation: 
- Shipowner; 
- Russian State Transport Supervision Administration (Rostransnadzor); 
- Master/Captain of the nearest Russian sea port or estimated port of arrival; 
- Russian Fishery Agency if emergency case occurs with fishing fleet boat; 
- The Administration of the Northern Sea Route in an emergency case 
occurring during navigation in the waters of the Northern Sea Route. 
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The preparedness agencies exchange information about the current situation, 
availability, dislocation (redeployment), capabilities and resources and degree of 
preparedness of SAR forces. This is carried out at least once a week and 
immediately, if any changes occur. Primarily such information is forwarded to the 
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (MRCC) and Rescue Coordination 
Subcenters (MRCS) of the Ministry of Transport, and the regional crisis 
management centers of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of 
Consequences of Natural Disasters within EMERCOM -the Russian Federation 
Ministry for Emergency Situations. 
In general, for the implementation of safety and security, the following 
organizations are responsible in the northwest: MRCC/MRCS, EMERCOM, the 
Northern Expeditionary Unit of rescue and salvage operations, the Boarder Guard 
of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Search and Rescue Administration of 
the Northern Fleet, the regional SAR units, etc. 
3.1.1.2 Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers/Subcenters 
In the marine basins, the responsibility for deployment and coordination of SAR 
assets lies with the head rescue coordination center based in Moscow, and rescue 
coordination centers and sub-centers within marine basins. Currently there are 
7MRCCs (Murmansk, St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, 
Novorossiysk, Astrakhan, Vladivostok, Dikson) and 8 MRCSs (Arkhangelsk, 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Taman, Tiksi, Pevek, 
Sevastopol, Kerch) (http://gmssr.ru/en/smrcc/about-smrcc). MRCSs Tiksi 
and Pevek function only during the navigation period of the Arctic waters. 
The Murmansk MRCC and Arkhangelsk MRCS are responsible for providing 
coordination of SAR operations in the northwest including the Pechora Sea 
(http://www.smrcc.ru/). 
MRCC and MRCS have the necessary equipment designed to operate in harsh 
Arctic conditions and fully comply with the International Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue at Sea, 1979, and the International Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual. Only former captains can be appointed as 
SAR mission coordinators in the MRCC and MRCS having passed the advanced 
training courses in Global Maritime Distress & Safety System, etc. 
The response time for air resources such as helicopters and planes is 45 minutes 
in winter and 30 minutes in summer. The response time for vessels is up to 2 
hours. 
71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1.3 Maritime Rescue Service 
The responsibility for maritime SAR operations is the responsibility of 
Morspassluzhba (Maritime Rescue Service) of the Federal Marine and River 
Transport Agency (hereinafter, Rosmorrechflot), reporting to the Transport 
Ministry. 
The maritime SAR resources and equipment in the northwest are owned by 9 
Morspassluzhba’s branches and emergency rescue and underwater engineering 
divisions in the regions. 
There are 5 types of Morspassluzhba vessels according to the order 05/08 from 
2009: 
1. Rescue tug boats (mean lifetime: 28 – 36 years); 
2. Supply vessels (mean lifetime: 30 – 32 years); 
3. Maritime diving vessels (boats) (mean lifetime: 37- 42 years); 
4. Rescue salvage vessels and boats (mean lifetime: 18 – 20 years); 
5. Auxiliary vessels (mean lifetime: 22 – 25 years). 
  
Figure 9: Responsibility area of Murmansk MRCS 
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Northern branch of Morspassluzhba - Murmansk Maritime Rescue Service 
(http://sevmss.ddns.net/). 
I. Multipurpose salvage tug "Kapitan Beklemishev" project 1454, built in 1985, 
place of construction – Yaroslavl (joint stock company «Shipbuilding Plant of 
Yaroslavl»), and navigation area— unlimited. Register of Shipping class: КМ μ 
UL [1] AUT2 tug/salvage ship. 
Table 4: Main characteristics of the multipurpose salvage tug "Kapitan Beklemishev" 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m 58,61 
Width, m 12,23 
Depth, m 5,9 
Displacement, t 1662 
Gross tonnage, t 1160 
Deadweight, t 404 
Capacity of the main engine (6ЧН 30/38 (5-
2D-42) or Zulcer 8 AL 25/30), hp 
2 х 1500 
Speed, knots 12/9,5 
Freeboard draft (maximum), m 4,69 
Carrying capacity of stern cargo boom, t 5 
Maneuvering device – bow, capacity, kW 130 
Tractive force on the winch (NORWICH), tf 35 
Diving equipment Pressure chamber, two posts in the hose 
version that supports two divers at a time, 
up to a depth of 60 meters. 
2. Sea coastal tug «Sever-7», project 16332, place of construction – Murmansk, 
built in 1989, navigation area – Kola Bay, А1. Register of shipping class: КМ 
μ R3 tug. 
Table 5: Main characteristics for the tug "Sever-7 " 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m 12.41 
Width, m 3.42 
Depth, m 1.5 
Draft, m 1.03 
Displacement, t 19.93 
Gross tonnage, t 16 
Deadweight, t 02 
Crew, pers. 8 
Capacity of the main engine (6 ЧСП 15/18), kW 1 х 110 
Speed, knots 9 
Autonomy, days 5 
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3. Multipurpose salvage vessel (MSV) "Kapitan Martyshkin", built in 1987, 
project V-92/I and V-92/II, place of construction – Poland (Szczecin), navigation 
area — unlimited. Register of Shipping class: КМ μ UL [1] AUT2 Supply vessel. 
Table 6: Main characteristics of the salvage vessel (MSV) "Kapitan Martyshkin" 
Main characteristics:  
Maximum length, m 81,16 
Length between perpendiculars, m 71.45 
Theoretical width, m 16,3 
Theoretical depth, m 7,2 
Freeboard draft (maximum), m 4,9 
Displacement (summer loadline), t 4017 
Deadweight, t 1329 
Gross tonnage, t 2737 
Cargo boom – carrying capacity, t 12,5 
Main engine, total capacity, kW  2 х Zulzer-Zgoda 6ZL40/482pcs, 
5300 
Fuel type Diesel 
Variable pitch propellers, quantity 2 
Steering control PZL 
Diesel generators, total capacity, kW Zulzer 6AL 20/24, 3х412 
Maximum speed, knots / fuel consumption, t/day 15/30,0 
Economical speed, knots / fuel consumption, t/day 10,0/20 
Towage speed, knots / fuel consumption, t/day 5,0/20 
Tractive force on the winch (ND-150A), tf 82 
Diving equipment diving station for rapid deployment, 
VSBR-2, hose option. 
4. Firefighting boat «Tchasovoy», project 14613, built in 2002, place of 
construction – Rybinsk. The boat is designed for fire-fighting services of sea 
ports, specialised ports handling petroleum products, fire protection of off-shore 
oil- and gas fields and intended to: 
– escort and support vessels carrying fire-hazardous cargo; 
– extinguish fires on floating and coastal facilities approachable from the sea, 
as well as fuel burning on sea surface; 
– tow wrecked vessels and craft; 
– perform surface and undersea salvaging operations; 
– conduct primary special treatment of outside surfaces of vessels and craft; 
– carry out decontamination operations and remove oil spills from sea 
surface. 
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Table 7: Main characteristics of the Firefighting boat «Tchasovoy» 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m 39,8 
Width, m 7.8 
Draft, m 2.2 
Deadweight, t 389 
Main engine, total capacity, kW  764 
Maximum speed, knots  12 
Crew, pers. 20 
5. Salvage and boom boat «Markab», project HS-2000, built in 1989, place of 
construction — Norway, navigation area – at the distance of 50 miles from the 
coast. Register of shipping class: КМ μ L2 R2-RSN.  
Table 8: Main characteristics of the salvage and boom boat «Markab» 
Main characteristics:  
Maximum length, m 15.4 
Width, m 5 
Depth, m 1.55 
Draft, m 1.2 
Light displacement, t 34.9 
Gross tonnage, t 37 
Deadweight, t 9.6 
Allowable number of persons on board 15 
Total capacity of the main engine  (diesel 
Fiat-Aifo 828 ISRM 70/10), kW 
2 х 794 
Speed, knots 20 
Autonomy, days 5 
Type of boon on board  EXPANDY, total length  243 м 
Skimmer Mini Max — Desmi capacity, m³/h 32 
6. Diving boat “Vodolaz Petchkurov”, project А-160, built in 2012, place of 
construction Nizhny Novgorod. The vessel is intended to perform underwater 
activities at the depth up to 60 meters by sea disturbance of 3 points, to provide 
SAR. 
Table 9: Main characteristics of the diving boat «Vodolaz Petchkurov» 
Main characteristics:   
Maximum length, m 28,43 
Width, m 5,68 
Draft, m 1,5 
Deadweight, t 94,6 
Crew, persons 3 
Divers  5 
Total capacity of the main engine, kW 2 x 442 
Speed, knots 14,1 
Autonomy, days 20 
Tank capacity, cubic meters 1,41 
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7. Dumb crane boat «SPK-19/35» project D-9040, built in 1989, place of 
construction – Hungary, navigation area – Kola Bay, А1. Register of Shipping 
class: КМ  μ R3 floating crane. 
Table 10: Main characteristics of the dumb crane boat «SPK-19/35» 
The main characteristics:  
Gross tonnage, t 606.00 
Net tonnage, t 181 
Deadweight, t 211.00 
Length, m  36.30 
Width, m 18.50 
Depth, m 3.20 
Carrying capacity, t 35 
8. Multipurpose salvage vessel "Murman" project MPSV06, built in 2015, place 
of construction – Wismar, Germany (joint stock company «Nordic Yard 
Wismar»), navigation area is unlimited. The ice class is Icebreaker6. The vessel 
is intended to assist in Oil Spill Response, SAR, dragging, towing. It is equipped 
with the firefighting system. It has two large cranes, for salvage, and a landing 
platform for helicopters. It is capable of operating remotely operated underwater 
vehicles, and has decompression facilities sufficient to support a team of deep 
divers. 
Table 11: Main characteristics of the multipurpose salvage vessel «Murman» 
Main characteristics:  
Maximum length, m 85,38 
Width, m 19,10 
Deadweight, t 5127 
Gross tonnage, t 4372 
Main engine, total capacity, kW  2 х 3500 
Maximum speed, knots  15 
Economical speed, knots  11.00 
Crew, persons 12 
Passenger capacity, persons 75 
Container capacity, FEU 12 
Tank capacity, cubic meters  800 
Diving equipment Deepwater diving vehicle GVK-300 (diving depth 300 
m), remove control deep water operating vehicle 
Sperre SUB fighter 7500v,  side-scanning sonar , 
inboard oil-gathering device with cranes manufactured 
by LAMOR  
9. Salvage and boom boat «Viktor Petrov», project А40-2Б, built in 2011, place 
of construction — Rybinsk, navigation area – R3-RSN. Mixed (river-sea) 
navigation with the distance from the harbor up to 50 miles. Register of Shipping 
class: КМ Ice 2 R3-RSN AUT3 oil recovery ship (>600). The rescue boat for 
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booms installation is a vessel functioning within the coastal infrastructure of sea 
and river ports which is to provide safe shipping and to protect the environment 
at oil spills. It is intended for: 
– transportation and installation of floating slick-bars, delivery of emergency 
and nature-conservation equipment to the places of oil spills; 
– localization of the spread of spilled mineral oil into rigid floating tanks of 
not less than 2 m3, and its subsequent towing to the receiving point of the 
shore or floating stations; 
– construction of oil collecting orders. 
Table 12: Main characteristics of the salvage and boom boat «Viktor Petrov» 
The main characteristics:  
Maximum length, m 19.90 
Width, m 4.70 
Deadweight, t 45,6 
Draft, m 1,05 
Main engine, total capacity, kW  2x442 
Maximum speed, knots  20.0 
Economical speed, knots  12.0 
Crew, persons 2 
Arkhangelsk branch of Morspassluzhba (http://arkh.morspas.com/) 
1. Salvage tug «Vyborg», project 8059.1, place of construction – Germany, year 
of construction - 1970. 
Table 13: Main characteristics of the salvage tag «Vyborg» 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  34.75 
Width, m 8.6 
Mean draught, m 2.84 
Deadweight, t 71 
Total capacity, kW 640 
Navigation area 20 miles 
Speed, knots    10 
Crew, people 8 
2. Maritime salvage tug of coastal navigation «ASPTR-5», project - Р-100, place 
of construction – Taganrog, year of construction - 1967. 
Table 14: Main characteristics of the salvage tag «ASPTR-5» 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  19,5  
Width, m 6 
Mean draught, m 1,03 
Deadweight, t 9,6 
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Total capacity, kW 2 x 150/110,4 
Main engine 2 x 3Д 6 
Navigation area 1000 miles by wind of 4 on Beaufort scale and waves height of 2 m 
Speed, knots 9,5 
Crew, people 6 
3. Rescue Sea vessel «Metel», project – 1458, place of construction – Astrakhan, 
year of construction - 1981. 
Table 15: Main characteristics of the rescue sea vessel “Metel” 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  27.07  
Width, m 6.64 
Mean draught, m 1.60 
Deadweight, t 8 
Total capacity, kW 1693 
Main engine 3Д12А1 
Navigation area А1, А2 
Speed, knots    17 
Crew, people 10 
Places for the rescued, persons 40 
4. Diving boat «Signal», project - РВМ-376, place of construction – Sosnovka, 
year of construction - 1985. 
Table 16: Main characteristics of the diving boat “Signal” 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  19 
Width, m 3.8 
Mean draught, m 1.2 
Deadweight, t 9.7 
Total capacity, kW 110 
Navigation area, miles А1, 10 
Speed, knots    10 
Diving equipment air compressor, pressure chamber, 2 diving station provided for 
2 divers at the depth of 60 m, underwater welding, cutting, video. 
4. Rescue boom boat «Hitek-85С», project – Hitek, place of construction – Ireland 
(EK MARINE).  
Table 17: Main characteristics of the rescue boom “Hitek-85C” 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  7.58 
Width, m 2.65 
Mean draught, m 1.0 
Navigation area, miles 50 
Speed, knots    30 
Persons onboard 10 
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5. Rescue dump barge «ASPTR – 8», project М – 10, place of construction – 
USSR, year of construction - 1973. Navigation area: coast. 
Table 18: Main characteristics of the dump barge “ASTR - 8” 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  16.03 
Width, m 4.97 
6. Diving vessel «Rybinsk», project SDS08, place of construction – Yaroslavl, 
year of construction - 2012.  Ice2 class. Can provide firefighting, tugging, OSR, 
load-lifting of objects of 2 tons. 
Table 19: Main characteristics of the diving vessel “Rybinsk” 
The main characteristics:  
Length, m  38,35 
Width, m 7,92 
Mean draught, m 2,35 
Deadweight, t 45 
Total capacity, kW 2 x 442 
Speed, knots    12 
Crew  7 
Tanks volume for oil product waters, m3 1,41 
Diving equipment Underwater activities at the depth of 60 m, remote 
controlled device,  underwater welding, cutting 
7. Diving boat “Vodolaz Sazonov”, project A-160, place of construction –Nizhny Novgorod, 
year of construction - 2012.  Ice2 class, navigation area: river-sea, 50 miles from the coast.  
Table 20: Main characteristics of the diving boat “Vodolaz Sazonov” 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  28,43 
Width, m 5,68 
Mean draught, m 1,5 
Deadweight, t 94,6 
Total capacity, kW 2 х 442 
Speed, knots    14,1 
Crew  3 
Tanks volume for oil product waters, m3 1,41 
Diving equipment Underwater activities at the depth of 60 m 
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The Northern Expeditionary Unit of rescue and salvage operations 
(http://www.seoasr.ru/RescueFleet/rf) 
The main tasks of the Federal State Institution "The Northern Expeditionary Unit 
of rescue and salvage operations” are to ensure navigational safety of fishing 
vessels and to perform Search and Rescue operations in the areas of fishing. 
Currently the Northern Expeditionary Unit has 5 ships. They are mainly marine 
salvage tugboats - multi-purpose diesel-electric ships for transportation and 
disembarkation, diving or deep-see salvage operations, fire-fighting operations. 
One is an ice-breaking Search and Rescue vessel. 
1. Salvage tug “Purga”, project 1454, place of construction – Nikolaev city, year 
of construction – 1974. 
Table 21: Main characteristics of the salvage tag “Purga” 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  58,3 
Width, m 12,6 
Mean draught, m 4,68 
Deadweight, t 1618 
Main engine type 5-2Д42 
Total capacity, kW 2х 1104 
Navigation area Unlimited 
Speed, knots    13,5 
Crew, people 27 
2. Salvage tug «Murmanryba», project 1454, place of construction – Yaroslavl, 
Russia, year of construction - 1979. 
Table 22: Main characteristics of the salvage tag “Murmanryba” 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  58,3 
Width, m 12,6 
Mean draught, m 4,68 
Deadweight, t 1618 
Main engine type Wartsila 9L20 
Total capacity, kW 2х 1215 
Navigation area Unlimited 
Speed, knots    13,5 
Crew, people 27 
3. Salvage tug “Mikula”, project 1454, place of construction – Yaroslavl, Russia, 
year of construction - 1980. 
  
80 
Table 23: Main characteristics of the salvage tag “Mikula” 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  58,3 
Width, m 12,6 
Mean draught, m 4,68 
Deadweight, t 1618 
Main engine type Wartsila 9L20 
Total capacity, kW 2х 1215 
Navigation area Unlimited 
Speed, knots    13,5 
Crew, people 27 
4. Salvage tug “Atriya”, project 1454, place of construction – Yaroslavl, Russia, 
year of construction - 1985. 
Table 24: Main characteristics of the salvage tag “Atriya” 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  58,3 
Width, m 12,6 
Mean draught, m 4,68 
Deadweight, t 1618 
Main engine type 5-2Д42 
Total capacity, kW 2х 1104 
Navigation area Unlimited 
Speed, knots    13,5 
Crew, people 27 
5. Icebreaking salvage ship «Stahanovets», place of construction – Finland, year 
of construction – 1980. 
Table 25: Main characteristics of the salvage ship “Stahanovets” 
Main characteristics:  
Length, m  72,07 
Width, m 18,0 
Mean draught, m 6,7 
Deadweight, t 4191 
Main engine type PC2-SL400 
Total capacity, kW 2х 2846 
Navigation area Unlimited 
Speed, knots    16,2 
Crew, people 25 
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3.1.1.4 Federal Agency of Air Traffic (http://www.favt.ru/) 
It is a managing body of the unified system of the aerospace Search and Rescue 
in Russia at the federal level and reports to the Ministry of Transport. 127 aircrafts 
and helicopters in total must be on duty at airports in Russia. The main task of 
these divisions is to provide assistance to aircrafts, their crews and passengers in 
distress but the SAR resources of the aerospace Search and Rescue in Russia can 
also be involved in SAR operations providing assistance for example to ships.  
There are 3 helicopters MI-8 always on duty in airports of Murmansk, 
Arkhangelsk, and Naryan-Mar. 
Table 26: Main characteristics of MI-8 helicopter 
Crew, number of people 3 
Engine 2хТВ2-117А 
Thrust, kilogram-force 1700 
Aircraft empty weight (kg) 12000 
Payload weight, kg 4000 
Number of passengers, people 28 
Winch carrying capacity, kg 150 
Cruising air speed (km/hour) 230 – 250 
Maximum flying distance (km) 445-465 (300-350 if  hovering over an 
object in distress during 20 min)  
3.1.1.5 EMERCOM 
10 Arctic maritime rescue centers of EMERCOM will be located in Dudinka, 
Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Naryan-Mar, Vorkuta, Nadym, Tiksi, Pevek, 
Provideniya and Anadyr. A total of 980 persons will be working at the centers, 
according to EMERCOM. 6 of these centers are already opened. 
Figure 10: Main characteristics of MI-8 helicopter 
[http://severpost.ru/read/33644/bank_view_info.php?bank_id=2], 
[http://51.mchs.gov.ru/pressroom/intervju/item/337810/] 
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On October 21, 2015 a specialized Arctic Rescue Center of EMERCOM was 
opened in Murmansk (www.regnum.ru/news/society/1996001.html). The Center 
was created in the framework of the federal target program "Risk reduction and 
mitigation of natural and man-made disasters in the Russian Federation". The 
Center’s main tasks are prevention and elimination of emergency situations of 
natural and man-made disasters in the Arctic zone of the Murmansk region, the 
area of which is 847,000 square kilometers. Staff number of the Emergency 
Rescue Center is 65 people. There are 9 units of equipment in the center, including 
2 boats, aircrafts used for Search and Rescue operations. But the center aircrafts’ 
base is located in Saint-Petersburg, currently the issue of polar aviation 
revitalization and creation of an air base for aircraft in Murmansk is under 
discussion. 
3.1.1.6 Arctic Rescue Center’s Search and Rescue equipment 
1. Boat «Leader-12М». Length overall is 13.3 m (13.0), transport width is 4,5 m 
(4,0), maximum speed is up to 35 knots. With a cruising speed of 30 knots boat’s 
range is up to 500 miles. The boat uses two engines of Volvo Penta type (Sweden) 
with a capacity of 575 horsepower each, as well as water-jet propeller Hamilton. 
Ship hull is made of aluminium. The boat is equipped with berths for 6 people 
with passenger capacity up to 12 people.  
2. Boat «Stringer-550Р». The boat can be used in the coastal zone in the seas 
with wave height of up to 4-8 FT-1.25-2.50 meters (4 grades). The boat is 
equipped with inflatable sides. The boat’s inflatable tubes are made of reinforced 
polyvinyl chloride with density of 1300 g/m² - it has 5 separate sections. External 
surface of the inflatable tube is protected from damage by sticking to it additional 
layers of polyvinyl stripes. There is built-in fuel tank in the hold of Aft cockpit. 
The stern part of the boat along transom is protected with a seem - welded stainless 
railing. There are automatic bilge pump and 4 armchairs. The boat is equipped 
with a searchlight with remote control, navigation lights, ship first-aid kit, life 
jackets in the amount of 8 pieces. 
Table 27: Main characteristics of the boat “Stringer-550P” 
Length, m  5,6 
Width, m 2,45  
Height (m) 2,15 
Boat empty weight (kg) 640 
Full fuel  (l) 120 
Cargo carrying capacity (kg) 700 
Number of passengers (people)  8 
Full engine power (h.p.) 150 
3. IL-76 – transport long range aircraft designed to carry large equipment and 
cargos. It has sturdy fuselage, wings and undercarriage allowing extending 
maximum payload range. 
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Table 28: Main characteristics of IL-76 aircraft 
Length, m  46,6 
Wingspread (m) 50,5  
Height over tailfin (m) 14,76 
Height over cab (m) 7,04 
Aircraft empty weight (kg) 86700 
Full fuel  (l) 90,0 
Fuel consumption (kg/hour) 8000 
Cruising air speed (km/hour) 750 
Operating ceiling (m) 12000 
Maximum flying distance (km) 7500 
Maximum Takeoff Weight (t) 190,0 
Maximum Landing Weight (t) 151,5 
The maximum cargo weight (t) 50,0 
4. Hydro airplane Be-200 is a multi-functional aircraft. It can be used for 
protection and patrolling the waters, goods and passengers transportation, fire 
fighting and rescue missions. 
Table 29: Main characteristics of Be-200 hydroplan 
Crew, people 2 
Engine 2хД-436ТП 
Thrust, kilogram-force 7500 
Aircraft empty weight (kg) 28000 
Payload weight, kg 6000 
Number of passengers 65 
Cruising air speed (km/hour) 610 – 710 
Maximum flying distance (km) 3600 
5. AN-148 – patrol aircraft. 
Table 30: Main characteristics of AN-148 aircraft 
Crew, number of people 2 
Engine 2хTRDD D-436-148 
Thrust, kilogram-force 6830 
Aircraft empty weight (kg) 38550 
Payload weight, kg 9680 
Number of passengers 85 
Cruising air speed (km/hour) 800 – 870 
Maximum flying distance (km) 2100 
6. Helicopter MI-8 (see characteristics on page 81). 
3.1.1.7 Arkhangelsk Arctic Rescue Center 
September 23, 2014, a specialized Arctic Rescue Center of EMERCOM was 
opened in Arkhangelsk. Like the Murmansk Arctic Rescue Center, it is a branch 
of the North-Western SAR Department whose main office is located in Saint-
Petersburg. The staff is 63 people, 45 of them are rescuers. 
84 
Arkhangelsk Arctic Rescue Center’ tasks are to respond to emergency situations 
in the Arctic areas and to provide firefighting, underwater works, OSR, SAR, etc. 
The responsibility area includes the territory of the Arkhangelsk region (587,400 
square km); inland waters and territorial waters of the White, Barents, and Kara 
Seas (http://29.mchs.gov.ru/document/4908927).  
The SAR vessels and equipment of the Arkhangelsk Arctic Rescue Center: 
1. Maritime Rescue Tug «Neotrazimy» built in 1981 is equipped with the three 
level icebreaker head and can provide underwater activities at the depth up to 50 
meters. 
Table 31: Main characteristics of maritime rescue tag “Neotraziny” 
The main characteristics:  
Length, m  58,3 
Width, m 12,6 
Mean draught, m 3, 75 
Deadweight, t 408 
Main engine type 25/30 8AL 
Total capacity, kW 1900 кВт 
Navigation area Limited A-2 
Speed, knots    13.5 
1. Firefighting vessel «Vyun», project 16640, is intended to assist vessels in 
distress and coastal construction by fires. The crew of the vessel can use both 
hoses and fire monitors - an aimable controllable high-capacity water jet used for 
firefighting designed to accommodate foam which has been injected in the 
upstream piping to extinguish oil products fires. This vessel can tow burning 
objects to safe places and dewater.  
Table 32: Main characteristics of firefiting vessel “Vyun” 
The main characteristics:  
Length, m  30,95 
Width, m 5,24 
Mean draught, m 0,85 
Deadweight, t 70,14 
Main engine type 2 x 124НС 18/20 (МУ19А) 
Total capacity, kW 810 
Navigation area Limited: rivers and lakes 
Speed, km   36 
Crew, persons 2 
Firefighter crew, persons  6 
Fire monitors 3 
Jet distance, meters  70 (water), 40 (foam) 
Firefighting equipment 117 hoses of different diameters: 150, 77, 66, 51 mm, 4 
pumps with capacity of 60 liters per second, 9 foam 
generators, etc. 
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2. Boat «20 years of EMERCOM» of the Leader-12М type (mail characteristics 
see above). http://fleetphoto.ru/projects/2933/ 
3. Boat «Stringer-550Р» (mail characteristics see above). 
4. Boat “BL-820” constructed in 2008 in Saint-Petersburg can be used in the 
coastal zone at the maximal distance of 50 miles from the harbor with the wave 
height up to 3 meters. The boat is equipped with inflatable sides. The passage 
capacity is 12 persons. The speed is 25 knots. 
5. Boat «Kasatka» constructed in 2008 in Nizhny Novgorod can be used in the 
coastal zone at the maximal distance of 3,600 meters from the harbor with the 
wave height up to 2 meters. The passage capacity is 6 persons. 
6. Patrol rescue boat «KS-7S» constructed in 2008 in Kostroma can be used in 
the coastal zone at the maximal distance of 12 miles from the harbor with the 
wave height up to 1,5 meters. The passage capacity is 12 persons. 
7. Boat «Hitek-75» constructed in 2007 in Nizhny Novgorod can be used in the 
coastal zone at the maximal distance of 2,000 meters from the harbor with the 
wave height up to 0,5 meter. The passage capacity is 10 persons. 
8. Boat of the AK-690 project constructed in 2007 in Saint-Petersburg can be 
used in the coastal zone at the maximal distance of 2 miles from the harbor with 
the wave height up to 1 meter. The passage capacity is 4 persons. 
9. Boat «Favorit F500» constructed in 2008 in Saint-Petersburg can be used in 
the coastal zone at the maximal distance of 3,000 meters from the harbor with the 
wave height up to 1 meter. The passage capacity is 8 persons. 
10. Boat «Favorit » constructed in 2009 in Saint-Petersburg can be used in the 
coastal zone at the maximal distance of 2,000 meters from the harbor with the 
wave height up to 0,5 meters. The passage capacity is 10 persons. 
11. Hovercraft boat «Argo» constructed in 2011 in the Leningrad region can be 
used in the coastal zone at the maximal distance of 2,000 meters from the harbor 
with the wave height up to 0,6 meters. The passage capacity is 10 persons. 
12. Hovercraft boat «Khivus» constructed in 2007 in Nizhny Novgorod can be 
used in the coastal zone at the maximal distance of 2,000 meters from the harbor 
with the wave height up to 0,4 meters. The passage capacity is 10 persons. 
13. Hovercraft boat «Khivus-10» constructed in 2016 in Nizhny Novgorod can 
be used in the coastal zone at the maximal distance of 3,000 meters from the 
harbor with the wave height up to 0,6 meters. The passage capacity is 10 persons. 
In addition, there are 10 EMERCOM fire stations located in the cities of 
Arkhangelsk, Kotlas, Severodvinsk. Some of them are trained to provide 
assistance at water in emergency situations. 
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3.1.1.8 Other regional SAR capacities 
The responsibility for SAR and fire safety in communities lies with each region 
of the Russian Federation. It means that regional fire stations, fire brigades, rescue 
services are equipped, trained at the expense of the regional budget. There are 62 
regional fire stations and 89 fire brigades (1,716 firefighters). 
The Arkhangelsk region Agency for State Fire Service and Civil protection as an 
organisational body within the regional government is responsible for managing 
the regional fire stations and other emergency organisations 
(https://dvinaland.ru/gov/-64eh614g). 
Arkhangelsk Regional Rescue Service operates under the jurisdiction of the 
Agency for State Fire Service and Civil Protection of Arkhangelsk Region and 
performs rescue missions, including firefighting, SAR, mitigation of large-scale 
chemical accidents, OSR, etc. The staff is 122 people. In 2007, an Aviation 
Rescue Swimmer division was established in ARRS in order to help the injured 
at sea. It is the only unit in the northwest of Russia whose rescue swimmers 
perform direct deployment by jumping in water from the helicopter 
(www.aocc.ru). 
The Civil Protection Center is another emergency organization with the staff of 
65 people that operates under the jurisdiction of the Agency for State Fire Service 
and Civil Protection and has the tasks to provide SAR, underwater works, etc. It 
owns 5 boats. One of them – the boat «Barents» - has the characteristics to 
navigate in seawaters. Its overall length is 11 m, maximum speed is up to 60 km/h. 
The boat uses two engines with a capacity of 340 horsepower each. Passenger 
capacity is up to 12 people (http://29.mchs.gov.ru/document/1324021).   
The “2nd Arkhangelsk United Aviation Division” is the largest enterprise 
operating helicopters in North-West region of Russia which provide 
transportation of passengers, cargo, and SAR. The company has a special 
agreement with the Agency for State Fire Service and Civil Protection to provide 
helicopters for SAR and firefighting, rendering of medical service to the 
population, etc. One helicopter is always on duty at the airport Vaskovo. At 
present, the helicopter fleet includes Mi-8T, Mi-8MTV and Mi-26 helicopters and 
planes – An-2 and L410-UVP-E planes (http://2aoao.ru). 
Table 33: Main characteristics of Mi-8T helicopter 
Crew 3 members  
Quantity of passengers  22 people  
Length (with rotating wings) 25,24 m  
Height (with rotating steering rotor) 5,65 m  
Diameter of main rotor  21,3 m  
Weight empty  6934 kg  
Normal take-off mass  11100 kg  
Max take-off mass  12000 kg  
Engines 2 х ТВ2-117 
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Engine power (on taking-off mode) 2 х 1500 h.p. 
Max speed 250 km/h 
Cruising speed  190 km/h 
Service ceiling  4500 m  
Range 1035 km  
Table 34: Main characteristics of Mi-8MTV helicopter 
Crew 3 members  
Quantity of passengers  22 people  
Length (with rotating wings) 25,35 m  
Height (with rotating steering rotor) 5,52 m  
Diameter of main rotor  21,3 m  
Weight empty  7381 kg  
Normal take-off mass  11100 kg  
Max take-off mass  13000 kg  
Engines 2 х ТВ3-117ВМ 
Engine power (on taking-off mode) 2 х 2000 h.p. 
Max speed 250 km/h 
Cruising speed  190 km/h 
Service ceiling  6000 m  
Range 1300 km  
Mi-26 is a multipurpose, wide-body transportation helicopter for air fright lift of 
cargo up to 20 tons both inside of cargo compartment and on a sling load. Power 
specifications of the engine make it possible to use the helicopter in an effective 
way in wide range of altitudes and ambient air temperatures, also to perform 
forward flight and approach with one engine operative. Design, equipment and 
systems of Mi-26 helicopter enable to operate it in day and night time in heavy 
weather conditions, over flatland, rolling country and mountains. Operation of the 
helicopter does not require special ground support equipment (such as 
stepladders, since engine and transmission cowlings in open position are bridges) 
and the helicopter is capable to long-time and independent basing. 
Airborne auxiliary power provides independent engines starting, power supply 
during cargo operations, test of aircraft equipment, air conditioning in the cockpit, 
heating and ventilation in the cargo compartment on the ground in the time of 
loading/unloading of vehicle. 
Table 35: Main characteristics of Mi26 helicopter 
Crew 6 members  
Quantity of passengers  4 people  
Length (with rotating wings) 40,03 m  
Height (with rotating steering rotor) 11,6 m  
Diameter of main rotor  32 m  
Weight empty  28150 kg  
Normal take-off mass  49500 kg  
Max take-off mass  56000 kg  
Engines 2 х ГТД Д-136 
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Engine power (on taking-off mode) 2 х 10000 h.p.  
Max speed 270 km/h 
Cruising speed  235 km/h 
Service ceiling  6500 m  
Range 1920 km  
L-410 is the universal twin-engine plane for domestic airlines. It has increased, 
relative to An-2 plane, speed, convenience and flight regularity, up-to-date 
avionic, providing performance of flights in heavy meteorological conditions in 
day and night and in any season. The plane, as the base passenger variant for 
transportation of 19 persons, can be used in cargo, medicine, airplane mapping, 
and patrol and fish survey variants. 
Table 36: Main characteristics of L-410 aircraft 
Crew 2 members  
Quantity of passengers  19 people  
Length (in land position) 14,42 m  
Height (in flight line)  5,83 m  
General span of wing 19,98 m  
Weight empty  4050 kg  
Normal take-off mass 6400 kg  
Payload  1710 kg  
Engine 2 x ТВД Motorlet (Walter) M 601Е 
Engine power (on taking-off mode) 2 х 750 h.p. 
Max speed 350 km/h 
Cruising speed  330 km/h 
Service ceiling  8400 m  
Range 1150 km  
3.1.1.9 MiIlitary SAR resources 
The main military resources able to be involved in SAR operations in the Arctic 
region include rescue tow and rescue vessels of the Departments for SAR 
activities: 
- rescue tug vessels of the 5757 project («Foty Krylov»; «Nikolay Chiker»); 
- the rescue vessel of the 537 project («Alagez»); 
- rescue tug vessels of the 712 project («SB-406»; «SB-408»); 
- rescue tug vessels of the 714 project («SB-521», «SB-522»; «MB-105»; 
«SB-523»); 
- rescue tug vessels of the 1452 project («Alatau»; «Mashuk»; «Pamir»; 
«Altay»); 
- the diving vessel of the 11980 project («BM-596»). 
Within SAR operations in the Arctic, the military helicopter Mi-8АМТ and 
aircrafts Il-76 are at hand. The rescue container can be hoisted down on the water 
to provide means for people to survive.  
89 
There are always 2-3 rescue vessels of the Navy on duty in different responsibility 
areas to be ready to respond within 1 hour [Taranukha, 2014]. 
The Northern Fleet, based in the Murmansk region, can if necessary, provide its 
rescue vehicles and equipment for the maritime Search and Rescue operations 
(http://flot.com/nowadays/strength/surfaceships/#spas-tug. This includes the 
following units: 
1. Helicopter KА-27 PS is designated for Search and Rescue operations at sea 
and on-shore at any time of day or night and in all seasons and weather and in 
seas with Significance Wave Height (SWH)  up to 2,5 - 4,0 m. It can fly on a SAR 
mission within a radius of about 200 – 250 km and hover above a ship or a person 
in distress for 20 minutes. It has lifting winch onboard with freight-carrying 
capacity of 300 kg. External load system provides transportation of spacecraft or 
other cargo weighing up to 3 tons. The unique undercarriage design provides 
taking off and landing on the deck during ship’s motion in waves. For an 
emergency landing on water helicopter has emergency airbags/ballonets. If 
necessary a seat or a belt can be attached to helicopter’s lifting winch to lift people 
aboard. In addition, there are the inflatable belts, two boats, rafts on board. It can 
also serve as an emergency medical service helicopter. There is a possibility to 
set up to 4 stretchers, 2 folding chairs, a table for medical staff/doctor, oxygen 
apparatus on board. The crew of the helicopter is four people, including a doctor’s 
assistant - rescuer, which compulsorily has a special diving and medical training. 
2. Helicopter MI-8 (the main characteristics and tasks shown above). 
3. Multirole and multifunctional boat “Saver Kononenko”. The crew of the boat 
can carry out Search and Rescue, underwater technical operations, as well as dive 
to a depth of 45 meters. There are advanced diving and fire-fighting equipment 
on board, as well as hydraulic crane-manipulator with lifting capacity of up to five 
tons, and cargo boom with a mechanical winch with carrying capacity up to 250 
kilograms. 
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The Northern sea route – the ROSATOM FLEET (www.rosatom.ru) 
One of the main challenges for more use of the sea route is the need for new 
icebreakers. Now the Russian nuclear-powered icebreakers fleet consists of 6 
vessels. It should be noted that the icebreakers and ice class rescue vessels are and 
will also act as “floating” SAR and oil response units. During the Northern Sea 
Route navigation season (June-October), SAR and OSR equipment and response 
teams are placed on two icebreakers – an atomic one and a diesel-powered one.   
Murmansk is the base for Rosatomflot vessels. In the event of a maritime accident 
in areas with heavy ice conditions nuclear icebreakers of Rosatomflot may be 
involved (when possible) into Search and Rescue operations. The most multi-
functional vessels of Rosatomflot are nuclear - powered icebreakers “Yamal” and 
“50 years of Victory”. They have similar technical characteristics. "Yamal" has a 
cruising speed of 20.6 knots, is capable of breaking through ice up to 2.5 meters 
(9.2 feet) thick. As emergency and life saving equipment the atomic icebreaker 
"Yamal" can carry covered plastic motor lifeboats and inflatable rescue rafts PSN-
10 MK as well as a tugboat "Orlan". There is a range of facilities and appliances, 
including a hangar for helicopters.  
 
Figure 11: Location of icebreakers (in red – diesel-powered icebreakers, in blue – atomic icebreakers). 
Source: Rosmorrechflot http://www.morflot.ru/lenta/n15.html 
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3.1.1.10 Hospital capacities 
In the Murmansk region, there are 51 hospitals, from them 33 regional, 18 
municipal, 3 middle level ones. Besides, 7 federal and 16 private hospitals are 
situated in the region [State health care programme of the Murmansk region]. 
In 1992, a team of the rescue doctors was established in the regional hospital. 
They are able to provide assistance in the very extreme Arctic conditions.  
Today, there are 11 such teams. Only the experienced intensivists, neurosurgeons, 
heart surgeons, chidren’s doctors, etc. [Murmansk vestnik, 2010]. 
In the Arkhangelsk region, there are 38 regional, 6 federal and 5 private hospitals; 
150 clinics. In total, the hospitals can provide almost 10,000 places for ill and 
injured people [State health care programme of the Arkhangelsk region, 2015]. 
Air ambulance service was established in the Arkhangelsk region in 1938. The 
“2nd Arkhangelsk United Aviation Division” provides the helicopters MI-8, 
aircrafts AN-2, L-410 for doctors and medical staff of the Arkhangelsk regional 
hospital [https://minzdrav29.ru]. 
The response time of the air ambulances is 40 minutes. 
3.1.2 Oil Spill Response 
According to some statistical data, more than half of accidental discharges (oil 
spills) occur when oil tankers transfer it. 75% of oil tanker’s accidents occur due 
to human failure.  According to accidental oil spills statistics for 2012-2016 years, 
the greater number of violation of rules of safety regulations and tanker incidents 
involving large oil spills in Russia occur during loading and unloading operations 
at the terminals. 
The authorities in charge of Oil Spill Response/OSR organization include federal 
executive bodies (Rosmorechflot and its branches, Energy Ministry, EMERCOM, 
Federal Fishery Agency, etc.); regions’ executive bodies; local self-government 
bodies; and organizations engaging in petroleum exploration, production, 
processing and transportation.  
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System receives signals and alerts a vessel 
about oil spillage, organizes communication between vessels and MRCCs as well 
as provides mariners with vital maritime safety information. 
3.1.2.1 OSR resources of the Murmansk region 
In the Murmansk region, the Murmansk branch office of Morspassluzhba and the 
Arctic Sea Specialized Inspectorate are responsible for prevention and response 
of the emergency situations related to the exploitation of oil and gas facilities, as 
well as for the implementation of state control in the field of environmental 
management and protection of marine environment. The Murmansk regional 
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branch of EMERCOM is to exercise overall control over security and participate 
in SAR operations. 
The Northern branch of Morspassluzhba provides OSR and oil spill prevention 
from the Norwegia-Russian border to 125°E in the west: in the Kola bay, in Vitino 
in the White Sea, at Varanday terminal in the Pechora Sea and at Rosneft fields 
in the Kara Sea. 
The total number of staff employed by Murmansk branch office of 
Morspassluzhba is 209 people, including branch office in Kandalaksha city (84 
people). Murmansk Basin Rescue Department is responsible for Oil Spill 
Recovery at regional level (oil spill scale at 500 to 5000 tons maximum). 
Murmansk Basin Rescue Department is an owner of special-purpose vessels such 
as “Svetlomor-3”, “Captain Martyshkin” and others vessels equipped with oil 
socks and skimmers. Currently “Svetlomor-3” is used in Black Sea area as supply 
vessel, “Captain Martyshkin” – in World’s oceans and seas. For Search and 
Rescue operations in Kola Bay “Markab” – high-speed oil garbage 
collector/boom pitter vessel, “VRB-4” and “VRB-10” are used. “Captain 
Nikolaev” is used in the Arctic. 
Table 37: Vessels of Morspassluzhba (Marine Rescue Service), Murmansk branch 
Vessel Function 
motor vessel UMKA Headquarters vessel. Trawling and oil skimming with 
trawl, boom and skimmer. Oil pumping from ship in 
distress 
motor vessel  SVETLOYE MORE Boom laying, trawling oil areas, receiving oil 
collected from other vessels. Oil pumping from ship 
in distress. Oil sweeping. Coordination of small 
vessel operation 
boom-laying boat MARKAB High velocity boom-laying boat 
 
Boat MOB-207 Small cargo vessel with the crew of 9 members, 
passenger capacity of 22 people and weight-carrying 
capacity of 3075 tons 
Technical facilities of Morspassluzhba (Marine Rescue Service), Murmansk 
branch 
Table 38: Technical facilities of Morspassluzhba (Marine Rescue Service), Murmansk branch 
Technical facility Specifications 
Boom OCEAN- 2000 length 1000 м (4x250 м) 
1 container 2 containers 3 containers 
weight 6400 kg weight 6400 kg weight 3200 kg 
Measurements 
2800x2200x2200 
mm 
2800x2250x2200 
mm 
2800x2200x220 
0 mm 
Boom EXPANDY Length 243 м 
weight 2700 кг 
measurements 1900x1900x1700 mm 
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Outboard side trap ROSVIP fixed on board, can operate at maximum wave height of up 
to 3 m. measurements 2250x1950x1700 mm 
1 container 2 containers 3 containers 
weight 2200 kg 110 kg 2000 kg 
Measurements 
2400x1300x1850 
mm 
2500x1750x1800 
mm 
800x2260x1800 
mm 
Pumping capacity:  
ТК-8 – up to 1000 cu m per hour,  ТК-5 – up to 450 cu m 
per hour 
Skimmer WALOSEP W2 capacity – 45 cu m per hour 
power plant unit weight – 1100 kg,  
power plant unit measurements 1650x1100x1100 mm 
skimmer weight – 450 kg 
skimmer measurements 2000x2000x1900 mm 
Skimmer DESMI-250 capacity – 70 cu m per hour 
container weight – 3145 kg 
container measurements 2440x2900x2440 mm 
Skimmer FOXTAIL УАВ 
4-9  
Capacity  – 30 cu m per hour 
power plant unit weight – 750 kg,  
container measurements 1500x800x1100 mm 
container weight – 585 kg, 
container measurements 2250x1950x1700 mm 
3.1.2.2 OSR resources of the Arkhangelsk region -Morspassluzhba, the 
Arkhangelsk branch 
Arkhangelsk branch of Morspassluzhba is responsible for Oil Spill Recovery at 
regional level (oil spill scale at 500 to 5000 tons maximum). It is an owner of 
special-purpose vessels “Metel”, “Signal”, “Diver Sazonov”, “ASPTR-5”, 
“ASPTR-5”, “ASPTR-9”, “Hitek-85C” (description see above), 3 outboard 
motorboats, 2 oar boats.  
Table 39: Vessels of Arkhangelsk branch of Morspassluzhba 
“Metel” Skimmer “MiniMax-12” with capacity 12 m3 per hour, 250 
running meters of booms, motorboat “Yaxe” 
“Signal” Skimmer “Desmi-250” with capacity 70 m3 per hour, 345 
running meters of booms, inflatable boat “Favorit F-500” 
”Diver Sazonov” Skimmer “Walosep W2” with capacity 45 m3 per hour, 255 
running meters of booms, inflatable boat “Zodiac” 
“ASPTR-5” Skimmer “Walosep W2” with capacity 45 m3 per hour, 255 
running meters of booms, inflatable boat “Favorit F-500” 
“ASPTR-7” Skimmer “Walosep W2” with capacity 45 m3 per hour, 255 
running meters of booms, inflatable boat  
“ASPTR-9” Skimmer “Walosep W2” with capacity 45 m3 per hour, 255 
running meters of booms, inflatable boat  
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To provide OSR, the Arkhangelsk branch of Morspassluzhba has the following 
equipment: floating booms of 420, 1455, 200 running meters, inflatable boom of 
250 running meters, log boom (for ice condition) of 50 running meters, 12 
skimmers (“Lamor Multi”, “Lamor Rock Cleaner”, “SP-7”, “Mini Max-12”, 
“Mini Max-10”, “Fortail Vab 4-9”, “Mini-Transrec-250”), 26 OSR suits of dry 
type and 4 rescue swimmer suits. The vessels are also equipped with firefighting 
facilities: 10 units of firefighter gear, 4 breathing apparatus, 51 and 66 mm 
diameter hoses of 140 and 210 running meters, 22 nozzles, 0,5 tons of foam. 
In addition, the Arkhangelsk Arctic Rescue Center of EMERCOM include booms 
of 2,300 meters in total, tanks for oil products, etc. 
3.1.2.3 Private industry resources 
Organizations engaging in petroleum exploration, production, processing and 
transportation are also obliged to ensure Oil Spill Response either via their 
dedicated divisions or outside, contracted, SAR units certified for oil spill 
emergency response. In case an oil spill occurs, organizations will immediately 
report to relevant governmental and local self-government authorities and arrange 
for response operations. For these purposes, organizations will have standby funds 
and material resources necessary to localize and respond to oil spills. 
Rosneft and Gazprom, the oil producing companies on the Barents Sea shelf, are 
either owners or operators of special purpose vessels. Their specifications and 
types of facilities used to clean up oil spill are identical. The following table 
provides information about the specifications and the number of such vessels.  
Table 40: Vessels of Oil&Gas Compnmay Rosneft in Murmansk 
Rosneft vessels Function 
Multi-function ice-class vessel 
- CAPTAIN REUTOV 
- CAPTAIN AVDUKOV 
The vessels are identical to Gazflot company 
Table 41: Vessels of Gazflot 
Gazflot vessels  Function 
Multi-functional ice-
class vessels: 
- VLADISLAV 
STRIZHOV 
- YURI TOPCHEV 
Ice-class Search and Rescue vessel capable of operating all year round; 
boom placing; oil removing and skimming. 
The following facilities are installed on board the vessels: 
- skimmer Lamor Free Floating Offshore (in the iceless season; with 
capacity of 115 cu m per hour;  
- skimmer Lamor Arctic (in ice season; with capacity 115 cu m per hour;  
- a set of booms with the total length of 400 m, height of 2,000 mm; 
- inflatable ice-class boom with total length of 300 m, height of 2,020 mm.  
- containers for temporary storage of the collected oil with the total storage 
volume of 1,000 cu m;  
- sorbent – 10tons; 
- diesel-power installation for hot water washing 
A new ice-class scoop oil skimmer is to be installed on board multi-
functional ice-class vessel with the total capacity of 140 cu m per hour  
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For safety reasons, the oil shipment from Varandey terminal is being monitored 
by Murmansk Port’s captain, or his assistants onboard every tanker. This offshore 
fixed ice-resistant shipping terminal is being assisted by the Kapitan Nikolaev 
icebreaker and an icebreaker-type tugboat, both designed to ensure safe tanker 
maneuvering, mooring and cargo handling. Onboard the icebreaker and the 
tugboat are the employees of Morspassluzhba branch in Murmansk, whose job is 
to ensure that all operations are performed in safe manner.  On board these vessels 
are also divers who are there to inspect the buoy and repair it and the subsea 
facilities, if necessary. Both the vessels are installed with firefighting systems and 
advanced Oil Spill Response facilities, whereas the terminal is equipped with fully 
automatic three-level oil spill prevention and response system able to handle even 
an emergency oil spill. 
The Prirazlomnaya platform’s oil spill contingency plan, for instance, provides 
for the use of the following facilities to handle oil spills under 1500 tons 
[Gaspromneftshelf, 2013]: 
− 2 multipurpose icebreaking vessels with 115 m3/h capacity Lamor Free 
Floating Offshore skimmer (summer modification) and Lamor Arctic 
skimmer (winter modification) onboard; 
− 1 dedicated vessel with marine OSR arrangement (summer, winter 
skimmers, etc.); 
− marine floating booms Lamor HDB – 1200 m; 
− 2 boom boats; 
− 3750 kg of absorbent. 
To handle larger marine oil spills, booms will be delivered and installed from a 
multipurpose icebreaking vessel, i.e. involving the resources of the RF Ministry 
of Transport.  
Handling oil spills as large as 10 000 tons will employ the facilities owned by 
GazpromNeftShelf oil company, namely, marine floating booms (1200 m), 
permanent flotation booms (600 m);  2 boom boats; 2 skimmer-equipped 
multipurpose icebreaking vessels; one 10 000 ton DWT tanker, etc. – all to be 
handed over to units handling the emergency. 
An oil spill of 10 000 tons is classified as a federal-scale Oil Spill Response 
operation. The assets and resources currently available to rescue teams and 
businesses are deemed sufficient to ensure the initial Oil Spill Response 
operations before the federal-level assets arrive – those of EMERCOM, the Navy, 
GosMorSpasSluzhba or adjacent countries’ coast guard. The available OSR 
resources may also be contributed by LUKOIL (JSC) according to a mutual 
assistance agreement. 
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According to Joint Shipbuilding Corporation, GaspromNeftShelf plans to build 3 
icebreakers to ensure oil production and transportation safety. 
To develop offshore areas in the Arctic, Joint Shipbuilding Corporation assesses 
the need for civil vessels and maritime equipment until 2030 in 50 
rigs/platforms/oil terminals, 85 special purpose transportation vessels, and 100 
tenders. 
 
Figure 12: Alignment of response resources, “Prilozlomnaya”. Source: Alexander Mandel, 
GaspromNeftShelf. 
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3.1.2.4 Private OSR companies 
There are 3 companies located in Arkhangelsk which have licenses to provide 
OSR. 
The company “SMARP” (http://solarn.ru/services/likvidaciya-razlivov-
nefteproduktov) has its main office in Saint-Petersburg and several branches, i.a. 
in Arkhangelsk. 
The company “Arcticspezservice” (http://www.arctic-asf.ru/index.php?id=1) is a 
professional emergency organization to provide OSR on the territory of the 
Arkhangelsk region and Nenets Autonomous Okrug in the waters of White and 
Barents Seas. One of the OSR groups is always on duty in the village Varanday 
of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. The company has a cooperation agreement 
with the Northern branch of Morspassluzhba to provide OSR. 
The company is an owner of the skimmers 6 «Lamor Minimax - 10» with capacity 
of 10 м3 per hour, «Lamor DWD» with capacity of 60 м3 per hour, 2 «Desmi 
Mini-Max» with capacity of 30 м3 per hour, Lamor Arctic Skimmer» with 
capacity of 115 м3 per hour, 2 «Lamor Rock Cleaner» with capacity of 10 м3 per 
hour, «Lamor Bow Collector» with capacity of 40 м3 per hour, «Lamor Free 
Floating Offshore» with capacity of 200 м3 per hour, «Lamor Backet» with 
capacity of 90 м3 per hour. 
It has floating booms of 6,000 meters, self-inflating booms of 500 meters, coastal 
isolating booms of 300 meters, heavy marine inflatable booms of 1,000 meters.   
The fleet includes the boats “Arcticspezservice-1” and “Arcticspezservice-2” of 
“ВВ-100М” type, boat “Yushar”, vessels “Merkury ” of the К 354 project and 
“Solombalez-3”, tug “Toboy”, and icebreaker “”Varanday” 
3.1.3 Violent Action Response 
The state management in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation is carried out 
by public authorities (state bodies) in a process of governing activities for the 
implementation of embodied state functions, providing 5 national legal regimes 
in the Arctic: 
1. Emergency regime which is set by the presidential decree and by the 
resolution of the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly on the 
approval of the presidential decree8; 
2. Martial law regime is set by a presidential decree 9 . However, the 
presidential decree approved by the resolution of the Council of Federation. 
                                                          
8 Federal Constitutional Law of May 30, 2001 No. 3-FKZ “On State of Emergency” 
9 Federal Constitutional Law of January 30, 2002 No. 1-FKZ “On Martial Law Regime” in contrast to the Law “On 
State of Emergency” prescribes to address the presidential decree to the both chambers of the Federal 
Assembly. 
98 
The State Duma is actually in need to be informed of the imposition of 
martial law; 
3. Frontier regime10; 
4. Mobilization11; 
5. Seaports regime12. 
The above-mentioned regimes characterized by the special importance of the 
regulated social relations, and the use of legal means provide a regime of 
restriction of the rights of citizens and organizations. Hence, all of the legal 
regimes in the Arctic zone have several common features: 
- a normative legislative determination; 
- the legal norms of different branch accessory, characterizing by strict and 
detailed regulative quality; 
- a variety of territories with different legal regime depending on legal 
norms; 
- specially established state governmental bodies with a list of competences. 
                                                          
10 Is directly established by the Article 16 of the Law of the Russian Federation of April 1, 1993 No. 4730-I “On the 
National Frontier of the Russian Federation”.  
11 Its standard fastening the regime received in the Federal Law of February 26, 1997 No. 31-FZ “On mobilization 
training and mobilization in the Russian Federation”. The Rules of “mobilization” contained in a large number of 
legislative acts (11 (eleven) normative legal acts) including federal constitutional laws and federal laws: 
Federal Constitutional Laws: Federal Constitutional Law of December 17, 1997 No. 2-FKZ “On the Government of 
the Russian Federation” (see: Article 114(2) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation); Federal Constitutional 
Law of January 30, 2002 No. 1 FKZ “On Martial Law Regime” (see: Article 87(3) of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation); Federal Constitutional Law of May 30, 2001 No. 3-FKZ “On State of Emergency” (see: Article 56 (1 
and 2) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation); 
Federal Laws: Federal Law of December 13, 1994 No. 60-FZ “On the Supply of Production for Federal State 
Purposes”; Federal Law of December 29, 1994 No. 79-FZ “On the State Material Reserve”; Federal Law of July 15, 
1995 No. 101-FZ “On International Treaties of the Russian Federation”; Federal Law of May 31, 1996 No. 61-FZ 
“On Defence”; Federal Law of February 12, 1998 No. 28-FZ “On Civil Defence”; Federal Law of June 19, 1998 No. 
14-FZ “On the Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation with Foreign States”; Federal Law of 
October 06, 1999 No. 184-FZ “On General Principles of Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive 
Bodies of State Power of Subjects of the Russian Federation” (note: “Subjects” means “Regions of the Federation”); 
Federal Law of October 06, 2003 No. 131-FZ “On General Principles of Local Self-Government in the Russian 
Federation” etc. In addition, there are a large number of by-laws and rules specifying these above-mentioned laws. 
12 Federal Law of 31 July 1998, No. 155-FZ “On the Internal Waters, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the 
Russian Federation”, other federal laws and other normative legal acts of the Russian Federation, applicable to 
sea ports, establishes “seaports regime” of the Russian Federation, taking into account the climatic, hydrological, 
meteorological and other peculiar properties (NB: Russia is a member-state of the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention 1982 (from March 02, 1997). 
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As for the terrorist threat in the water basins, regional Frontier Service forces of 
FSB, the regional transport departments of MIA-The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and the regional departments of EMERCOM are to respond to terrorist attacks. 
The Frontier Service of the Federal Security Service in the Western Arctic 
Area 
The basic principle of the fight against terrorism connected with the unity of the 
goals and objectives of all state institutions are under the supervision of the 
Frontier Service of the Federal Security Service (FSB). 
Currently, the protection of the frontier border of the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk 
Oblast’ (Regions), Nenets Autonomous Okrug (District) etc. are implemented by 
the Frontier Service of the FSB in the Western Arctic Area (hereinafter – Arctic 
Frontier Service) including the zone: 
- from the Norwegian-Russian frontier to Taimyr Peninsula (Krasnoyarsk 
Krai (Territory)); 
- the western sector of the Northern Sea Route,  
- 15 seaports: 1) Amderma; 2) Arkhangelsk; 3) Belomorsk; 4) Varandey; 5) 
Dickson; 6) Dudinka; 7) Kandalaksha; 8) Mezen; 9) Murmansk; 10) 
Naryan-Mar; 11) Igarka; 12) Onega; 13) Khatanga; 14) Vitino; 15) Sabetta.  
The coastline stretching: over 10,500 km. 
The area of responsibility also includes the internal waters, territorial sea areas, 
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation 
in the Barents, White and Kara Seas. 
The FSB Arctic Frontier Service also solves issues in the maritime areas adjacent 
to the archipelago of Spitsbergen (see: Spitsbergen Treaty 1920) in the NEAFC 
Regulatory Area (NEAFC – North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission) – outside 
the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation. The units of the Arctic 
Frontier Service are responsible for the sovereignty and presence of Russian 
Federation at the remote territories in the Arctic, i.e. Franz Josef Archipelago and 
Severnaya Zemlya. 
 Arctic Frontier Service has 4 tasks: 
1. Defense of the state frontier; 
2. Defense of marine biological resources; 
3. Monitoring and control of the movement of vessels on the Northern Sea 
Route in the Western sector of the Arctic; 
4. Implementation of compliance with the state's national interests. 
The central part of this activity is a complex measure to the use of forces and 
special equipment by 3 structural units of the FSB: 
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1. The coast guard; 
2. The operational units; 
3. Aircrafts. 
The FSB Regional Frontier Service forces coordinate the actions of the Coast 
Guard which is directly responsible for the following tasks: 
- defence and protection of the state border; 
- protection of national economic interests; 
- control over national law and international agreement observation; 
- life saving at sea; 
- security of sea transportation along the Northern Sea Route; 
- environmental protection. 
Monitoring the situation in order to counter terrorism threat is carried out with the 
use of modern technical equipment adopted for use in the FSB. The Arctic 
Frontier Service forces utilize radio-location and radio-technical observation 
efforts along the most actively used routes of the Northern Sea Route. An 
interdepartmental regional Information and Coordination Centre (I&C Centre) 
was set up in Murmansk to meet the objectives of marine security, oil and gas 
facilities security, transport communication security, marine resources and 
environmental protection. The I&C Centre is there to achieve the goals of 
coordination and enhancement of interdepartmental cooperation of the federal 
agencies responsible for the complex control of the situation in the sea surface 
areas. The information is provided to the center in real time through a number of 
media including satellite communication channels. Besides other federal 
agencies, executive bodies and organizations pass on the information to the 
control center. Following the interdepartmental and inter-ministerial agreements, 
the Frontier Service forces have access to information resources in the automated 
information systems and monitoring systems of the federal executive bodies, i.e. 
the Russian segment of vessel identification and long-range tracking system; 
VIKTORIA, Ministry of Transport global automated system of monitoring and 
control of vessel position; Federal Fisheries Agency industrial automated system 
of biological resources monitoring;  the National Information System of Global 
Monitoring in the world ocean, etc. The Complex Integrated Information System, 
to monitor and control the location of Russian sea and sea-river vessels is to be 
connected to I&C Centre. 
Also, there are efforts to set up an integrated automated system with technical 
control of the surface picture taken, with the use of information technologies and 
large-scale departmental monitoring systems. More work is done to increase the 
range of its functional application by integrating it with the existing vessels, 
means of passive ranging and distance Earth sounding system. Automated 
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systems of technical control over the sea surface are being introduced now. In 
2014, the latter was implemented along the Northern Sea Route in the Barents 
Sea. A number of technical observation posts of the Frontier Service forces of 
Murmansk and Archangelsk region were integrated in one single system as they 
are a part of transport-infrastructure potential of Russian Federation. 
Regional border security forces are equipped to duly react to any criminal actions 
and terrorist threats that are targeted against people’s life, property and 
environment in the sea areas of the region. 
Table 42: Vessels of regional border security forces 
Ships Boats  Patrol vessels Logistic and supply 
vessels 
 97P 
 1135.1 
 1124  
 745  
 1241.2  
 1208  
 205P  
 1248  
 10410 
 22460 
 22100 “Ocean” 
 1496  
 RM376  
 P1415 
 1400 
 371U 
 12200 
 502  
 13031 
 "Commander" 
 "Hurricane" 
 22120  
 12150 
 1595 
 16900A 
 16931 
 1481 
a) Technical control: automated technical control system “Frontier-North”. 
b) Joint Strategic Command “North” (“Arctic troops”): from Murmansk to 
Anadyr. “Arctic troops” also include the 80th separate motorized “Arctic 
brigade”. 
c) Frontier post “Nagurskoe”. 
d) Transport: 
1) multi-purpose fully amphibious auxiliary armoured tracked vehicle; 
2) ATVs “DT-10” and “DT-30”; 
3) ATVs “TM-140A” and “TREKOL-39294”; 
4) Articulated tracked snow and marsh buggies floating high cross-
4902PS TTM-10; 
5) Snowmobiles “A-1”, “TTM-1901 “Berkut” with a heated cabin; 
6) Army ATVs “AM-1A”; 
7) Hovercrafts; 
8) All-wheel drive trucks “Ural” and “Kamaz” adapted to extremely low 
temperatures (up to -52 ° C). 
e) Arms: 
1) Tanks “T-72”; 
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2) Self-propelled howitzers “2S1” and “2S3”; 
3) Combined short to medium range surface-to-air missile and anti-
aircraft artillery weapon system “Pantsir-S1”; 
4) 82-mm mortars “2B14”,  
5) Unmanned aerial vehicle “Orlan-10”. 
Source: https://xn--g1aohgee.xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/UT_MVD/podrazdeleniya/item/720886/  
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) line departments of water transport in the 
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions are in charge of counteracting against any 
criminal activity in the coastal parts. 
The areas and spheres covered by the regional line departments of water transport 
are: 
- sea ports and navigable parts of their water basins; 
- sea ports; 
- hydrotechnical infrustructure and navigational facilities located in the areas 
of navigable parts of sea ports; 
- vessels and other floating facilities at the quay and in the harbour; 
- storage and processing facilities in the sea ports. 
The operation of MIA line departments of water transport in Murmansk region is 
characterized by such factors as a long stretch of the coastal port zone, a big 
number of companies located there and port access control regime. As Murmansk 
region border on Finland and Norway, most of the port facilities under control are 
border check points. The length of the quay line is 10 km. More than 130 
companies are located in the port zones with more than 6000 employees. 
Being in charge of the water transport security, personal security and public order 
and safety on the sea vessels and port facilities, Murmansk regional line 
departments of water transport plays a key role in providing security and safety 
on the water transport. 
Their responsibilities for people’s security and public order and safety include 
active involvement in handling emergency situations such as accidents, 
catastrophies, fires, natural disasters etc and cooperation with other MIA 
departments in saving lives and giving the injured people the first aid, standing 
guard over the scene of action and somebody’s unprotected property. Besides, 
MIA provides security along the transport routes, stations, railway stations, 
airports, sea ports, river boats and aircraft. 
Murmansk regional line departments of water transport is also engaged in the 
crime and wrongdoing prevention work by organizing Search and Rescue actions 
to prevent and stop criminal activity in the sphere of cargo and passenger 
transportation, transportation economy, detecting circumstances leading to 
criminal offences and making efforts to eliminate them. 
103 
3.2 CHALLENGES REGARDING ARCTIC MARITIME EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS CAPACITIES  
3.2.1 Search and Rescue capacity challenges 
We analyzed typical emergency situations in the northwest of Russia for the last 
5 years. The most frequent accidents in Murmansk region are connected with 
trawl winding onto the propeller, vessel running aground and engine breakdown. 
We can provide the description of a typical study case: On 9th October 2015, 
Purga, a rescue tug of the Northern rescue expeditionary force, provided 
assistance to Norvag, a Norwegian tanker, which was lying dead due to the fact 
that the cable had wound into the propeller. The towing operation to Båtsfjord 
was complicated by severe weather conditions with Beaufort Force 7 and wind at 
20 m/s in the dark. Both navigators and safety divers performed their duties very 
successfully. The rescue tug approached the tanker at safe distance and shot a 
synthetic line from the line throwing machine to transport a towing rope to the 
vessel in distress. After the towing rope had been fixed, the rescue tug started to 
move. Although the rescue team worked professionally in timely manner, it took 
almost an hour due to the nasty weather conditions. The distance between the 
place of accident and the Norwegian coast was about 200 miles and it took two 
days to tug the Norwegian tanker to Varangerfjord in accordance with the 
schedule, but the Norwegian pilot recommended another port, Båtsfjord. There 
were no injured crew members and no threat of oil spill 
[http://seoasr.ru/News/mm/8]. 
According to the rules and regulations governing the rescue procedure for vessels 
in distress, the basic principle is the interaction between different ministerial and 
departmental rescue services: Ministry of Transport, EMERCOM, etc. In practice, 
in the Murmansk region it is the Northern rescue expeditionary force which bears 
the heavy load of all the Search and Rescue operations with all other rescue 
services and their facilities being hardly ever brought in for help. This causes 
longer duration of the rescue operations from several hours to several days. Such 
approach can be partly justified when the situation is not life threatening for the 
crew of vessels in distress. But in practice all the potential risks cannot be assessed 
properly at the initial stage, which can result in wrong conclusions leading to 
higher level of risk for the vessel to be wrecked and the crew to be harmed. 
Most of the available vessels and equipment has operational time limits. All 
vessels of the Northern rescue expeditionary force, mostly involved in SAR and 
salvage operations, were built in the 20th century. At the same time, the fleet of 
Morspassluzhba is being updated, some SAR and salvage vessels have increased 
ice class. 
In total, 41 new rescue and salvage vessels are ordered by the 
Rosmorrechflot to be delivered by 2020 [http://morspas.com/ ]. 
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The EMERCOM Arctic recue center fleet in the Murmansk region has a very 
limited navigation area and cannot be involved in the SAR operation in the open 
sea along the Northern Sea Route. The Arctic Rescue Center in Arkhangelsk owns 
a more efficient fleet but the location of the center at the entry of the Northern 
river entry makes it complicated to arrive at the emergency site offshore within 
relevant time. Actually, the fleet resources correspond to the EMERCOM’s 
function to provide safety and assistance within the 12 miles maritime zone. 
There is a growing activy in these waters so that in the near future (in 5 - 10 years), 
even if the number of life-saving craft and their service characteristics remain the 
same, carrying out Search and Rescue operations would become difficult. 
Therefore, taking into account ships age and decommissioning, further 
construction and development of an up-to-date rescue fleet is required, with 
priority on the construction of rescue tugboats, supply vessels, multimission 
rescue vessels with unlimited navigation area. 
Unfavourable navigational, hydrographical and hydrometeorological conditions 
in the Arctic as well as the requirements of rules and regulations for specifications 
of rescue vessels to be exploited in the Arctic zone are quite demanding. Ice class 
vessels can meet such demands almost fully. However, their main disadvantage 
is the speed, which is a vital factor in SAR. With maximum time period for a 
person in the survival suit being 6-8 hours and the icebreaker speed being 18-20 
knots, the maximum distance to the emergency scene should be no more than 300 
km. It is evident that with the existing system of complex Search and Rescue 
centers and marine Search and Rescue forces being located far from the probable 
emergency scenes at sea, the rescue of people and vessels in distress with the help 
of icebreakers is not always technically feasible. 
In Russia, the main maritime SAR strategy is based on surface vessels. The 
analysis of SAR resources shows that ice class Search and Rescue vessels equipped 
in accordance with requirements of International Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
meeting other demands are the best solution for rescue operations. However, long 
distances in the Arctic and hard weather conditions demand quicker response that 
only aircrafts can provide in some circumstances. 
According to experts, it is necessary to decline the so called two-dimensional 
system of SAR in favour of a three-dimensional SAR system, which involves air 
support in case of any evacuation in the Arctic [http://szfavt.ru/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/insspasop.pdf]. 
In the Murmansk region, the civil emergency resources in the Murmansk area 
don’t possess appropriate preparedness level to participate in the SAR missions 
and exercises like the Exercise Barents, according to Murmansk MRCC. The air 
resources of the EMERCOM Arctic rescue center are located in Saint Petersburg 
far away from the possible emergency sites. The air resources of the Northern 
Fleet are on duty to be involved in SAR if an incident occurs. The Air Northern 
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Fleet is a unit of the Navy responsible for the defense of northwestern Russia. 
SAR operations related to civil vessels and persons in distress is not a primary 
function of this air division. The unit does not report to the Murmansk MRCC and 
need not provide information about the availability of its resources. 
In the Arkhangelsk region, the air resources of the civil air enterprise are used but 
have to be paid for. In the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the SAR unit of the Agency 
for Air Transport is involved in SAR missions. 
The different patterns in air SAR in the regions should be replaced by a unified 
system to provide efficient assistance at sea. To provide aircrafts to the 
EMERCOM centers is one of the main strategy task of the ministry. EMERCOM 
is planning to increase the number of upgraded aircrafts and helicopters also for 
operation in the Arctic conditions within the next three years: 
- The aircrafts IL-76 and IL-114 
- The helicopters MI-26 and MI-8.  
“They must be multipurposed, equipped with the special rescue devices, i.a. to 
provide evacuation of the injured persons”, according to EMERCOM minister 
Vladimir Puchkov [EMERCOM, 2017].  
According to the legislation of the Russian Federation, aircrafts and sea vessels 
use different frequency bands and cannot communicate directly. Therefore, the 
communication between the rescue helicopter and the vessel in distress is 
provided following the chain «vessel in distress — rescue coordination center — 
air traffic authorities — aircraft/helicopter» and backwards. Emergency 
information transfer through this chain is very complicated, takes much time and 
does not meet the requirements of the 1979 SAR Convention.  
It has been noted that when the rescue operation takes place in the northern parts 
of the Barents Sea, the quality of radio signal suffers frequently, which adds 
further complications to the radio exchange between the rescue service and 
vessels in distress. This is caused by disturbances in the upper layer of atmosphere 
during daily or seasonal solar variability or by worse weather conditions. These 
natural processes impair the quality of radio wave reception especially in the 
medium frequency (MF) and high frequency (HF) ranges, which are used for radio 
transmission for medium and long distances (more than 30 nautical miles) 
[http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/bitstream/handle/123456789/10849/10%20-
%20Kostina.pdf?sequence=1]. 
Inmarsat C, the global maritime distress satellite communication network, is 
effective up to the latitude of 70ºN. Other satellite communication networks, 
which can provide high quality radio signal reception, such as Globalstar and 
Iridium, are not obligatory to be installed at marine vessels according to the 
requirements of Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). 
106 
Other significant factors to achieve increased efficiency of management and 
coordination of all SAR organizations are the use of information technology, 
which provide the reception and processing of data about the unit in distress from 
various sources of information; planning SAR and taking effective decisions and 
controlling their executions afterwards. The SAR organizations involved in the 
rescue operations in the Arctic seas, the existing rescue vessels and icebreakers 
are not fully equipped with the automated control systems. 
Taking into consideration the current facilities and forces available to deal with 
SAR and specific state demands, a conclusion is that there is a need for an 
advanced Search and Rescue system which is capable of meeting all the 
organizational and technical requirements at all the stages of SAR. 
The reason for the shortcomings is a so-called bottleneck approach to the problem 
solution, i.e. vessels and rescue facilities are equipped in accordance with 
requirements of international maritime conventions. Any extra facilities or 
technical systems, which are capable of making the rescue operations more 
efficient, are not stipulated in the documents. All the attempts by the crew of 
showing initiative that are coming from the bottom of the hierarchy to the vessel 
owners and heads of regional and federal ministries and departments fail. Their 
proposals to enhance and improve the existing security systems are mostly 
ignored or realized within a very long period of time due to bureaucratic 
procedures of consideration and coordination. 
The researchers of the Russian academic and research institutions, i.e. Research 
Centre for Complex Transport Problems, State Research and Development 
Institute of Marine Transport, St. Petersburg State University of Water 
Communication have developed a plan to improve the current marine Search and 
Rescue system in various parts of Russia. The content of the plan was reflected in 
the Federal target program ”Development of the transport system of Russia” and 
its implementation included the tackling of the following tasks and objectives: 
- provide the necessary quality of technical facilities and Search and Rescue 
forces to guarantee SAR service in the Arctic region; 
- build new icebreakers, specialized Search and Rescue vessels; 
- form the fleet of marine Search and Rescue aircrafts; 
- develop new technical facilities to carry out Oil Spill Response at low 
temperatures, in ice and fractured ice; 
- develop new technical facilities for search and examination of sunk units; 
- develop new navigational and hydrographic software for high latitudes; 
- set up new technical facilities for communication with the use of space 
facilities and equipment; 
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- establish new coastal Search and Rescue centers and improve the existing 
coordination centers; 
- enhance quality and mechanism of coordination of forces that can be 
involved in SAR in high latitudes at sea; 
- develop new methods and techniques of SAR in high latitudes; 
- advance the basing systems of forces and technical means for SAR in the 
Arctic, etc. [http://base.garant.ru/1587083/1/]. 
One major weakness as to efficient rescue operations at the facilities comes from 
ice conditions. Suffice to say, that throw overboard life rafts and rescue boats can 
be used only in iceless waters, while they are not effective if there is drifting ice 
or ice cover as rubber life rafts are fragile in ice conditions and cannot be 
maneuvered easily in extreme weather conditions being surrounded by ice blocks 
and fragments. 
The analysis of SAR shows that ice class salvage vessels equipped in accordance 
with requirements of International Maritime Organization (IMO) and meeting other 
demands are the best solution for rescue operation from arctic platforms. However, 
such vessels cannot be located in close proximity to platforms all the time. It is 
necessary to involve air support in case of crew and staff evacuation from oil 
platforms in the Arctic. 
3.2.2 Pollution response and capacity challenges 
Taking into account the presented information, it is possible to make the following 
conclusions: 
1) The oil producing companies in offshore Russia are capable of oil spill 
liquidation in the amount of 1,500 tons in case the oil well control is lost; 
2) The oil companies’ available facilities and vessels are enough to liquidate the 
oil spill of 10,000 tons at the first stage of the recovery operation in case of oil 
tanker emergency until the state rescue vessels arrive at the place of the 
emergency. The state rescue vessels belong to such organisations as the Ministry 
of EMERCOM, Russian Navy, Federal State Organisation Gosmorrspassluzhby 
(state marine rescue service) and the cost guard service.  
3) With rescue vessels equipped with the Oil Spill Response facilities being 
located in isolated and remote places from the deployment base, the efficient 
response in case an extensive oil spill occurs is slowed down. Special purpose 
vessels based in the port of Murmansk will arrive at the place of the emergency 
within the period of 6 to 8 hours, weather permitting and ice conditions being 
favourable.  
The existing system of accident prevention at the oil platforms and drilling 
facilities and Oil Spill Response cannot be acknowledged as adequate. 
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In spite of the use of more advanced technical facilities, techniques and methods 
to prevent and respond to the emergency situations, there are leakages at the units 
of oil and gas connected with exploration, production and marine transportation,  
causing environmental and economic damage and lead to casualties.   
Fortunately, there have not been large oil spill accidents in the Arctic. But, some 
oil spills have occurred in other regions. Due to rough weather conditions, the 
1,139 DWT tanker Nadezhda crewed by eight people ran aground on November 
28th 2015, damaging its hull and one of its cargo tanks 150 meters from the fishing 
port of Nevelsk (Sakhalin island). It was carrying 746 tons of fuel oil and diesel 
fuel. Significant environmental damage was reported in the area. Oil coated a 20-
km stretch of the shore, with the sticky sludge extending up to 4 meters on land 
from the water line and resulted in deaths of animals and birds. Total damage to 
the environment and local communities was about 524 mln Rub.  The master was 
found guilty and sentenced to a fine within 120,000 Rub. 
Public investigation showed that up to 50% of oil tankers operating in the Far East 
don’t have double hull that doesn’t correspond to international requirements. 
Also, the lack of financial responsibility for environmental damage isn’t 
determined in legislation for oil spills caused by the tankers loaded with less than 
2000 tons of oil products. 
The Nadezhda oil spill also demonstrated some shortcomings in Oil Spill 
Response system at sea. Clean-up procedures were not efficient due to booms and 
vessels absence. Monitoring, environmental assistance and the population 
warning weren’t organized [WWF, 2017].  
Russian legislation allows mechanical, chemical methods and in situ burning 
providing OSR. However, all branches of Morspassluzhba, as well as private 
teams, serving ports and terminals, are equipped with mechanical means which 
have traditionally served as the main means in Russia. Use of in situ burning is 
complicated due to fire safety regulations, and chemical dispersants and herders 
must be pre-approved by environmental and fisheries authorities for application 
in sea waters, as they are considered environmental pollutants. Rules for oil-
dispersant application in sea waters in Russia entered into force in 2005. With 
expanding petroleum and shipping activities in the Russian Arctic, we can expect 
improvement in capacities for dispersant application in the case of oil spill 
[Bambulyak, 2015]. 
In Russia with the most extended maritime borders and continental shelf, there is 
no federal law which would govern issues of maritime environment pollution 
prevention, Oil Spill Response taking into account interests of the state and 
industry (and their interaction). The current legislation – federal laws, resolutions 
of the government and orders of federal authorities are not united, they don’t take 
into account maritime links, are very general and sometimes adverse which can 
cause different reading and corruption. 
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A unified law is needed in the field of oil spill prevention and response with 
respect to the Arctic conditions [Ivanchin, 2014]. 
3.2.3 Violent Action Response and capacity challenges 
Violent Action Response is a challenge in the Arctic due to long distances and 
mobilization of special forces especially in the case of bad weather conditions.  
The Analysis of the current situation in the Arkhangelsk Oblast’ (Region) and 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug (District) allows to allocate 5 major challenges for the 
activities aimed at prevention of acts of unlawful interference: 
1) Adverse weather and climatic conditions of the Arctic region, complicating 
the redeployment of anti-terrorist forces from the main places of stationing, 
and carrying out a special operation; 
2) Substantial removal of the vast majority of potentially dangerous objects 
located in the Arctic zone of Russia, from the places of permanent 
deployment of special units of the security forces (FSB, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defence); 
3) Insufficient load capacity at the airports and airfields located in the Russian 
Arctic zone, which makes it impossible to use large-capacity aircrafts; 
4) Lack of firearms among private security personnel operating in the Arctic 
zone of Russia, which does not allow at the initial stage to organize the 
effective combating and countering of terrorist and other threats; 
5) The ability to access into the staff of potentially dangerous objects by 
individuals hatching wrongful intent to commit acts of unlawful 
interference. 
It should be noted that the “security flaws” in the Arctic region have allowed 
international environmental organization “Greenpeace” virtually unimpeded to 
implement in 2012 and 2013 provocative actions against offshore ice-resistant 
stationary platform “Prirazlomnaya” in the Barents Sea. These circumstances 
gave rise to the leadership of “Greenpeace” declaring Russia's failure to ensure 
the security of oil and gas platforms in the Arctic. 
However, realization of provisions of the Federal Law of February 09, 2007 No. 
16-FZ “On Transport Security” and the Federal Law of July 21, 2011 No. 256-FZ 
“On the Safety of the Fuel and Energy Complex” by organizations located in the 
Arctic zone of Russia, has not yet been completed, and separate companies ignore 
these requirements. 
The responsibility of a number of persons in accordance with the current 
legislation of the Russian Federation may occur after the categorization of objects 
of transport and fuel and energy complex (FEC), taking into account the 
application of serious harm to human health or causing major damage (Article 
217.1 “Violation of safety requirements and anti-terrorism protection of objects 
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of fuel energy complex”, Article 263.1 “Violation of transport security 
requirements” of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). 
Otherwise, even for the systematic avoidance of the realization of the 
requirements of the federal laws, enterprises could only be brought to 
administrative responsibility of regulatory authorities vested with this power.  
Nevertheless, at the present stage, the main tool forcing enterprises to fulfill the 
requirements of regulatory documents in the field of security is the adoption by 
courts of “interim measures” for the implementation of the requirements of the 
federal laws and governmental resolutions. 
According to the information presented here, it is possible to state that the 
structure and the number of forces formed in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk 
regions is adequate to react to terrorist threats and counteract any criminal activity 
on the sea transport at the current rate of cargo and people transportation. This can 
be considered sufficient for the nearest future in case the rate of transportation 
stays the same. 
3.3 OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS FROM CROSS-BORDER 
COOPERATION 
The data presented in the previous chapters give a positive characteristic of the 
existing system of emergency response in the marine waters of Murmansk region, 
which has a very good potential for further development. Nevertheless, the 
analysis of the efficiency of the SAR system brought forth a number of drawbacks 
and flaws as well as some recommendations to overcome them. It should be noted 
that the realization of the suggested strategy is not quite feasible as it is a complex 
task for regional departments and centers, and they need full assistance from 
federal and ministerial bodies.  
There is strong evidence to suggest that SAR operations become highly effective 
when all the related services and forces, located in specific sea regions join their 
efforts to carry out international rescue operations.  
Signed international agreements on SAR and OSR considerably decrease the time 
spent on communication between SAR services of different countries in case of 
emergencies. Thus, the rescue operation is carried out faster and more effectively 
due to better planning and management. 
Taking into consideration the significance of this activity, the Russian and 
Norwegian government take considerable efforts to improve the SAR 
cooperation. One of them is the annual Norwegian-Russian “Exercise Barents”, 
which is conducted in accordance with the “Agreement of 4 October 1995 on 
cooperation in connection with Search and Rescue of persons in distress in the 
Barents Sea and “Agreement concerning cooperation on the combatment of oil 
pollution in the Barents Sea of 20 April 1994”.  
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The main exercise objectives are to exercise the cooperation between the 
Murmansk MRCC and Joint Rescue Coordination Center of North Norway 
related to Search and Rescue /SAR and between the Morspassluzhba and 
Norwegian coastal administration related to oil spill operations. As a minimum, 
the objectives include the coordination of scenarios of SAR operations and Oil 
Spill Response, communication and information exchange, clearance for aircrafts, 
vessels and other relevant resources to enter Norwegian or Russian territory. 
In order to exercise SAR and Oil Spill Response objectives, the Russian and 
Norwegian rescue coordination centers performed proper initial notification, 
worked out search planning at Sea, exercised cooperation between rescue units on 
scene and the On Scene Coordinator, communication, air operations with special 
emphasis on the aircraft coordinator function and maritime/oil spill operations. 
The Barents exercise usually consists of two scenarios: SAR and OSR.  
Besides, some times a year, the special-purposed OSR exercises are conducted in 
the cross-border area between Russia and Norway. As to the international projects 
aiming at oil spill prevention, a good example was the project “Enhancement of 
Oil Spill Response System by Establishing Oil Database” funded by the Kolarctic 
ENPI. The specific objective of the project was to generate a mechanism of 
effective coordination between international response forces in case of emergency 
spills of Russian oil in the waters of northern seas. The mechanism will take into 
account the forecast of oil behavior on the basis of laboratory studies [Kolarctic, 
2015]. 
During oil spills, there may be changes in physical and chemical properties of oil 
that affect the behavior of the oil patch. Laboratory data on oil weathering makes 
it possible to predict the behavior of oil at sea more accurately under various 
weather conditions and, therefore, to choose the most efficient response measures, 
for example, mechanical recovery, use of dispersants, etc. 
Taking into account the expected growth of production and transportation of oil 
in the Arctic the implementation of these activities would significantly contribute 
to reduction of the risk of accidents and, therefore, potential threats to the 
environment and traditional life-sustaining activities in the Arctic. 
As results of the project, oil weathering studies and database were established, the 
dispersants performance with different types of oil were studied, the interaction 
pattern between response forces based on the created oil database was improved, 
and the recommendations for the application of the database and improvement of 
the technology of the emergency Oil Spill Response were provided. 
It is necessary to mention that the ship-owner companies are often involved as full 
members into different international projects. For example, RosAtomflot 
Company has successfully carried out a number of international projects aimed at 
enhancing physical protection system of atomic vessels and coastal facilities, 
increasing the nuclear and radiation safety level when handling radioactive wastes 
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and spent nuclear fuel. The projects “Site for the temporary storage of containers 
with spent nuclear fuel of military fleet ships” and “Automated system of 
monitoring the site for the temporary storage of containers with spent nuclear fuel 
of military fleet ships at FSUE “Atomflot” were realized as part of the 
international cooperation with the governments of Norway and USA. Another 
project done at FSUE “Atomflot” is the “Reconstruction of the container-type 
depository for the long-term (up to 50 years) storage of unreclaimable nuclear fuel 
of atomic icebreakers”. The enterprise’s physical protection system is up-to-date 
and meets all international requirements in the sphere of nuclear material 
protection. FSUE “Atomflot” works in close cooperation with IAEA on the 
matters of radiation background monitoring. – 
[http://www.rosatomflot.ru/index.php?menuid=6]. 
As shown above, there are efforts to increase the exercise activity including 
private companies. The Northern fleet has taken part in the last year’s Exercise 
Barents, which is positive as they represent a significant capacity. Not the least 
the Northern fleet has helicopter capacity, a resource that is strongly in demand 
in the Arctic regions. Even though there are efforts to upgrade and renew the fleet 
of vessels there are limitations as to operational capacity both as to SAR and oil 
spill. The investments by the offshore oil and gas companies represent an added 
capacity both within SAR and Oil Spill Response.  The limited amount of armed, 
anti-terror special forces in the North and long transport distances have opened 
for a discussion about armed capacities at the installations to increase security. 
Experiences with environmentalist organizations demonstrating at oil rigs in 
Russian waters have contributed to increased focus on local capacities and 
increased cooperation.  
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4 ICELAND’S PREPAREDNESS CAPACITIES, CHALLENGES 
AND NEED FOR COOPERATION BY VALUR INGIMUNDARSON 
AND HALLA GUNNARSDÓTTIR  
This section covers Icelandic maritime preparedness capabilities and potential for 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation to enhance maritime safety in the Arctic. It 
analyzes and evaluates Iceland’s policies in relation to Search and Rescue (SAR); 
pollution prevention; anti-terrorist activities; and intergovernmental maritime 
collaboration. Together with MARPART reports on Icelandic institutional 
preparedness, maritime activity and risk factors,13 it is based on interviews with 
key people within the Icelandic maritime preparedness system and reports on 
threat assessments and Search and Rescue plans and operations.  
4.1 PREPAREDNESS CAPACITIES  
Since Iceland does not have a military, its preparedness system is exclusively run 
by civilian governmental institutions and non-profit companies. This has not 
prevented its security organizations, especially, the Coast Guard, to cooperate 
with foreign militaries, such as the Danish Navy, on maritime safety. In terms of 
operational capability, the Icelandic preparedness system is highly dependent on 
regional and international collaboration, especially with neighbouring countries, 
such as Denmark and Norway, but also within multilateral forums, such as the 
Arctic Council, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the North 
Atlantic Coast Guard Forum.   
4.1.1 Search and Rescue capacities 
The Icelandic Coast Guard (ICG), under the auspices of the Ministry of the 
Interior, is the central organization responsible for maritime safety in Iceland’s 
Search and Rescue Region (SRR), which comprises around 1.9 million square 
kilometers. Weather conditions within the SRR can be extremely difficult, 
particularly in the northern part, which stretches into very deep sea north of 
Iceland and east of Greenland. South of Iceland, the average waves are amongst 
the highest in the world.14   
The domestic Search and Rescue operational capability focuses mainly on 
response to vessel incidents within Iceland’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 
involving fishing vessels and cargo ships.  Weather conditions, drift ice and long 
distance from land can significantly hamper Search and Rescue operations in the 
area.15  Larger incidents would pose great challenges to the SAR system and 
                                                          
13 See Valur Ingimundarson and Halla Gunnarsdóttir, “Iceland: Maritime Preparedness Institutional 
Framework” (December 2014); idem, “Maritime Activity around Iceland” (April 2015); idem,“Iceland Risk Pattern 
and Types of Unwanted Incidents” (May 2015).  
14 “Search and Rescue in the Northern Seas. Report of a joint Steering Group within the Ministry of the Interior” 
(Reykjavik: Ministry of the Interior, 2016), 11. 
15 “Search and Rescue in the Northern Seas,” 22. 
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require international collaboration, particularly in the case of cruise vessels, which 
increasingly pass through the Icelandic SRR with a large number of passenger. 
Such a scenario was the main theme of the Arctic Council’s SAREX Greenland 
Sea 2013 exercise and related desk exercises. These exercises exposed huge 
operational difficulties with respect to large rescue efforts in the area, while also 
identifying potential for multilateral collaboration.  
The preparedness system is mainly based on the Icelandic Coast Guard’s three 
patrol vessels, three rescue helicopters, and one rescue and surveillance aircraft. 
The ICG strives for having, at least, two helicopters on continual standby. Still, 
every year there is a number of incidents that are too far from land for the 
helicopter’s flight range, which is up to 250 nautical miles. Helicopters are not 
considered a viable rescue option, except for in special circumstances, where they 
would be operated from foreign patrol vessels. Under some conditions, Danish 
and Norwegian patrol vessels and aircraft could be enlisted in rescue operations 
in the SRR together with ships in the vicinity of accident sites.16  
Due to financial restraints, the ICG surveillance aircraft frequently participates in 
financed missions abroad. In the past five years, the plane has been away from 
Iceland for up to six months a year. Currently, discussions are taking place 
between the Icelandic and Danish governments on joint surveillance flights 
around Greenland and Iceland. The proposal – which could provide possibilities 
to maintain TF-SIF permanently in the North – will require the approval of the 
Danish parliament.17 No final decisions about such enhanced cooperation has 
been made, but there is a willingness on both sides to formalize it.    
The main risk factors for maritime traffic in the sea around Iceland are the 
following:  weather conditions; ships’ condition and equipment; fire incidents; 
and human mistakes or errors in decision-making.18  Any given SAR action, 
followed by a pollution prevention operation, is heavily dependent on the location 
of the ICG’s helicopters and patrol vessels. Response to fire at sea would, for 
example, be much more effective if the ICG’s Þór – which is equipped with class 
1 firefighting system – is available. In the event of a large incident, the ICG would 
also rely on collaboration with the Metropolitan District Fire Brigade. Such 
cooperation is, however, hampered by the Brigade’s lack of continuous training 
with respect to response to maritime fire incidents. Given the long distances and 
difficult terrain, fire fighting operations are likely to center on putting out fires 
and cooling down vessels rather than on saving lives.19  
                                                          
16 “Search and Rescue in the Northern Seas,” 22. 
17 Interviews with Icelandic Coast Guard officials, 13 June 2016; 9 September 2016.  
18 “Summary of Cruise Vessels Safety at Faxaflóahafnir” (Reykjavik: Faxaflótahafnir, 2012), 
http://www.faxafloahafnir.is/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/upload/files/fundargerdir_hafnarstjornar/fundir_2012/102._fundur/oryggi_skemmtif
erdaskipa_-_samantekt_5__okt_2012.pdf.  
19 “Search and Rescue in the Northern Seas,” 24. 
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Functional collaboration between the relevant institutions and multilateral 
collaboration, for example, between JRCC Iceland and JRCC Nuuk, are also 
essential to the success of SAR operations in the area. In addition, the entire SAR 
system depends on telecommunication equipment, including a mechanism to 
enlist support from nearby vessels. As with all major and minor incidents, 
pollution prevention is the top priority after saving human lives. 
4.1.2 Oil Spill Response  
In a recently approved National Security Policy for Iceland (2016) 20 
environmental threats, sea pollution, or accidents due to increased maritime traffic 
in the North Atlantic and the Arctic are defined as key risks for Iceland because 
of its dependence on fisheries. The Environment Agency of Iceland is in charge 
of pollution prevention on land and sea and coordinates action against marine 
pollution. Pollution surveillance is mainly undertaken by monitoring satellite 
radar images from the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). EMSA’s data 
sharing between Iceland and Greenland (Denmark) needs to be complemented by 
the capability to explore the area in the case of pollution incidents. This further 
highlights the importance of collaboration between Iceland and Denmark on 
maintaining the presence of TF-SIF in the area, as it is the single pollution 
surveillance airplane available anywhere from Canada to Norway. Similarly, 
ICG’s Þór is the only patrol vessel in the region that has the oil recovery 
equipment needed to maintain control of the situation until further assistance 
arrives from other countries on the basis of the Copenhagen Agreement 
(Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden concerning 
Cooperation in Taking Measures against Pollution of the Sea by Oil or other 
Harmful Substances) or through the Arctic Council Agreement on Cooperation 
on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. Still, in the 
event of a pollution accident within Iceland’s EEZ, it could take up to 46 hours 
for Þór to reach the scene and much longer for assistance from other countries.  
Reaction to potential pollution incidents, therefore, relies on the day-to-day 
location of Þór and of TF-SIF. The delay in removal of vessels that are stranded 
or without power can pose a further threat to the environment. In case of an 
incident involving large vessels, such as cruise vessels, assistance from other 
countries would be essential. It could take many days for vessels with sufficient 
towing capacity to arrive from Norway or from continental Europe. It is also 
worth noting that to this day most major pollution incidents have taken place at 
warmer sea areas, and there is much less experience and equipment tailored to the 
circumstances in the Arctic where lower sea temperature can change the course 
                                                          
20 “Parliamentary Resolution on a National Security Policy for Iceland” (Reykjavik: Althingi, 145th legislative 
session, parliamentary document 1166, case no. 327, 2016). 
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of oil pollution.21 Further scientific collaboration is, therefore, needed to ensure 
the most effective response to oil pollution in the colder Arctic sea areas.  
The increased activities of private, marine salvage companies has added to the 
complexities of responding to, and preventing and pre-empting, sea pollution. In 
the past, conflicts have arisen between Icelandic authorities and salvagers 
contracted by insurance companies or ship owners regarding operational 
management on scene and on the salvage award.22 This is a particularly sensitive 
issue in Iceland, with its small government administration, where huge financial 
interests are at stake.   
4.1.3 Violent Action Response 
The Act on Maritime Security, which came into force in 2004 with amendments 
in 2007, provides the legal framework for Iceland’s anti-terrorist preparedness.23 
The Minister of the Interior is responsible for Maritime Security, with the National 
Commissioner of the Icelandic Police being in charge of anti-terrorist measures 
at sea in cooperation with the Icelandic Coast Guard. The National Police 
Commissioner benefits from international cooperation and information exchange 
in the field and has Special Forces under its command who have received anti-
terrorist training in maritime situations. The purpose of the Act on Maritime 
Security was to ensure that ship, crew passenger, cargo and port facility security 
are not compromised by terrorist acts. It calls for regular assessments of risk and 
security incidents and operational plans to counter such scenarios. Together with 
the National Police and Coast Guard, the Maritime Traffic Service, which is 
within the ICG’s operation center, and port authorities are covered by the Act. 
Shipping companies, flying the Icelandic flag, are also subject to the Act and are 
responsible for fulfilling mandatory security measures. The Coast Guard is 
responsible for compliance with the Act in Icelandic waters in accordance with 
the provisions of international conventions.  
The 2009 government report on Risk Assessment for Iceland notes that terrorist 
and criminal organizations might target oil-, gas-, and passenger transportation in 
the Arctic.24 So far, however, such plans or activities have not been detected in 
or around Iceland. In general, the threat of a terrorist attack in Iceland at sea is 
considered low. Yet, according a 2015 Terrorist Risk Assessment report issued 
by the National Police, the general terrorist threat has, in line with the findings of 
similar assessments undertaken by other European governments, been upgraded 
to a medium level to take into account recent terrorist attacks in Europe and the 
                                                          
21 “Search and Rescue in the Northern Seas”  (2016), 23–25 
22 Valur Ingimundarson and Halla Gunnarsdóttir, “Risk Patterns and Types of Unwanted Incidents,”  (2015). 
22 Interviews with officials from Icelandic preparedness institutions, 27–29 July 2016.  
23 See Act of Maritime Security 2004 with 2007 amendments 
(http://www.lhg.is/media/vaktstod_siglinga/Act_on_Maritime_Security_no_50_2004.pdf)).  
24 Risk Assessment for Iceland: Global, Societal and Military Factors (Reykjavik: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
2009), https://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/Skyrslur/Skyrsla_um_ahattumat_fyrir_Island_a.pdf.  
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transnational nature of such violent acts25. This means that a terrorist attack on 
land cannot be ruled out in Iceland, even if no concrete information on such plans 
exist. This assessment, as well as the preparedness capacity, is under constant 
review with a view to national, regional, and international developments. As for 
counter-terrorist activities in Icelandic waters, periodic Air Policing by NATO 
countries in Iceland could also serve such purposes in exceptional circumstances, 
although its central focus is on the patrol of Iceland’s airspace. Another future 
possibility is that the U.S. military would be enlisted in anti-terrorist operational 
activities at sea, that is, if the United States increases its military presence in 
Keflavik in response to increased military activities in the region.26  
4.2 CHALLENGES REGARDING ARCTIC MARITIME EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS CAPACITIES 
Iceland participates actively in international cooperation on maritime safety in the 
Arctic, for example, within the Arctic Council and IMO. All relevant institutions 
are in contact with their sister organizations in the neighbouring countries. The 
ICG is active on SAR matters within the Arctic Council and is a part of the Arctic 
Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR), the Nordic Coast Guard Cooperation 
(NCGC), and the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum. These platforms are 
considered important for information and intelligence exchange on law 
enforcement; marine security; pollution prevention; Search and Rescue, and 
fisheries surveillance. The Icelandic Coast Guard has put much recently on its 
participation in the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, which offers potential for 
increased cooperation between all the Arctic states. 
Following the departure of U.S. troops from Iceland in 2006, Iceland negotiated 
bilateral, non-binding, “soft security” cooperation arrangements with three Arctic 
states, Norway, Denmark, and Canada, together with Britain (which has an 
Observer status in the Arctic Council). Iceland is also a member of the 1989 
NORDRED-agreement, which seeks to strengthen cross-border cooperation 
between the Nordic countries on emergency response. While the Icelandic 
government has been in favour of a non-permanent NATO surveillance role in the 
Arctic, it opposes the remilitarization of the region. 
On the operational level, the ICG and other institutions, depending on 
circumstances, participate in a number of international SAR exercises, such as the 
Arctic Council’s SAREX, NATO’s Northern Viking and DYNAMIC MERCY. 
The participating countries could extend their collaboration on “lessons learned” 
                                                          
25 See National Police, “An Assessment Report: The Risk of Terrorist Attacks and Other Acts of Mass Destruction,” 
(Reykjavik: National Policy, 2015), http://almannavarnir.gre.is/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Mat-
r%C3%ADkisl%C3%B6greglustj%C3%B3ra-%C3%A1-h%C3%A6ttu-af-hry%C3%B0juverkum-og-
%C3%B6%C3%B0rum-st%C3%B3rfelldum-%C3%A1r%C3%A1sum.pdf. 
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from such exercises, which play an important role in increasing domain awareness 
in the region. 
The ICG cooperates extensively with the Danish Navy through the Danish Joint 
Arctic Command (JACO) on maritime safety and surveillance around Iceland, 
Greenland, and the Faroe Islands. This cooperation, which has increased in the 
last few years, is formalized in a 1996 bilateral agreement (Standing Operational 
Procedures for Co-operation between the Icelandic Coast Guard and Danish 
Forces). All signs point toward increased Icelandic-Danish maritime security 
cooperation in the next few years and that it will lead to a permanent presence of 
TF-SIF in the area. Any such regional collaboration is likely to benefit both the 
Icelandic preparedness system and maritime security in the area. The Danish 
Navy already provides the Icelandic Coast Guard with up-to-date visual 
information of ship movements within Greenland’s EEZ. 
The ICG has also concluded a bilateral agreement with the Norwegian Coast 
Guard and with the Norwegian Costal Administration to facilitate information 
exchange. While this cooperation has proved useful, it is not as extensive as that 
with Denmark. Also, the existence of the IMO’s Long Range Identification and 
Tracking system has made this information exchange less relevant since the ICG 
has access to all maritime traffic within a 300 nm radius around Iceland. 
Iceland is usually not in direct contact with Russia on maritime security, with 
Norway serving as an intermediary between the two countries when needed. It is, 
however, possible to expand this cooperation, for example, through shared patrols 
of Russian fishing vessels near the Icelandic EEZ and through information 
exchange about the movements of fishing and container ships from Murmansk, 
which would, then, be an addition to the information exchange on maritime traffic 
taking place between the European Union, Russia, Iceland, Norway and Denmark 
(together with Greenland and the Faroe Islands) within the North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). 
The civil maritime cooperation with the United States is formalized in a 
Memorandum of Understanding (2008) between the Icelandic Coast Guard and 
the U.S. Coast Guard. In addition, the Icelandic Coast Guard provides U.S. 
military forces with logistics support when stationed in Iceland as part of military 
surveillance activities. While the 1951 U.S.-Icelandic Defence agreement was 
meant to legalize the permanent presence of U.S. military forces in Iceland, it has 
been readjusted to fit current realities after the departure of U.S. forces from 
Iceland. Increased U.S. temporary presence in Iceland could serve maritime 
security and SAR purposes, even if this remains only a possibility at this stage. 
During the Cold War and in the post-Cold War period, the United States assisted 
in numerous maritime rescue operations in Iceland’s SRR. 
Information exchange and cooperation on maritime security are also outlined in a 
MoU between the Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Canadian 
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Minister of National Defence. ICG has maintained good relations with relevant 
actors in both North American countries (such as the Rescue Coordination Centers 
in Boston and Halifax).   
The Copenhagen Agreement is the corner stone of pollution prevention in the 
area. The geographical location of Iceland, however, has the disadvantage of 
creating a long response time for international assistance. The Nordic countries 
could increase administrative collaboration to respond to the challenges of the 
increasingly international nature of the shipping industry as well as of the growing 
activities of salvage companies. To be sure, many salvage companies are fully 
capable of undertaking difficult operations at sea. But there is no guarantee that 
all of them are fit for purpose. In addition, disputes have arisen over responsibility 
for pollution prevention and the salvage award. Given the huge importance of the 
ocean to livelihood and the economy in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions, a 
strong argument can be made for providing government authorities with increased 
legal means to take control on scene and to receive monetary reimbursement for 
involvement in any operations related to pollution prevention and oil recovery. 
The prospects of increased maritime access and the opening of new sea routes – 
resulting from climate change – have fuelled discussions on Iceland’s future 
territorial role in the Arctic. A Steering Group under the auspices of the Icelandic 
Ministry of the Interior, and with the involvement of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, is currently evaluating the feasibility of establishing an International 
Rescue and Response Center in Iceland. The aim is to increase support capability 
in rescue and response operations in the Arctic region and to offer facilities and 
opportunities for joint SAR training. The idea is for the hub to be located in 
Keflavik with the aim of utilizing the territory and facilities of the former US 
Naval Air Station. The outcome of the project will not only be contingent on 
Icelandic resource commitments but also on the interest of other stakeholding 
countries in supporting it. So far other countries have waited for concrete 
Icelandic proposals before deciding on participation in the project. Several 
questions remain unanswered about the purpose and functional role of the 
proposed International Rescue and Response Center. There is, for example, 
unclarity about under whose ministerial and institutional control it should be 
placed and about whether participants should be limited to Iceland’s closest 
security partners or include others. 
As a first step, the Steering Group has suggested that an Icelandic Rescue and 
Response Cluster be formed in cooperation with foreign partners. Its purpose 
would be to prepare the groundwork for the International Rescue and Response 
Center; to bolster international research on search rescue environmental security, 
Search and Rescue together with supporting foreign research activities in Iceland; 
and to strengthen sea-based preventive and preparedness mechanisms, maritime 
surveillance activities, and transnational collaboration in these fields. Since an 
extensive preparatory work is still needed, it is unlikely that a political decision 
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on the establishment of an International Rescue and Response Center will be made 
any time soon. 
4.3 OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS FROM CROSS-BORDER 
COOPERATION 
While the Icelandic Coast Guard has proven to be reasonably well equipped to 
respond to Search and Rescue incidents in the sea around Iceland, the level of 
difficulties would increase substantially if they took place further from land and/or 
involved more people. North of Iceland long distances and bad weather conditions 
could hamper rescue operations. In the event of a severe incident within the 
Icelandic SRR, the Icelandic preparedness system would be dependent on regional 
and international assistance both for Search and Rescue and for pollution 
prevention. Bilateral and multilateral agreements, along with operational 
exercises, are, therefore, essential for the maritime preparedness system in the 
area. There is also room for more administrative collaboration between countries 
in the area in the event of pollution prevention and oil recovery operations. Such 
collaboration also reduces the costs of operations that are derived from the 
increasingly international nature of the shipping industry and of insurance and 
salvage companies. 
The idea to establish an International Rescue and Response Center in Iceland 
could raise Iceland’s profile in regional maritime preparedness. Yet, while being 
under active government consideration, it is still too early to predict whether it 
will materialize.   
On the operational level, Iceland cooperates most extensively with the Danish 
Navy Joint Arctic Command. Negotiations on further collaboration to maintain 
TF-SIF, the ICG’s rescue and surveillance aircraft, in the North would 
significantly improve the rescue and pollution prevention capability in the area.  
There are also close security relations between Iceland and Norway and the 
United States as well as with other countries, such as Britain and Canada, even if 
they are not as extensive. The cooperation with Russia could be expanded, even 
if the current framework, which is based on Norway’s intermediary role, works 
well. Finally, apart from multilateral forums such as the Arctic Council and the 
IMO, the Icelandic Coast Guard has recently put emphasis on its participation in 
the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum as a multilateral cooperation venue for 
SAR-related questions. 
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5 GREENLAND’S PREPAREDNESS CAPACITIES, GAPS AND 
NEED FOR COOPERATION BY UFFE JAKOBSEN 
Introduction 
This chapter covers Greenland’s maritime preparedness capacities, capacity gaps 
and potential benefits of cross-border cooperation with neighbouring states and 
Arctic or regional institutions to enhance maritime safety and security. It analyses 
and assesses Greenland’s preparedness and response capacities in relation to 
Search and Rescue (SAR), Oil Spill Response (OSR) and Violent Action 
Response. The chapter builds on chapters on Greenland in earlier MARPART 
reports on maritime activities, risks and preparedness (Jakobsen & í Dali, 2016), 
(Jakobsen & Kern, 2016), (Poppel, 2018), (Jakobsen, 2018) and additional 
sources. To understand the implications of risks for emergency prevention, 
preparedness and response (EPPR) capacities a few facts on the politics, 
geography, climate and infrastructure of Greenland are important. 
In terms of international law, Greenland is not an independent state but a 
constituent part of Denmark. Greenland has, however, obtained autonomy or self-
government in most domestic policy areas but, constitutionally, as it were, not in 
e.g. foreign, defence and security policy areas (Ackrén & Jakobsen, 2015). 
Therefore, maritime preparedness capacities in Greenland are both Danish, 
Greenlandic and a mix of Danish and Greenlandic. Within domestic policy areas, 
Greenland has its own government (Naalakkersuisut) and parliament 
(Inatsisartut), and the relations between Greenland and Denmark are basically 
regulated through the 2009 Self-Government Act (The Prime Minister’s Office; 
Nalakkersuisut). The Self-Government of Greenland, like the Home Rule of the 
Faroe Islands, is quite comprehensive in domestic policy areas, while central 
policy areas remain the prerogative of the Danish government (Kleist, 2010). 
Terminologically, Greenland together with the Faroe Islands and continental 
Denmark form the “Danish Commonwealth” or the “Community of the Realm” 
or the “Kingdom of Denmark” (Government of Denmark, Government of the 
Faroe Islands, & Government of Greenland, 2011: 10).  
Greenland’s territory is huge - more than two million square kilometers. The 
longest distance from south to north is 2.670 km, from west to east 1.050 km, and 
the total coastline amounts to 44.087 km. Also, the sea territory of Greenland 
within the 200 nm line is huge, covering more than two million square kilometers. 
Greenland has a typical Arctic climate with average summer temperature below 
10 degrees Celsius and average winter temperature below minus 20 degrees 
Celsius in north-western Greenland. The coastal waters of Greenland are also 
partly ice covered or marked by icebergs and pack ice making shipping difficult, 
dangerous or impossible for ships without ice class hulls or icebreaker assistance. 
This goes for the northern coast and most of the eastern coast all year round and 
for the northern part of western coast part of the year. Only parts of the south-
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western coastal areas of Greenland belong to the so-called “open water areas” that 
are ice-free all year round. So, Greenlandic waters are generally characterized by 
these special climatic circumstances or extreme weather and ice conditions. 
The infrastructure or overall transport system is different from most countries and 
largely determined by Greenland’s size, climate, settlement pattern or dispersed 
population and even its history as a colony and as a former integrated part of 
Denmark. Also, Greenland’s military strategic importance for the US during 
World War II and the Cold War has remaining impacts on the transport system. 
Due to the large distances, dispersed population, rough geography and harsh 
climate, land transport is difficult and almost excluded, so no road system or 
railways exist in Greenland between towns and settlements. Therefore, transport 
between cities and towns must be done exclusively by flight or shipping. Due to 
ice conditions, especially in the northern and eastern parts of Greenland even 
shipping is impossible and supplies have to be transported by flight three to six 
months of the year in the winter season. 
The total size of the population in Greenland is less than 56.000 and the island is 
very sparsely populated. Greenland has 17 towns with a population of more than 
17.000 in the capital of Nuuk, and less than 500 in Ittoqqortoormiit in eastern 
Greenland. There are around 60 settlements with a population of less than 8.000. 
80% of the population live in towns, 50% of the population live in the four biggest 
towns and around 6% of the population live in two towns of Ittoqqortoormiit and 
Tasiilaq and the settlements around Tasiilaq on the southern part of the eastern 
coast. The remaining north eastern part of Greenland is a national park (972.000 
square km) with no permanent inhabitants (Statistics Greenland, 2017). 
5.1 PREPAREDNESS CAPACITIES 
Even if climate change will have positive effects in terms of economic 
development for business and society in general in Greenland, the increased 
maritime activity connected to an increase in fisheries, offshore and mining 
industries and tourism, as well, will result in increased risks of accidents in 
Greenland. Increased shipping, thus, has its security implications under the 
prevailing conditions and, consequently, creates a need for extended preparedness 
capacities trans-border cooperation. 
5.1.1 Search and Rescue capacities 
Greenland’s maritime SAR responsibility region (SRR) covers an area of 3 
million square km from south of Greenland (at 58 degree north) to the North Pole 
(a distance around 3.500 km) delimited by Canada’s SRR to the West and 
Iceland’s and Norway’s SRR to the east (Forsvarsministeriet, 2016: 79). 
Compared to the size of the SSR, the Greenlandic capacities seem limited. The 
rescue capacities have, historically, been dimensioned in relation to the small 
population and in relation to fisheries as the traditional dominating offshore 
125 
activity in Greenland waters. Also, historically, the traffic of cargo ships between 
Europe and Greenland has been limited (Kudsk, u.å.). 
 
Figure 13: Greenland’s EEZ and SSR zones. (Source: Forsvarsministeriet 2016: Frontpage) 
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5.1.1.1 Divisions of SAR responsibilities 
In case of incidents in Greenland that require SAR operations, these operations 
are provided by several actors of which some are part of Danish jurisdiction and 
others are part of Greenlandic central or local self-government. 
The responsibility for maritime SAR operations is divided between the Greenland 
Police, which is a section of the Danish National Police, which is handling SAR 
operations in local coastal waters, and the Danish Defence’s Joint Rescue 
Coordination Centre (JRCC) that is handling maritime SAR operations in an area 
from the coastal line to the outer limits of Greenland’s SAR responsibility area 
(SSR) according to the SAR agreement made under the auspices of the Arctic 
Council (Arctic Council, 2013) 
 
Figure 14: The SAR Responsible Authorities in Greenland 
The SAR Responsible Authorities in Greenland have agreed on this principled 
outline of the procedures for allocation of responsibility as SAR Mission 
Coordinator (SMC): When an emergency call (“alarm”) is received by one of the 
SAR responsible authorities in Greenland (either JRCC Greenland or Greenland 
Police Command Station (“KSN”)), the other SAR responsible authority is 
contacted to determine who should be the responsible SAR Mission Coordinator 
(SMC) – a so called visitation process (“visitering”). A SAR event may change 
SMC as soon as it is realised that the other SAR responsible authority can more 
effectively coordinate the efforts. Further, it is the SMC who decides to designate 
the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) to handle the necessary on-site coordination and 
insertion of available capacities. The designated SMC must always seek to make 
decisions in cooperation with other SAR responsible authorities. If a SAR event, 
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after the designation of the SMC, develop in a way in which it is deemed necessary 
to call reinforcement from JRCC or/and the police, liaison officers 
(“forbindelsesofficer”) are exchanged between the SAR responsible authorities. 
(Source: Skibsfartens og Luftfartens Redningsråd 2016: 4.) 
Irrespecively of who has the reponsibility for the SAR operation, it is the Chief 
Constable of the Greenland Police who must coordinate all SAR operations 
according to the Greenland Parliament’s act on emergency preparedness 
(Inatsisartut, 2010: § 13).  
With few exceptions, authorities in Greenland do not have at their disposal SAR 
capacities that are acquired, equipped and utilised solely for SAR tasks. The SAR 
capacities normally have other main purposes but, additionally, they will also be 
available for SAR operations when needed (Skibsfartens og Luftfartens 
Redningsråd, 2016: Pt. II, Ch. 4) 
5.1.1.2 Greenland Police 
The Greenland Police is a section of the Danish National Police that is the police 
authority of the whole of the Danish realm including Greenland, the Faroe Islands 
and continental Denmark. The police is administratively placed within the 
responsibility area of the Danish Ministry of Justice. The main task of the police 
is, of course, to maintain order and ensure compliance with laws and regulations 
and to fight and prevent crimes in the Greenlandic society. However, the police is 
also an important actor within the emergency preparedness organisation in 
Greenland. 
Organisation and management 
The Greenland Police is headed by the Chief Constable of Greenland Police based 
in Nuuk. Administratively, the Greenland Police District has in 2012 been divided 
into four regions: 
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Figure 15: The police regions of Greenland 
The figure above shows the North, Middle and South Region of the Greenland 
Police on the Western coast, the Capital Region that now covers both the Western 
part and the former “Region East” on the Eastern coast south of the National Park 
in the northwest corner of Greenland that covers 45 % of the total Greenland 
territory and where the police is not present (www.politi.gl; Forsvarsministeriet 
2016: 78). 
This is clearly a vast area for a police authority with all in all 321 employees. 
Especially, outside the capital of Nuuk it has been a problem to provide service 
for citizens after 16 p.m. on workdays and during weekends and holidays, since 
the local offices are often only manned by one person. Now, since 2015, a 
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nationwide control centre has been established, which is responsible for receiving 
and coordinating all inquiries to the police between 16 p.m. and 08 a.m. on 
weekdays, and on Saturdays and Sundays and public holidays all day long 
(www.politi.gl).  
Internally, the Greenland Police is organized according to a three level model: a 
strategic level with leading staff members, an operative level at which the KSN 
(the Greenland Police Command Station) is situated, and a tactical level or the 
command stage. The SAR operations are directed by the KSN with or without 
backup from JAC (see the organizational chart above) and implemented at the 
tactical level. 
SAR capacities 
Among the police staff are 21 trained sailors that are engaged with the four police 
cutters that are available for SAR operations depending on the specific needs and 
whether they are not occupied with other police matters (Pedersen, 2015). 
The police cutters also have other functions for the Greenland Police. A schedule 
for the usage of the cutters are issued by the Police to inform about the 
whereabouts and the availability of the police cutters for transportation etc. 
- The police cutter Sisak is 28 m (length) x 7 m (beam) x 3 m (draft). The 
max. speed is 12 kn and the range 1400 nm / 5 days. The crew size is 6 
person. It has space for another 6 persons and for sheltering 50 people for 
a shorter time.  
- The three police cutters Sisak II, Sisak III and Sisak IV are all 24 m 
(length) x 6 m (beam) x 3 m (draft). The max. speed is 10 kn and the range 
2900 nm / 12 days. The crew size is 5 person. It has space for another 3 
persons and for sheltering 50 people for a shorter time ((Skibsfartens og 
Luftfartens Redningsråd, 2016: Pt. II, Ch. 4). 
5.1.1.3 Joint Arctic Command 
The Joint Arctic Command (JAC), since 2014 with its headquarters based in 
Nuuk, is the North Atlantic and Arctic part of the Danish Armed Forces with a 
unit in the Faroe Islands, as well. 
Organisation and management 
Like the Greenland Police, SAR operations are not the main tasks of the Joint 
Arctic Command (JAC). Its main tasks are military defence of Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands, surveillance and maintenance of sovereignty of the northern parts 
of the territory of the Danish realm. In addition to its main tasks, JAC also has 
civilian tasks as SAR, Oil Spill Response (OSR), fishing vessels inspection and 
other forms of support to the civilian society in different ways. 
JAC also hosts the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC Greenland) at its 
premises in Nuuk. JRCC in this way becomes an integrated part of the JAC. In 
130 
connection with SAR operations JRCC has all military units in Greenland at its 
disposal from the Royal Danish Navy and the Royal Danish Air Force. The 
Danish Ministry of Defence also has a contract with Air Greenland that allows 
JRCC operative access to the use of Air Greenland capacities for SAR purposes.  
So, JAC has at its disposal SAR capacity resources from the Danish government 
(JRCC personnel, Navy and Air Force units) and from Air Greenland on contract 
with the Danish Ministry of Defence. This clearly illustrates that maritime SAR 
in Greenland beyond the coastal line is the responsibility of the Danish 
Government, primarily the Danish Ministry of Defence. The operative 
management is situated at JAC including JRCC. None of the military units at 
disposal for SAR operations are either acquired or designated solely for SAR tasks 
but for their main tasks of defence, maintenance of sovereignty and surveillance 
(Skibsfartens og Luftfartens Redningsråd, 2016a: 1). 
SAR capacities 
The maritime SAR capacities of the Joint Arctic Command consist of 
ships/vessels, aircrafts and helicopters. 
Ships/Vessels 
The Royal Danish Navy has a varying number of ships of different classes located 
in the Arctic at different times of the year: 
- One or two ocean patrol ships of the Thetis class. The Thetis class ocean 
patrol ship is a large patrol ship of the size of 112 m (length) x 14 m (beam) 
x 6 m (draft). The max. speed is 20 kn and the range 9000 nm. The staff 
size can be between 51 and 91. It has also space for sheltering 200 people 
for a shorter time. It has ice-reinforced hull for navigating in icy water and 
ice-breaking capacity. All in all, the navy has four ships of this class 
(Skibsfartens og Luftfartens Redningsråd 2016: Pt. II, Ch. 4). 
- One or two offshore patrol vessels of the Knud Rasmussen class. The size 
of a Knud Rasmussen class patrol vessel is 72 m (length) x 15 m (beam) 
x 5 m (draft). The max. speed is 17 kn and the range 7000 nm. The staff 
size can be between 19 and 45. It has also space for sheltering 200 people. 
It has ice-reinforced hull for navigating in icy water and ice-breaking 
capacity. The navy has three vessels of this class of which the latest one 
has only been in service since December 2017. This new vessel, Lauge 
Koch, has replaced the last patrol cutter of the Agdlek class that was 31 m 
(length x 8 m (beam) x 4 m (draft) with a max. speed of 12 kn and a max. 
range of 3500 nm (Skibsfartens og Luftfartens Redningsråd 2016: Pt. II, 
Ch. 4). 
These ships are all equipped with electronic devices that qualify them as SAR 
vessels with capacities as On Scene Coordinators (OSC) (Skibsfartens og 
Luftfartens Redningsråd 2016: Pt. II, Ch. 4). 
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Aircrafts 
- The Air Force has on a non-permanent basis a long range transport and 
patrol flight of the type Challenger CL-604 based at the airport in 
Kangerlussuaq at the disposal of JAC for surveillance etc. Its average 
range is 5500 km. The crew number is 2-5 depending on the type of 
mission. It can carry up to 12 passengers. Max. speed is 350 kn.  
- Also on a non-permanent basis a long range transport flight of the type 
Hercules C-130J is in Greenland or used for transportation of goods or/and 
passengers between Denmark and Greenland. Its average range is 5900 
km. The crew is normally 4. It can carry up to 123 passengers. Max. speed 
is 250 kn. 
Helicopters 
Navy helicopters - The Thetis type patrol vessels is equipped with a Lynx 
helicopter with an operational range of 2 hours or 200 km. However, the Lynx 
helicopters are being phased out with Seahawk helicopters with a higher level of 
capacity (Skibsfartens og Luftfartens Redningsråd 2016: 4-1). The MH-60R 
Seahawk has a larger operational range (3 hours or 230 nm) and can lift more 
weight than the Lynx helicopter. The Danish armed forces have ordered nine 
Seahawks from the US Navy to be delivered 2016-2018 (www2.forsvaret.dk). 
 
Figure 16: Ranges of operation: Lynx helicopter and Seahawk helicopter equipped with extra tank of 
fuel and commissioned to rescue 5 persons in distress. (Source: Forrsvarsministeriet 2016: 48.) 
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Air Greenland helicopters - In addition to the aircrafts and helicopters of the Air 
Force and the Navy, the Danish Ministry of Defence also agreed on a contract 
with the Air Greenland company on deploying one 24/7 available SAR Sikorsky 
S-61 helicopter at the Kangerlussuaq airport and one SAR Bell 212 helicopter at 
the Qaqortoq heliport available from Monday to Saturday from 8 a.m. to 16 p.m. 
(Skibsfartens og Luftfartens Redningsråd 2016: Pt. II, Ch. 4). 
- The Sikorsky S-61 has an average speed of 220 km/h and a range of 4 
hours or 600 km. It has space up to 19 passengers and it is equipped with 
an external hoist (Forsvarsministeriet 2016: 91). 
- The Bell 212 has an average speed of 185 km/h and a range of 3 hours or 
600 km. It has space up to 9 passengers and it is equipped with an external 
hoist (Forsvarsministeriet 2016: 91). 
5.1.2 Oil Spill Response 
The consequences of oil spill in Greenlandic waters is expected to be extremely 
damaging for the environment including flora, fauna and human beings, 
especially, in a country where relatively many people are living from fishing and 
hunting. Therefore, the capacity for Oil Spill Response is also very important. The 
low temperatures, the seasonal darkness during winter, the ice and the restricted 
infrastructure are also reasons why the effects of oil spills are expected to last 
longer in Greenland than in countries outside the Arctic (Mosbech, 2002). 
5.1.2.1 Organisation and management 
The organisation and responsibilities of Oil Spill Response in Greenland is, as is 
the case for the SAR organisation, divided between authorities of the Danish 
community of the realm and central and local Greenlandic authorities. The 
maritime environment emergency response system is divided in two geographical 
areas, the “Greenlandic” and the “Danish” (Departementet for Natur og Miljø) or 
between the Joint Arctic Command as a part of the Danish Ministry of Defence 
and the Government of Greenland (Forsvarsministeriet 2016). The Government 
of Greenland is responsible for the internal waters till the 3 nm line. This has been 
the case since 1993. JAC is responsible for Oil Spill Response in waters between 
the 3 nm and the 200 nm line for environment surveillance and response apart 
from issues related to natural resources (Forsvarsministeriet 2016). When the 
policy area of mineral resources changed from a Danish responsibility area to a 
Greenlandic responsibility area in 2010, maritime environmental issues in 
connection with mineral resource activity became part of the responsibility of the 
Government of Greenland also between 3 nm and 200 nm from the coastal line. 
5.1.2.2 Incidents 
One example that clearly illustrates the lack of sufficient capacities and the 
difficult conditions for operating in the Arctic is an incident in the waters between 
Greenland and Iceland 350 km east of the Greenlandic town Tasiilaq. A potential 
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oil spill was observed by the Joint Arctic Command and the development was 
followed by a Challenger C-130 aircraft from the Danish Air Force that surveyed 
the area when passing by. JAC wanted to confirm that it actually was an oil spill 
and to take a sample to determine the source of the oil spill. However, the nearest 
Danish navy patrol vessel was 1.280 km away. So, the Icelandic Coast Guard was 
contacted for assistance. But the Icelandic Coast Guard did not have available 
capacity for this task. Therefore, the Danish patrol vessel was directed to the area 
to investigate the oil spill. Due to the large distance from the location of the ship 
to the location of the presumed oil spill, and due to the weather conditions with 
10 m high waves and drifting ice along the Greenlandic coast, the vessel arrived 
to the area five days after the oil spill was first observed, and at that point of time 
the potential oil spill had disappeared! This was noticed by Greenpeace, who took 
this as an occasion for criticising the Danish preparedness capacities for not being 
sufficient (Greenpeace 2015). Also, Danish National Audit Office had criticized 
the Danish Defence for not prioritizing surveillance of the Greenlandic marine 
environment, lacking assessment of the environmental risks and legislative 
enforcement in the area (Rigsrevisionen, 2013: 25). The lesson learned by the 
Danish Ministry of Defence was that satellite-based surveillance and surveillance 
flights and helicopters are needed for an efficient Oil Spill Response system 
(Forsvarsministeriet 2016: 116-118.) 
5.1.2.3 Government of Greenland and internal waters 
The Department for Nature and Environment upholds a maritime environment 
emergency preparedness based on personnel and equipment placed at the fire 
departments in the Greenlandic towns of Qeqertarsuaq, Ilulissat, Qasigiannguit, 
Aasiaat, Sisimiut, Maniitsoq, Nuuk, Paamiut, Narsaq, Qaqortoq, Nanortalik og 
Tasiilaq. This Greenlandic maritime preparedness organisation can primarily 
respond to pollutions in the harbour areas and coastal waters and - if the weather 
conditions allow - also in waters between the coastal line and the 3 nm line 
(Departementet for Natur og Miljø). 
5.1.2.4 Greenland Oil Spill Response Company 
The Greenlandic institution for preparedness and response in case of maritime oil 
spill in connection with natural resource activities is the government-owned 
company Greenland Oil Spill Response (GOSR) (Inatsisartut, 2012). GOSR is 
in control of quite a large amount of equipment for handling oil spill, e.g. different 
oil boomers for harbours, beaches and open waters, oil skimmers, temporary 
containment systems and chemical dispersants (www.gosr.gl). In 2014 GOSR’s 
response equipment was moved from the airport area in Kangerlussuaq to the 
harbour areas in the towns of Nuuk and Aasiaat in order to ensure a better 
coverage of the whole country and faster mobilisation (Greenland Oil Spill 
Response, 2015: 5). Even though the response equipment is available in Nuuk and 
in Aassiat, there is still a question on how fast the equipment can arrive at a 
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possible waste site. GOSR has since 2016 recruited and trained groups of 
volunteer Oil Spill Responders in Nuuk and Aasiaat and also organised a number 
of courses like “IMO Level II Course - Response to Oil Spills for Supervisors & 
On-Scene Commanders (OSC)”, “IMO Level III Course – Response to Oil Spill 
for Administrators & Senior Managers”, “Arctic Shoreline Clean-up Assessment 
Technique Course” and others (gosr.gl). 
 
Figure 17: Speech by Lonnie Wilms of GOSR 
Director of the government-owned company Greenland Oil Spill Response (GOSR), Lonnie Wilms 
(standing to the right) gives a presentation at a panel organised by the MARPART project at the 
Democracy Conference (Qassimiuaarneq) in Nuuk, Greenland, 30 June 2016. The rest of the panel is 
sitting at the table – from left to right: Head of Contingency for the Kommuneqarfik Sermersooq 
municipality, Knud Petersen, Chief Constable of Greenland Police, Bjørn Tegner Bay, Lieutenant 
Commander at the Joint Arctic Command, Nils Westergaard, and Professor at the University of 
Greenland, Uffe Jakobsen, responsible for organizing the MARPART panel. (Source: Sermitsiaq.AG, 1 
July 2016.) 
5.1.3 Violent Action Response 
As Greenland is a part of the Danish Kingdom and as foreign, defence and security 
policy as well as police enforcement are policy areas under Danish authority 
(Danish Parliament 2009), the territory of Greenland is included in the overall 
strategies of counterterrorism for the Danish realm. 
5.1.3.1 The Danish National Police 
In case of an emergency situation related to terrorism or other forms of violent 
action, Greenland Police would probably require assistance from the Danish 
National Police depending, of course, of the level of threat involved. But the 
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number of staff and the level of available capacity for counterterrorism in the 
Greenland Police would probably be very low. Therefore, any activity considered 
related to counterterrorism would be left to the Danish capacities in the form of 
special police units including their equipment that would have to travel from 
Denmark to Greenland, which means a comparatively long response time 
compared to independent states (more than six hours from Copenhagen airport to 
Nuuk airport as a minimum).  
Even if the assessment of the level of the threat of terror formally is the same in 
the Danish realm as a whole, it is in practical terms much lower in Greenland that 
has no history of terrorism. Even if the threat in actual terms is not as high in 
Greenland as in Denmark, due to the remoteness, dispersed population patterns 
etc. in Greenland, it is of course still important to recognise that the probability 
might be less, while consequences might be more severe, e.g. due to the longer 
response time. The annual Danish Intelligence risk assessments include 
Greenland. However, Greenland is not discussed in the report in relation to 
terrorism. Terrorism is seen as the most important external threat to Denmark and 
to the West in general. But the threat of terrorism is not considered in relation to 
the Arctic or Greenland. Quite differently, the concerns are China’s economic 
interest in maintaining a commercial involvement in Greenland that is considered 
as a risk of potential political interference in Greenland  (Danish Defence 
Intelligence Service, 2017)(Danish Defence Intelligence Service 2017: 45).  
5.1.3.2 The Greenland Police 
Incidents of violent behaviour towards persons or/and physical installations may 
increase in Greenland. One example is the environmental activism by Greenpeace 
as related to the development of oil and gas activity from 2008 and onwards. In 
2011 Greenpeace performed an action against offshore installations performing 
test drillings for oil off the western coast of Greenland. The Greenland Police 
prosecuted Greenpeace that after four years was sentenced to pay a large fine due 
to their physical occupations of the offshore installations, where one of the actions 
was assessed as producing security risks with regard to safety for humans and the 
environment (Reuters 2015). Even if Greenpeace is present in Greenlandic waters 
and does from time to time perform actions, the principle of Greenpeace is not to 
do violent actions but direct action. Therefore, the risk of human lives is estimated 
as insignificant in relations to all types of maritime vessels and activities. Since 
Greenpeace progammatically strives to protect the environment, the risk to the 
environment should also be estimated as insignificant! 
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5.2 CHALLENGES REGARDING ARCTIC MARITIME EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS CAPACITIES 
The increasing maritime activity in the Arctic necessitates more focus on security 
risks for people and the environment, and to establish the implications for the 
emergency preparedness and response systems. A major challenge both for SAR, 
Oil Spill Response and Violent Action Response is the lack of capacities for 
surveillance to strengthen the possibilities of a more adequate situation awareness. 
The gap between actual capacities and realistic needs for immediate availability 
of resources in unexpected and unwanted situations of crisis or disaster has to do 
with the harsh climate and long distances in the huge geographical area. But it 
also has to do with organisational adaptation and well established chains of 
command between different authorities and between authorities and citizens. The 
common focus mentioned by most actors is the need of more thorough practices 
of surveillance in Greenlandic waters to establish a sufficient situation awareness. 
5.2.1 Search and Rescue capacity challenges 
This was aptly put by the Commander of the Danish Joint Arctic Command (JAC) 
when he in an interview stated that the armed forces in the Arctic “have been 
blind” (Kim Jesper Jørgensen in Krog 2018). He stated that the Armed Forces 
only knew very little about what was going on at the territory of Greenland. But 
now the Joint Arctic Command is working on establishing an overall picture of 
the maritime situation in the Greenland waters by utilising satellite surveillance 
of maritime activity and environmental pollution. This endeavour is partly based 
on cooperation and information sharing between Canada, Norway, Iceland, the 
US and Denmark (Krog, 2018). 
In Greenlandic waters the authorities have been strongly dependent on captains 
fulfilling their navigational duties to manually report their destination, course and 
speed to JAC via the so-called Greenpos system when entering and navigating 
within Greenland’s EEZ. Satellite-based survelliance, therefore, would be an 
enormous advantage to be able to simultaneously know what is going on and to 
react fast and adequately in emergency situations. Especially, cruise ships are 
vulnerable due to their size, number of passengers and crew, and often also lack 
of navigational experience from Arctic waters. At the same time, they are growing 
in numbers both absolutely and relatively to the overall number of ships in 
Greenlandic waters. So, this constitutes an obvious risk and a growing task for the 
Arctic emergency preparedness systems (Brix, 2018). The worst case scenario 
would be a large cruise ship in distress in a remote and isolated area on the north 
or northeast coast of Greenland with thousands of passengers onboard. 
Hypothetically, the solution to such a risk is a costly expansion of the 
infrastructure in these remote and isolated areas. Based on a survey among experts 
on maritime emergency preparedness systems in the Arctic countries, a 
comprehensive list was established identifying the following key challenges for 
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Arctic SAR: long  distances, severe weather, ice, cold conditions, poor 
communications network, lack of infrastructure and resource presence (Ikonen, 
2017: iv). 
5.2.2 Pollution response and capacity challenges 
For future surveillance and verifications of oil spill, the resource gap could also 
be filled with volunteer citizens forming an efficient organisation in local areas 
obtaining sufficient qualification through education, training and exercises 
(Forsvarsministeriet 2016: 122). 
5.2.3 Violent Action Response and capacity challenges 
The lack of considerations on how to respond to the threat of terrorism and other 
forms of violent action in the Arctic can be explained as a consequence of lacking 
realism in raising the question, at all. However, thinking ahead of developments 
might strengthen the future level of preparedness towards an issue that maybe 
only apparently is hypothetical.  
5.3 OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS FROM CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION   
A compulsive argument for cross-border cooperation is that some emergency 
preparedness and response tasks are simply too big for a single country to manage. 
Danish authorities have characterised the case of the cruise ship Crystal Serenity 
as an example of a situation in which no country has sufficient capacity of its own 
for an effective maritime rescue of people in distress on that scale (Danish 
Emergency Management Agency 2018). In the summer of 2016, and again in the 
summer of 2017, the first cruise ship ever sailed all the way through the Northwest 
Passage from Vancouver in Canada to Ilulissat in Greenland with around 1.700 
passenger and crew onboard. From Ilulissat the cruise ship continued for several 
hundred kilometres along the west coast of Greenland to Nuuk, and from Nuuk to 
New York City. The warning by the Danish Emergency Management Agency is 
crystal clear: “no country has sufficient capacity to launch an effective sea rescue 
of people on that scale in the Arctic” ((Danish Emergency Management Agency, 
2018: 156). 
5.3.1 Large-scale incidents 
The emergency response capacity in Greenland, therefore, needs not only the 
resources and capacities to handle smaller SAR operations, but also to handle 
larger operations. Today, these will not only require Greenlandic SAR and OSR 
resources and capacities but also assistance from Denmark and probably Canada 
or/and Iceland, as well, depending on the position and the size of a tourist cruise 
vessel in distress. Large-scale incidents and mass rescue operations are low-
probability and high-consequence events that are in most cases overwhelming and 
in some cases as the Crystal Serenity even considered impossible to handle for the 
preparedness and response system of any one country (DEMA 2018). In other 
words, the very possibility of effective response to such large incidents requires 
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planning, training and realistic cross-border exercises. Joint courses prepared for 
Arctic SAR and cross-border cooperation on research to examine innovations and 
technological developments could improve practical international cooperation 
(Ikonen 2017). 
5.3.2 Multilevel Governance 
The Arctic Council initiated the “Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic” (Arctic Council 2013) that 
was adopted at the Kiruna ministerial meeting as a remedy for strengthening 
cross-border mutual assistance among the member states that are obliged to 
maintain a national preparedness and response system and respond to request for 
assistance from other member states. This still needs to be fully implemented to 
see how it can work in practice. In the case of Greenland, however, there is an 
extra governance level between national authorities in Denmark and local 
authorities in Greenland, which multiply the cooperation and coordination 
challenges. Especially in the current situation where independence sentiments in 
Greenland are growing stronger, the coordination is more complicated, and 
proposals for future capacities and institutions are under more thorough 
considerations. Still, maritime security and societal safety is important, and so is 
cross-border cooperation to continue the efforts to establish effective emergency 
prevention, preparedness and response capacities in the Arctic. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
This report has presented maritime preparedness capacities for Search and Rescue 
operations, Oil Spill Response and Violent Action Response in Arctic Norway, 
Russia, Iceland and Greenland. Arctic conditions pose challenges for both 
equipment and personnel resources. The capacities in the mainland areas and also 
for the more common small-scale incidents are sufficient and performed with high 
degree of professionalism. There is, however, a general lack of preparedness 
resource capacities for the larger incidents. These “black swans” – incidents with 
potential high impact, which are difficult to foresee – represent a challenge 
especially the more remote from the populated areas they appear. 
The Arctic countries have divided geographic responsibility areas between them. 
However, they have not declared clear quantitative objectives as to response 
capacities and response time in the different regions of the Arctic. This is in stark 
contrast to the demands towards private actors such as the oil and gas companies, 
where defined risk areas have to be clearified and response time and capacity 
tested. There is also a lack of systematic analyses as to the risk potential due to 
change in activity patterns in and between the Arctic countries. The countries 
could also have more systematic focus on the learning potential from real 
incidents and exercises with critical analysis of performance. Data for such 
systematic and independent evaluation is often not available and partly classified 
within the emergency response agencies. 
It is critical to explore the risk patterns and capacity levels for every sea region in 
the Arctic in order to ensure the proper level of response. It is important to 
understand the opportunities and the potential for cooperation with other agencies, 
communities, commercial units and cross-border resources. So far, this potential 
is to a large degree unexploited.  
In uncommon multiple-cause incidents demanding long-term efforts, increased 
emergency resource capacity beyond regional and national resources is in 
demand. Cross-border cooperation may be a critical aspect for all types of 
unwanted incidents. This includes SAR operations, Oil Spill Response and 
Violent Action Response. In this report, the main institutions that coordinate 
preparedness capacities are described together with an overview of the available 
resources. Discussion and critical reflections are presented on challenges, 
opportunities and benefits from cross-border cooperation. 
6.1 SEARCH AND RESCUE CAPACITIES 
Country details. SAR capabilities in Greenland, Iceland, Norway and Russia are 
established to provide emergency preparedness according to a wide range of 
international, bilateral and national SAR agreements. In terms of cooperation 
capabilities, the bilateral agreements and interorganizational organizations have 
provided a platform for increased cooperation. 
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Taking this into consideration, capabilities for cooperation and coordination are 
on a very good development path. The state- and municipality-owned resources 
provide the most substantial and wide-reaching coordination capabilities. The 
JRCC -Northern Norway has a central position when it comes to Norway’s efforts 
for international SAR cooperation in the Northern regions, and now open up for 
more systematic research and innovation efforts. However, there is a concern with 
respect to personnel availability. A report of 2016 by JRCC NN sees a certain risk 
for their capacities to be overwhelmed in large incidents, hence there is a demand 
for more capacity. Analytical capacity is also needed to follow up incidents, 
training and exercise efforts. This is true for most of the emergency response 
agencies.  
The need for systematic knowledge development has increased. The physical 
availability of resources is low and mobilization times are long in remote regions 
such as the northern and eastern part of the Barents Sea and the Svalbard region. 
Commercial operators, in particular passenger- and transport vessel companies as 
well as the oil- and gas industry, have had to follow regulations and set up 
independent emergency response services. This includes first line and second line 
capabilities, which will cooperate and assist during any SAR operation if 
necessary. Especially the stationary oil- and gas fields usually have rescue 
helicopters, stand by vessels close to the field, and supply vessels serving as 
additional SAR capacity.  
In Russia, a large number of different actors are involved in emergency response. 
Information on SAR capacities including the current situation, availability, 
locations, capabilities and resources and degree of preparedness, is forwarded to 
SAR relevant institutions at least once a week.  
The military is another resource that provides substantial SAR capacity in the 
form of tow- and rescue vessels and airborne facilities. The Northern fleet in the 
Murmansk region can provide SAR capacities. In addition, Rosatom fleet consists 
of 6 icebreaker vessels which may act as “floating” SAR and OSR units. Yet, 
incidents have shown that in some regions local capacity are most often 
performing the heavy load of the Search and Rescue operation. Taking into 
account challenges such as a future increase of traffic and ship ageing and 
decommissioning, further construction and development of up-to-date rescue 
capacity is required. Priority should be given to construction of rescue tugboats, 
supply vessels, and multimission rescue vessels with unlimited navigation area. 
In addition, further focus should go to providing more airborne capacity to 
EMERCOM. Also, there is a need for SAR-coordinators to receive more 
information on the Air Northern Fleet, which is a unit under the Navy. However, 
SAR is not their primary function. 
In Iceland, SAR operational capability focuses mainly on response to vessel 
incidents within Iceland’s Exclusive Economic Zone. This involves mostly 
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fishing vessels and cargo ships. Larger incidents would pose great challenges to 
the SAR system and require international collaboration, particularly in the case of 
cruise vessels. Multilateral collaboration with authorities from Danmark, Faroe 
Islands, Norway etc., are essential to successful SAR operations in Iceland. All 
signs point toward increased Icelandic-Danish maritime security cooperation in 
the next few years. In addition, Iceland considers establishing an international 
Rescue and Response Center in Keflavik. 
The preparedness system is mainly based on the Icelandic Coast Guard’s three 
patrol vessels and two helicopters on continual standby. An ICG surveillance 
aircraft frequently participates in financed missions abroad for up to six months a 
year. 
In Greenland, one of the main challenges is the vast area of the SAR responsibility 
region (SRR) which covers an area of 3 million square km with low satellite 
coverage, scarce resources and low population density.  
The Joint Arctic Command is working on establishing an overall picture of the 
maritime situation in Greenlandic waters by utilising satellite surveillance of 
maritime activity and environmental pollution. This endeavour is partly based on 
cooperation and information sharing between Canada, Norway, Iceland, the US 
and Denmark (Krog, 2018). The responsibility in Greenland is divided, as some 
operations are part of Danish jurisdiction and others are part of Greenland’s 
central or local government. Furthermore, both JRCC Greenland and Greenland 
Police Command Station have responsibility and the capacities to perform SAR 
mission coordination. They usually need to determine at the start of an operation 
on who has the best capability on coordinating the efforts. Also, most SAR 
capacities normally have other main purposes such as security, sovereignty or 
civilian use. This could potentially increase the mobilization time. 
Cooperation on SAR-issues. For all countries in this report, the bilateral 
agreements and interorganizational agreements have provided a foundation for 
substantial tacit knowledge and experience. The participation at the Arctic 
Council with working groups such as EPPR (hosting the SAR and MER Expert 
Group) facilitate SAR capacity development for all countries. Also, the Arctic 
Coast Guard Forum represent a platform for further cooperation on operational 
routines and competence sharing. An increased number of joint education, 
training and exercises should be considered, for example through expanding the 
Norwegian-Russian Exercise Barents. 
An aspect, which may increase capacity for potential cooperation during SAR is 
increased understanding of culture differences, shared planning and IT-systems 
as well as language (both technical language as well as possibility to understand 
foreign languages). 
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In addition, private cooperation including oil and gas, cruise industry and other 
maritime activity increases capacity and should be included in training and 
exercises. 
6.2 OIL SPILL RESPONSE CAPACITIES 
Oil Spill Response capacities are coordinated by authorities of different levels 
within the studied countries, with more resources coming from private companies. 
In Norway, the response resources are coordinated by entities at three levels – 
private, municipal and state. Each of the levels coordinate equipment and 
personnel capacities. Technologies and services are operated by a long and varied 
list of organizations. Managing oil spill preparedness response capacities is a 
complex interplay of strategic, tactical and practical considerations and actions. 
Efforts should be directed towards an assurance of effective interplay and 
coordination of resources between these organizations, as well as strengthening 
private–public partnership in oil spill preparedness. 
In Russia the authorities in charge of oil spill preparedness capacities include 
many ministries and organizations from different levels. In spite of the available 
resources, facilities and vessels at all levels, the existing system of Oil Spill 
Response cannot be regarded as adequate. More advanced techniques and 
methods to prevent and respond to emergency situations need to be implemented. 
Although, Russia is subject to the most extended maritime borders and the 
continental shelf, there is no federal law which would govern issues of maritime 
environment pollution prevention. Additional development efforts should be 
focused on the interaction of the state and the industry.  
In Iceland, a more simple coordination system is at hand through the coordination 
of the Environment Agency of Iceland. The agency is in charge of both land-based 
and maritime pollution prevention and therefore coordinates action against marine 
pollution. The Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources has overall 
responsibility with regards to pollution prevention, fire prevention and fire 
brigades. For Iceland, multilateral collaboration is highly important. It could take 
several days for vessels with sufficient towing capacity to arrive from Norway or 
from continental Europe. There is however an initiative for increased 
collaboration between Iceland and Denmark.  
In Greenland the capacity for Oil Spill Response is very limited but at the same 
time of great importance. Effects of oil spills are expected to last longer in the icy 
waters of Greenland. However, vast areas in combination with limited 
infrastructure and personnel is a challenge for operations. 
In all countries, long distances between potential capacity such as depots, 
personnel, airports and destinations for collected oil and waste, will be a major 
challenge. Collected oil must be transported out of the area if it is not dispersed 
or burned on site. There is a need to develop better methods for separation of oil, 
ice and water. Mechanical collection and absorption of oil in ice-filled waters is 
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challenging. Even at low ice coverage, booms and collecting systems have 
operational limitations. There is a need for product development including 
initiative for further winter adaptation of existing equipment and technology 
development for better detecting oil in ice.  
6.3 VIOLENT ACTION RESPONSE CAPACITIES 
The police is responsible for Violent Action Response during peace times in most 
countries. In addition, Norway and Russia have a large system of vulnerable 
maritime installations within offshore oil and gas where the coast and border 
guards together with the military special forces play a central role in the 
preparedness system.  
International cooperation is also important within security, especially when it 
comes to intelligence. Close cooperation between different institutions will give 
an opportunity to exchange experiences and knowledge, and provide the 
opportunity to proactively launch necessary specialized resources. International 
joint exercises should be considered between the police and border guard special 
forces in the region. 
6.4 BENEFITS FROM CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 
Cross-border cooperation gives opportunities to assess resources, personnel 
capabilities and share knowledge and experience. This study analyzed capacity 
challenges connected to the Arctic operational context, management and 
organization of the resources within the four countries. These challenges call for 
stronger cross-border cooperation in border zones offshore and far in the North.  
Existing cooperation across borders in the North shows that these enhanced 
relations provide mutual safeguarding of person traffic, critical installations such 
as oil platforms, and a mobilization potential for helping out also in areas of 
policing. Linking coast guards, RCCs and border police are important platforms 
for enhanced emergency prevention and preparedness cooperation in a 
challenging area and during challenging times. Collaboration also increasees trust 
and mutual understanding of each other’s capacities.  
Cooperation within and between local communities, voluntary groups and 
industrial capacities is also becoming more crucial when it comes to fast 1st line 
mobilization, increased competence, and efficient sharing of all available 
emergency response resources. An example of this we can see on Svalbard with 
the strong cooperation between the Norwegian and Russian communities. 
Management education as well as training and exercises for relevant skills are 
crucial factors. The cooperation in the Arctic will benefit from a clear 
understanding of who the leaders are and which personnel in which organization 
has particular competences to perform the different tasks. This is relevant for all 
levels of emergency response. 
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The need for advanced competences in emergency management in the Arctic seas 
calls for increased frequency and complexity level of joint exercises. Shared 
exercises – both full scale, functional and table top – improve cooperation as well 
as understanding of each other’s capacities in an actual incident.  
Furthermore, analysis capacity is needed to look into weaknesses and gaps. 
Competence platforms or hubs may facilitate this. Cross-border comparative 
studies will bring more diverse, and comparative reflections and a better 
understanding of the different organizations and how they handle critical 
incidents. Close-knit, cross-border cooperation may bridge many gaps present in 
the current emergency response system of the Arctic. 
